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ABSTRACT 
Equal Open Access and Competition Creation in the Wireline Telecommunications 
Local and Last Mile Market Segments 
Daniel L. Van Epps 
Expanded telecommunications was deemed a serious need for end users.  The “Local 
Market” and “Last Mile” market segments have largely consolidated into “natural utilities”.  
Competition and access problems occur if new providers enter the local market and desire 
competitive access and service to end users.  Local and last mile telecommunications market 
structures are believed to be significantly responsible for inhibiting achievement of a more 
perfect marketplace.  The purpose of this study was to examine potential solutions from 
laboratory network emulation results addressing the research question “Can equal open access 
and competition for all users be created in the telecommunications local and last mile segments?”  
Emulations for 63 local and last mile models were designed and grouped into 16 scenarios.  An 
observation questionnaire was designed to provide further qualitative data regarding the models.  
The experiment was constructed and attempted to be operated, but the SOHO routers 
representing telecommunications marketplace participants could not be properly configured to 
successfully network with each other to provide Traceroute data for validity and verification 
purposes.  Observation data was obtained and was classified into groups and used to create 
model “filters” regarding optimal local market competition, provider interconnectivity, and four 
types of last mile provision.  All of the models were filtered and scored.  Those with the lowest 
scores (best attributes) were considered to be the leading candidates to address the research 
question.  Further discussion involved opportunities for continued research, application of the 
findings in real telecommunication markets, and possibilities of why the emulation failed. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Background 
More government agencies tasked with economic retention and development mandates 
have identified telecommunications as a serious need for their end users (Benkler, 2009, p.21) 
and have become increasingly involved in their telecommunications markets.  Some agencies, 
quasi-public private partnerships, cooperatives, non-profit corporations, and end users 
themselves have also tried entering various telecommunication market segments and 
jurisdictions on their own hoping to provide services, lower costs, increase competition, and in 
certain cases possibly profit from provision. 
The “Local Market” telecommunications market segment is where providers establish 
their market presence, house their switching equipment, and administer their services.  The “Last 
Mile” telecommunications market segment is where providers’ networks link to their end users’ 
facilities.  The two segments have largely consolidated over time into “natural utilities” 
sanctioned by local governments as monopoly franchises per infrastructure mode to relieve 
“unnecessary” and “costly” duplication of wireline-type infrastructure provision previously 
experienced when multiple providers competed in the same market areas each with their own 
systems. 
The local and last mile market segments combined can be referred to in telephony as the 
“Local Exchange” and in data networking as a Metropolitan Area Network (“MAN”).  The 
junction of middle mile and last mile market segments involves the local providers “bridging” 
the two (or more) systems with their network equipment within a facility, and using written 
agreements to determine each of those other providers’ and end users’ access and use terms and 
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conditions.  Most MANs are inherently configured for technically efficient enterprise service 
emulating private end users’ Local Area Network (“LAN”) architectures, where the LAN 
provider totally controls their infrastructure and service provision to their own equipment, and in 
the case of businesses to their staff end users. 
Problems occur however if new providers enter the local market and desire competitive 
access and service to those MAN end users.  The incumbent provider(s) can virtually 
monopolize the MAN market by controlling the access to and use of their systems, and those 
competitors gaining access and use will likely encounter unfair competition disadvantages 
including assessed prices above the incumbents’ costs, restricted throughputs and services, etc. 
(van Schewick, 2010, p.266).  Competitive providers not agreeing to the incumbent’s terms, 
rates, etc., must additionally construct their own last mile systems to provide end users with 
service under their own administration and favorable terms, or may elect not to enter that local 
market at all.  The reduced competition affects end users with potentially higher costs and more 
limited service, while incumbent providers’ local and last mile market shares are increased to 
between 75% - 95% (Elliott & Settles, 2010). 
Another model featuring a government enterprise providing similar last mile rights of 
way, infrastructure, facilities, network equipment, and carriage service to end users within its 
jurisdiction is a “Public MAN”.  The government likewise can contract with middle mile 
providers for its end users to gain upstream network connectivity.  Such public 
telecommunications provision may again be implemented to create competition in the local and 
last mile markets (van Schewick, 2010, p.370), but Public MANs similarly structured to the 
usually private sector ISPs can also compete unfairly vs. private incumbent and other 
competitive providers, and possibly constitute a public monopoly. 
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Problem Statement 
The local and last mile telecommunications market segment structures are believed to be 
significantly responsible for inhibiting the achievement of a more perfect telecommunications 
marketplace. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to examine potential solutions from experimental network 
emulation results within a laboratory setting regarding equal open access and competition in the 
local and last mile telecommunication market segments. 
 
Research Questions 
The following research question was answered by this study. 
• Can equal open access and competition for all users be created in the telecommunications 
local and last mile segments? 
 
Assumptions 
The assumptions for this report were as follows. 
• Appropriately and accurately scaled down networks constructed and researched within 
laboratories can model, simulate, and emulate larger networks situated in the real world. 
• In reality a truly perfect telecommunications market can never be achieved.  Such markets 
can approach perfectly competitive status but remain at best imperfectly competitive. 
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Limitations 
The limitations of this study were as follows. 
• The results of the study were limited by the validity and reliability of the experiment’s 
instrument developed and used to gather and report data. 
• The experiment relied upon emulations of Internet service providers and Municipal Area 
Networks within the laboratory, as actual in-service ISPs and MANs were not feasibly 
available for testing purposes. 
• Theoretical perfectly competitive markets permit an infinite number of providers and end 
users to transact their business, and in reality evolving technology is handling ever-increasing 
numbers of market participants.  However for the purpose of this study only a limited number 
of providers and end users could be feasibly emulated and tested for the experiment. 
• The experiment and its results are not necessarily applicable to various wireless modes of 
telecommunications. 
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
This chapter of related literature reviewed the economics, politics, technologies, and 
social aspects and issues involving the distribution sector and telecommunications industry, the 
evolution and current state of the industry’s wireline technologies, and the telecommunication 
industry market. 
 
Production-Distribution-Consumption Market Overview 
This section examined the Production-Distribution-Consumption market model, 
technology uses by market participants, the politics and philosophies of trade, government 
involvement in markets, and the importance of the distribution sector in the market. 
 
Production-Distribution-Consumption Market Models 
Although the term “Market” has numerous definitions and may be sub-grouped by locale, 
demographics, and other interests and aspects, it can also be defined as a collective of producers, 
distributors, market and exchange places, and consumers serving in respective market segment 
roles of Production, Distribution, Marketplace Provision, and Consumption.  Usually the flow of 
goods and services starts with a Producer intending to provide them for consumption by a 
consumer.  Intermediary parties are necessary including Distributors utilizing mobility, 
transportation, communications, and telecommunications means to convey products and services 
among parties, and providers of actual and virtual sites for marketplaces and exchanges.  
Sometimes Producers are Consumers as the products and services are reconfigured into other 
types of products and services and are further conveyed to other Consumer=Producers until they 
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are finally consumed by end user Consumers.  Consumers to can then be Producers, as in the 
case of producing garbage that is conveyed to a trash collector consumer. 
Figure 2.11 details a similar multi-dimensional model “ … composed of many 
interdependent sectors, subsectors, and players,” with a supply chain goal of “an all-
encompassing end-to-end solution … optimized by material, information, and money, flowing 
simultaneously, in real time, and without paper.” (Battelle Memorial Institute, 2007, p.xi).  
Suppliers, wholesalers, and retailers are broken out from manufacturers, with private sector-
provided Transportation; Information and Related Technologies; and Warehousing and 
Distribution, and public sector-provided Transportation Infrastructure and Regulations and 
Tariffs, both spanning an entire Supplier-Consumer “Goods, Information and Money” spectrum. 
 
Figure 2.1. Battelle economic model. (Battelle Memorial Institute, 2007, p.xi). 
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Market Technology 
Providers and consumers can incorporate technology as a tool and/or technique to help 
create new and better products and services, solve production and use problems, devise new uses 
and applications for products and services, develop improved technologies, etc.  Distribution 
providers can incorporate mechanization to automate natural mobility and communication into 
transportation and telecommunication respectively.  Providers that did not incorporate or upgrade 
their technologies were at the potential mercy of other providers that did.  Distributors were 
increasingly more important, as other participants in the P-D-C economic model have become 
more automated and technology-reliant.  The U.S. Federal Communication Commission’s 
National Broadband Plan (U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2009) noted the 
developments and benefits of technology when utilized by market participants in their production 
and distribution of information vs. previous controls imposed by the lack of such technologies. 
The conduct of key business activities such as communication, collaboration, 
process enhancements, and transactions is made easier by use of broadband applications 
such as online conferencing, social networking, cloud-based business software, and e-
commerce.  Perhaps chief among the benefits of broadband for business is that it allows 
small businesses to achieve operational scale more quickly.  Broadband and associated 
information and communication technologies can help lower company start-up costs 
through faster business registration and improved access to customers and suppliers.  
Broadband also gives small and medium enterprises (“SMEs”) access to new markets and 
opportunities by lowering the barriers of physical scale and allowing them to compete for 
customers who previously turned exclusively to larger suppliers.  E-commerce solutions 
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eliminate geographic barriers to getting a business’s message and product out to a broad 
audience. 
However, small businesses are not fully capitalizing on these opportunities.  An 
estimated 60M Americans go online every day to find a product or service; but only 24% 
of small businesses use e-commerce applications to sell online.  The large majority of 
small businesses are missing an opportunity to level the playing field versus their larger 
rivals. 
The benefits described above are most compelling when broadband is supported 
with significant investment in information technology (“IT”) hardware, software, and 
services and material improvement in business processes.  Even technologically lagging 
firms in the small and midsize space recognize that broadband is a key part of a firm’s 
basic IT infrastructure.  Yet IDC, a research firm, indicates that roughly half of small and 
midsize firms say that they are cautious when it comes to investing in new IT.  Other 
small businesses voice skepticism about select broadband applications either because of a 
perceived lack of applicability or uncertain profitability (U.S. Federal Communications 
Commission, 2009, pp. 266-267). 
Anderson noted how consumers used technologies and the benefits of them doing so. 
We, the users, will figure out what to do with (technology), because each of us is 
different: different needs, different ideas, different knowledge, and different ways of 
interacting with the world.  The engineers brought us the technical infrastructure of the 
Internet and Web - TCP/IP and http:// - but we were the ones who figured out what to do 
with it.  Because the technology was free and open to all, we, the users, experimented 
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with it and together we populated it with our content, our ideas, and ourselves.  The 
technologists invented the pot, but we filled it (C. Anderson, 2009, p.88). 
van Schewick discussed the benefits of systems to the economy and society, depending 
upon how they were structured. 
The architecture of a system influences economic structures and behaviors 
regarding the development and evolution of the system, and affects the amount and kind 
of innovation that might occur.  In particular, architectural features influence which 
actors may develop and change a complex system, the incentives under which they act, 
and the governance structures through which their activity is organized.  Conversely, 
innovation may change existing architectures or create new ones (van Schewick, 2010, 
p.29).  Furthermore, since economic considerations shape actors’ (users’) decisions, 
system architects (providers) will tend to favor architectures that support their own 
economic interests.  At least in part, then, architectural designs hinge on the choices of 
economic actors, all of whom pursue their own interests under their particular constraints.  
Thus, the evolution of architectures is partly endogenous (van Schewick, p.32). 
The economic system in which the network is used consists of the actors who use 
and operate the network, the relationships among them, and the governance structures 
through which they interact.  By providing the context in which innovations are to be 
deployed, this economic system may constrain the evolution of certain parts of an 
architecture more than simply considering the dependencies within an architecture would 
suggest.  The economic system in which the network is used influences who controls the 
components that must be altered and what incentives these actors may have to make these 
changes (van Schewick, 2010, p.152). 
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van Schewick then discussed technology’s contributions to economies and societies. 
Technological progress is the most important engine of growth for modern 
economies.  Economists have estimated that as much as 70% of the growth in output per 
hour in the U.S. between 1950 and 1993 can be attributed to technological growth.  
Exactly how and to what degree specific technological advancements contribute to 
economic growth, however, is less clear. 
Research in economics indicates that technological inventions do not contribute 
equally to economic growth.  Instead, over extended periods of time, technical progress 
and economic growth seem to be driven by a few general-purpose technologies; some 
examples are the steam engine, the electric motor, semiconductors, and information 
technology.  General-purpose technologies offer generic functionality that can potentially 
be applied in a large number of sectors within the economy.  As the use of a general-
purpose technology spreads throughout the economy, use of the technology increases 
productivity in the sectors in which the technology is applied.  At the same time, new 
applications of the technology or adoption of the technology in additional sectors of the 
economy increase the returns to innovation in the general purpose technology, triggering 
new advances in the general-purpose technology itself.  These advances, in turn, may 
spawn the adoption of the general-purpose technology in additional sectors of the 
economy, or may lead to new or improved applications in sectors that already use the 
technology.  Thus, the adoption of general-purpose technologies exhibits increasing 
returns to scale.  The ongoing dynamic interactions among new or improved uses of the 
technology, adoption of the technology in additional sectors of the economy and 
advances in the general purpose technology can create enormous increases in economic 
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growth. 
Owing to the general nature of a general-purpose technology, and the mere 
existence of such a technology is not sufficient to have a positive effect on economic 
growth.  A general-purpose technology's effects on growth stem from its adoption in 
more and more sectors of the economy and from the resulting increases in productivity.  
Owing to the general nature of the technology, however, its potential applications and 
uses are not immediately obvious.  Instead, realizing a general-purpose technology's 
inherent promises in a specific sector of the economy requires a considerable amount of 
innovative activity in order to identify and realize potential uses.  Thus, adoption of a 
general-purpose technology in a specific area is an important innovative activity in its 
own right; for this reason, such activity is often called co-invention. 
As a result, the rate at which a general-purpose technology can affect economic 
growth depends on the rate of co-invention, not primarily on the rate of technological 
innovation in the general-purpose technology itself.  Thus, the cost of co-invention is an 
important determinant of the speed with which the social benefits of the general-purpose 
technology can be realized.  In fact, the empirically found delay with which firms' 
investments in information technology lead to increases in economic growth is usually 
explained by the high costs of co-invention - that is, by the costs of finding the best ways 
to apply the new technology in a firm's daily operations, the costs of developing the 
appropriate software, and the costs of changing organizational structures and processes in 
response to the new opportunities. 
Thus, on the one hand, general-purpose technologies have the potential to 
contribute disproportionately to economic growth - that is their promise.  On the other 
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hand, the rate at which a general-purpose technology can contribute to this growth is 
limited by the rate at which new uses of the technology can be identified and realized. 
These insights help us think about the importance of application innovation for 
economic growth.  As a general-purpose technology, the Internet has the potential to 
contribute disproportionately to economic growth.  The ability to communicate cheaply 
and cost-effectively with computers all over the world may be usefully applied in a large 
number of contexts.  The higher the number of uses, the higher the aggregated increases 
in productivity and the higher the effect of the Internet on economic growth.  The rate at 
which the Internet can contribute to economic growth, however, depends on the rate of 
co-invention - that is, the rate at which potential uses for the Internet are identified and 
applications that enable or support these uses are developed, deployed, and used.  
Measures that increase the cost of co-invention or otherwise reduce the amount of co-
invention can harm social welfare significantly.  Specifically, increasing application-level 
innovation increases economic growth; in contrast, limiting application-level innovation 
may significantly limit the Internet's ability to contribute to economic growth. 
The importance of innovation in applications goes beyond its role in fostering 
economic growth.  The Internet, as a general-purpose technology, does not create value 
through its existence alone.  It creates value by enabling users to do the things they want 
or need to do.  Applications are the tools that let users realize this value.  For example, 
the Internet's political, social, or cultural potential - its potential to improve democratic 
discourse, to facilitate political organization and action, or to provide a decentralized 
environment for social and cultural interaction in which anyone can participate - is tightly 
linked to applications that help individuals, groups, or organizations do more things or do 
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them more efficiently, and not just in economic contexts but also in social, cultural, or 
political contexts (van Schewick, 2010, pp.357-359). 
Shirky noted technology improvements were assisting end user-provided sharing, 
cooperation, and collaborative efforts. 
For the last hundred years the big organizational question has been whether any 
given task was best taken on by the state, directing the effort in a planned way, or by 
businesses competing in a market.  This debate was based on the universal and unspoken 
supposition that people couldn't simply self-assemble; the choice between markets and 
managed effort assumed that there was no third alternative.  Now there is.  Our electronic 
networks are enabling novel forms of collective action, enabling the creation of 
collaborative groups that are larger and more distributed than any other time in history.  
The scope of work that can be done by non-institutional groups is a profound challenge to 
the status quo.  The collapse of transaction costs makes it easier for people to get together 
- so much easier, in fact, that it is changing the world (Shirky, 2008, pp.47-48).  
Ridiculously easy group-forming matters because the desire to be part of a group that 
shares, cooperates, or acts in concert is a basic human instinct that has always been 
constrained by transaction costs.  Now that group-forming has gone from hard to 
ridiculously easy, we're seeing an explosion of experiments with new groups and new 
kinds of groups (Shirky, p.54). 
 
Political Philosophy of Trade 
As discussed, a market hosts participants that may potentially trade products and services.  
Ideally trading would be “perfect” – fair and free from malice, fraud, outside coercive influence, 
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and other intentional or unintended biases.  Trading can theoretically function without 
competition by its participants.  Such non-profit trading involves sharing or donations of 
products and services among producers and consumers for a potential collective public good and 
for non-material needs.  "Communitarianism", "Primitive Communism", and the similar 
“Cooperatism” movements tend to consider trade more as a basic utility.  All producers and 
consumers are "winners", and there are no "losers" or sufferers as a result of trades in those 
models.  Some religious-based societies tend to view products and services and their trade as 
being subservient to higher personal beliefs.  Shirky further elaborated upon these cooperative 
types. 
Sharing creates the fewest demands on the participants.  Many sharing platforms 
operate in a largely take-it-or-leave-it fashion, which allows for the maximum freedom of 
the individual to participate while creating the fewest complications of group life.  
Knowingly sharing your work with others is the simplest way to take advantage of the 
new social tools (referring to the digital photograph sharing website Flickr) (Shirky, 
2008, p.49).  Cooperating is harder than simply sharing, because it involves changing 
your behavior to synchronize with people who are changing their behavior to synchronize 
with you.  Unlike sharing, where the group is mainly an aggregate of participants, 
cooperating creates group identity - you know who you are cooperating with (Shirky, 
pp.49-50).  Collaborative production is a more involved form of cooperation, as it 
increases the tension between individual and group goals.  The litmus test for 
collaborative production is simple: no one person can take credit for what gets created, 
and the project could not come into being without the participation of many (Shirky, 
p.50).  Collective action is the hardest kind of group effort, as it requires a group of 
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people to commit themselves to undertaking a particular effort together, and to do so in a 
way that makes the decision of the group binding on the individual members.  A union or 
a government engages in collective action, action that is undertaken in the name of the 
members meant to change something out in the world, often in opposition to other groups 
committed to different outcomes (Shirky, p.51). 
Anderson discussed “Free” trading among end users. 
Free can mean many things, and that meaning has changed over the years.  It 
raises suspicions, it has the power to grab attention like almost nothing else.  It is almost 
never as simple as it seems, yet it is the most natural transaction of all.  If we are now 
building an economy around Free, we should start by understanding what it is and how it 
works (C. Anderson, 2009, p.17).  Even after most cultures established monetary 
economies, day-to-day transactions within close-knit social groups, from families to 
tribes, was still mostly without price.  The currencies of generosity, trust, goodwill, 
reputation, and equitable exchange still dominate the goods and services of the family, 
the neighborhood, and even within the workplace.  In general, no cash is required among 
friends.  But for transactions between strangers, where social bonds are not the primary 
scoring system, money provided a common agreed-upon metric of value, and barter gave 
way to payment.  But even then was a place for Free, in everything from patronage to 
civil services (C. Anderson, pp.36-37).  In giving something away, (Peter Kropotkin, 
1902) argued, the trade-off is not money, but satisfaction.  This satisfaction was rooted in 
community, mutual aid, and support.  The self-reinforcing qualities of that aid would, in 
turn, prompt others to give equally to you.  “Primitive societies” worked that way, he 
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argued, so such gift economies were closer to the natural state of human affairs than 
market capitalism (C. Anderson, p.40). 
In reality, trading is imperfect and politics are usually introduced into the trading process 
due to human nature.  For-profit trade creates a more materialistic valuation of products and 
services when they are traded for other products and services, representative currency, or 
financing.  Adam Smith posed when a party makes a (for-profit-type) trade they are valuing the 
desired products and services more so than what they are exchanging for them; if in a for-profit-
type trade a party does not value the product or service at a greater value than what they desire to 
trade for it, then the party has the option of not trading and is free to retain their product or 
service or solicit offers from other parties (Smith, 1776). 
“Capitalism” can be defined as private entrepreneurial producers and consumers seeking 
to trade products and services in an attempt to increase or at the least maintain their corporate or 
personal worths.  In pure Capitalism, producers must demonstrate certain returns on investments.  
Revenues are used to offset expenses, and excess revenues are available for use as profits, 
dividends, positive investment ratings (resulting in lower borrowing rates), and reinvestment 
means.  Conversely, any lack of producer revenues could increase debts, ultimately risking 
bankruptcy and potential liquidation, with further complications to raise future capital.  
Shareholders may also encounter losses, and other lawsuits, legal fines, and similar punishments 
are also possible.  In the capitalistic trading contest there are winners and losers, where winners 
may remain in the market and possibly acquire more assets, market share, and pricing power, 
while losers may find competing and remaining in the market more problematic.  Skewed 
gamesmanship may enter into for-profit Capitalistic trading, including advertising and marketing 
techniques used by a producer to coerce a consumer into purchase choices, and bartering 
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techniques employed by both producers and consumers to shift trade values in their favors.  In 
both cases where further wealth and fewer losses are desired, there may be increased risks of 
trading and/or marketplace irregularities to accomplish those goals. 
Ideally a “Perfect Market” would exist where producers, consumers, distributors, the 
market, and trade are all perfect in their functions.  In reality only “Imperfect Markets” exist, 
possibly resulting in various irregularities that affect market participants.  A “Cornered Market” 
can be defined as a market where a provider or consumer has attained significant market share 
over other competitors through unfair techniques that adversely affect other competitors.  An 
“Oligopoly” results when a small group of providers corners a market, a “Duopoly” results when 
two providers corner a market, and a “Monopoly” results when one provider dominates or 
completely captivates a market.  Conversely, an “Oligopsony” results when a small group of 
consumers corner a market, a “Duopsony” results when two consumers corner a market, and a 
“Monopsony” results when one consumer dominates or completely captivates a market.  A 
“Cartel” and “Collusion” are attempts by market participants to cooperatively and usually 
covertly corner a market.  A market where both providers and consumers are present - a basic 
necessity for markets to exist – can be defined as a “Served Market”.  A market lacking 
providers, consumers, or both can be defined as an “Unserved Market”.  In theory a market 
lacking a distributor is not necessarily an unserved market if the producer and consumer are 
situated immediately adjacent to each other, but in reality distribution is naturally part of the P-
D-C model and if the provider is absent then the market is unserved. 
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Government Involvement in Markets 
Markets under both Cooperatistic and Capitalistic model types can theoretically exist 
without government involvement and its oversight.  A government can nonetheless be a 
significant consumer for wares and may be quite welcomed by producers, distributors, and other 
consumers to participate in a market in that respect.  Market participants are typically willing to 
subsidize their government for it to provide functions they do not desire to provide on their own 
such as emergency services, sovereign defense against internal and abroad threats, promoting 
and assisting their growth and security, currency standardization, a legal system to enforce 
private property rights, binding agreements, etc. 
If markets experience problems including those previously addressed and cannot fairly or 
conveniently rectify the situations themselves, then they may invite participant litigation or 
require the government to play an arbitrating regulatory role to reduce irregularities and prevent 
potential market-wide and participant failures.  One opinion during the 2010 Wall St. financial 
crisis supported the regulatory option.  “Ultimately … litigation is a poor substitute for 
regulation.” (Sorkin, 2010).  As one mission of governments is to retain and expand their 
economies, functional markets are desired and even dysfunctional markets are tolerated, but 
market failures are distinct threats to a country's economy, society, sovereignty, and must be 
avoided at all costs to ensure its long-term success and survival. 
 
Mixed Economies 
Any government intervention in a market can be defined as a “Mixed Economy” and is 
usually undertaken to achieve certain desirable goals for the market or enforce political 
ideologies.  In one definition of a "Mixed Economy", an issue can be located as a midpoint 
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somewhere within a range of extreme economic philosophies, with multiple issues having 
varying positions on the range.  MSNBC commentator Lawrence O'Donnell said, “As any 
introductory economics course can tell you, there‘s no capitalist economy anywhere in the world 
and there is no socialist economy anywhere in the world, not even Cuba.  We are all mixed 
economies, that is, mixes of capitalism and socialism, and we all vary that mix in different ways.  
That‘s why we have a mixed economy, an economy in which we‘re trying to use the best, most 
efficient forms of capitalism, and the best, most efficient forms of socialism where necessary.” 
(Povich, 2011). 
A mixed economy can also result when a government uses a number of solutions in an 
attempt to correct market problems.  U.S. federal government agencies including the former 
Interstate Commerce Commission and its successor Surface Transportation Board, the Federal 
Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and numerous others have 
regulatory oversight regarding distribution markets.  Likewise states' public service/public utility 
commissions are responsible for certain intrastate distribution market regulations.  Some 
regulations are reserved for county, district, municipal, and other local government agencies.  
The amount and degree of regulation these government agencies have over market participants 
varies per the powers granted by their legislatures and the will of their executive branch leaders.  
Of course the executive and legislative branches are also influenced by voters, lobbyists, higher 
level executive and legislative governmental branches, and other parties with particular interests 
in market regulation.  A government agency can control markets as both a consumer and a 
producer.  For example the U.S. federal government can purchase gasoline for strategic national 
security reserves, and in a producer role release ("resell") it, with both actions most likely 
affecting the gasoline market.  Similarly the federal government can sell some of its assets (i.e., 
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mineral rights, forests) to other producers, which may affect market prices for similar assets and 
final prices to consumers. 
In theory, a government is non-profit with its revenues adequately covering expenses 
while maintaining a reserve fund.  Most of the government's revenues are obtained from taxes 
and fees, with some revenues and royalties acquired from product and service conveyances.  But 
in reality the government is usually willing to forego equilibrium by providing tax breaks, grants, 
sub-market rate loans, tariffs on international wares, and other incentives to subsidize market 
participants.  Obviously there will be resulting shortfalls in its near term revenues, but the 
government hopes the thus-stimulated economy will provide sufficient revenues to eventually 
offset its investments and cover borrowing debts. 
Ongoing mixed economy debates include what degree of government involvement is 
necessary to achieve desired market goals, what market goals are addressed with government 
involvement, what are the effects upon market participants, and what are the costs to the 
government for intervention.  von Mises argued that there is no such thing as a mixed economy.  
"The market economy or capitalism, as it is usually called, and the socialist [mixed] economy 
preclude one another.  There is no mixture of the two systems possible or thinkable; there is no 
such thing as a mixed economy, a system that would be in part capitalist and in part socialist." 
(von Mises, 1949).  Former astronaut and Eastern Airlines CEO Frank F. Borman, II once said, 
“Capitalism without bankruptcy is like Christianity without hell,” (Taylor, 1982) which in a strict 
interpretation of Capitalism is correct but competes against many governments’ mixed economy 
goals where all market segment participants are advocated as winners to benefit and expand their 
economies. 
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Other possible mixed economic models include “Statism” that can be defined as where 
government market intervention is significant.  Conversely, “Laissez-faire” can be defined as 
where government market intervention is more limited, sometimes to the extent of permitting the 
market to function by and regulate itself.  “Corporatism” can be defined as where private 
providers have greater influence over any government market intervention.  “Socialism” can be 
defined as where consumers have greater influence over government market intervention.  
However von Mises considered government provision not to be Socialism, "It is a step on the 
way toward socialism, but not in itself socialism." (von Mises, 1949).  “Autocratic”, 
“Authoritarian”, “Totalitarian”, and similar government regime types can be defined as where 
those governments usually being controlled by one party or an individual have significant if not 
complete control over their sovereign markets in the express interest of the government.  
“Anarchy” can be defined as the absence of government, which like total dictatorial control may 
be equally less desirable. 
Market segment participants may try to counter government intervention to protect their 
investments and other interests by contributing to politicians’ election campaigns, and seeking 
legislative deregulation and favorable court rulings if those options are available or permissible 
in the particular governance model. 
 
Government-Assigned Markets 
The most invasive and pronounced solutions to market problems a government could 
incorporate are when it assigns a market or market segment to one or more select participants, 
provides a market or market segment itself, or creates a hybrid public-private partnership, all of 
which can be considered a "sanctioned market".  Such assignments can be achieved through 
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techniques including urban planning, territorial sovereignty, eminent domain, market 
restructuring, nationalization, and privatization.  A “Natural Monopoly”, “Natural Utility”, or 
“Public Utility” can be defined as when a market served by a single participant is considered to 
be more efficient than having multiple participants competing against each other, or when 
provision by multiple participants in the market is thought to be technically, physically, or 
practically inefficient, unwieldy, or “redundant”.  Certain distribution system and carriage 
service providers for electricity, railroads, pipelines, telephony, and cable TV have often been 
designated natural monopolies or “Government Sanctioned Monopolies”. 
 
Government-Provided Markets 
Early in U.S. history many transportation market segments were privately provided.  
However such roadways, turnpikes, canals, interurban, and streetcar lines often succumbed to 
bankruptcy and overall market failures, leaving other market participants with more limited 
choices for distribution modes.  Even the U.S. federal government, which had nationalized many 
private roadways such as the National Road, assigned their control to state governments.  U.S. 
government agencies now generally provide distribution transportation market segments 
including highways, secondary roadways, and streets; trails; waterways on rivers and canals with 
some requiring dams and locks; seaways; and airways (airspace over sovereign territory, airports, 
and air traffic control).  A few exceptions to those examples include private drives and 
completely privatized or public-private partnerships for bridges, highways, turnpikes, ports, and 
other infrastructures and facilities.  While government agencies provide these systems, they tend 
not to engage with other transportation service providers for competitive carriage. 
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In some markets and market segments, government agencies constitute public 
monopolies.  Public transit systems with buses, commuter trains, and other variants of vehicles 
(again with a few exceptions) are generally government agency-provided, with their own system 
ownership, maintenance, control, security, monitoring, liability, and additional responsibilities.  
The government agency in those cases is the sole carriage provider/operator.  Many government 
agencies, particularly at the municipal level, provide their citizens with distribution 
transportation pipeline-based water and sewer systems and service.  Their systems (the 
distribution market segment), products (water from the government producer, sewage from 
consumers as producers) and carriage (the service) are combined into one agency. 
 
Quasi-Public/Private Markets/Market Segments 
In other instances, U.S.-based government agencies along with private providers jointly 
own and/or administer distribution systems using various hybrids of public-private partnership 
(“PPP”) models as the sole market or market segment providers, a sample of which are detailed 
in the following cases. 
 
U.S. Postal Service. 
The U.S. Postal Service was created in 1775 with the U.S. Constitution empowering 
Congress "To establish Post Offices and post Roads" as an "independent establishment of the 
executive branch of the Government of the United States".  In 1971, the Post Office Department 
was reorganized as a quasi-independent agency of the federal government - wholly owned by the 
government and controlled indirectly by the U.S. President.  USPS had a government sanctioned 
monopoly on most first class mail and standard formerly "third class” mail.  USPS said 
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monopolization provided "for an economically sound postal system that could afford to deliver 
letters between any two locations, however remote" 
(http://about.usps.com/publications/pub542/pub542_ch1_002.htm 2013), ensuring rural delivery 
service (a.k.a. “Universal Service”) immune from network rationalization and creamskimming 
risks usually found in private business models.  In effect, producers mailing letters to a consumer 
located nearby were subsidizing producers mailing letters to distant consumers’ locations, with 
the charges built into postage costs.  USPS was tax exempt, non-profit, and was “self-funded and 
does not receive any Congressional appropriations to support its operations, (although) some 
funding is provided to cover the costs of certain statutorily mandated services”. 
(http://www.usps.com/financials/anrpt08/pg43.htm 2011)  USPS competed against private parcel 
carriers, including DHL that was once owned by the Government of Germany's Deutsche Post 
until its privatization in 2000.  Although USPS was a carrier and subcontracted other modal 
carriers to assist with parcel carriage service, it was not a distribution market provider, i.e., it did 
not own its own highways. 
 
U.S. Railroad Administration/U.S. Railway Administration. 
During WW I, German submarines patrolling off the U.S.'s east coast were sinking ships 
destined and arriving from Europe.  The panic resulted in transoceanic ships refusing to depart 
and railroads' east coast port-bound trains backing up in some cases west to Pittsburgh.  Thus in 
1917 as an emergency wartime measure to address the gridlocking and other rail industry 
problems of the era, the U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission recommended the U.S. 
government create the U.S. Railroad Administration to nationalize and administer all of the 
railroads for the duration of the war.  USRA as a government agency was the sole provider of 
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both the distribution system and carriage service nationally.  The lines were re-privatized to their 
respective owners and USRA was dissolved after the war until its re-incarnation as the U.S. 
Railway Administration to address the Penn Central Transportation Co.'s bankruptcy and 
conversion into Conrail.  USRA version 2.0 was government intervention in the market that 
determined what rights of way, infrastructure, and service providers would continue to exist and 
operate in specific markets.  Had the government not taken over the railroads during WW I and 
the PCTC crisis, the nation’s security, economy, and distribution systems risked market failure 
and during WW I hostile takeover by foreign governments. 
 
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak). 
The quasi-public/private National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) was created 
by the Rail Passenger Service Act in 1971 to assume intercity passenger service spun off by 
private railroads that preferred freight carriage service.  Those railroads that under their 
traditional monopolized distribution + carriage service business models had been losing money 
for decades providing rail passenger service were then freed to concentrate solely upon freight 
carriage service in an attempt to stabilize their finances and better compete against other 
transportation modes using more advantageous business, governance, and market models.  
Amtrak, an independent for-profit corporation, with all preferred stock owned by the U.S. 
government and common stock owned by railroads and their successors, leased rail line access 
("trackage rights") from private rail carriers for some of its trains, and owned other rights of way 
and infrastructure segments elsewhere.  In addition to providing intercity and some commuter 
passenger services, it has carried mail and some intermodal freight traffic.  Amtrak constantly 
faced calls for reorganization, privatization, spinoffs of some services, discontinuance of certain 
long distance train routes, and even liquidation as it continued to have budget problems, but 
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interestingly it has increased its patronage, popular support, and received federal American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 stimulus funding to increase service provision.  In some 
markets Amtrak owns its distribution market segment and provides carriage service as a 
monopoly, while in most other cases it has government mandated access to private railroads’ 
lines.  Former Amtrak President David Gunn (having previous public transit agency experience) 
resisted calls for separating Amtrak’s own systems from its service provision, advocating instead 
that Amtrak be operated essentially as a public transit agency without competition assuming that 
other companies were not interested in rail passenger service provision.  After his departure there 
were calls by the former G.W. Bush Administration for Amtrak’s restructuring, including 
renewed investigations of the distribution-carriage separation option using a PPP model variant. 
 
Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail). 
As the result of Penn Central Transportation Co.'s and other regional rail carriers' Ch. 77 
bankruptcies, Congress re-established U.S. Railway Administration to reorganize and 
consolidate those carriers on 4-1-1976 into the U.S. government-subsidized private Consolidated 
Rail Corporation for continued freight and some passenger services in the U.S. Northeast and 
Midwest and Southern Canada regions.  Conrail as a government-assigned system provider + 
carriage service provider competed against more solvent and other government-subsidized 
private system + service providers often in the same market areas until its eventual privatization 
on 10-21-1986.  The government reportedly subsidized Conrail with $7B in 1983 dollars 
(Sumcad, 2007). 
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Conrail Shared Assets. 
On 6-1-1999 Conrail was jointly acquired by competitors CSX and Norfolk Southern, 
which then split up most of its distribution and carriage assets amongst themselves.  However in 
certain market areas, fairly equal splits could not be accomplished without giving one company 
an advantage over the other.  To solve the problem and gain buyout approval from the U.S. 
Surface Transportation Board, the companies created Conrail Shared Assets to control the 
Detroit, South Jersey/Philadelphia, and North Jersey areas consisting of 1,202 miles of Conrail’s 
former network (http://www.conrail.com/freight.htm 2010).  CSA conducts local carriage and 
train car switching for consumers in those markets, who then have a choice of using CSX’s or 
Norfolk Southern’s networks for carriage service beyond the CSA local market areas. 
 
Ohio Rail Development Commission. 
The Ohio Rail Development Commission was an independent state agency created under 
the Ohio Department of Transportation, and controlled by ODOT and the Ohio Department of 
Development with oversight by the Governor’s Office and the State Legislature.  ORDC was 
authorized by to acquire and operate rail lines, generally those that were unwanted by private 
railroad companies and/or were in danger of being abandoned or liquidated.  ORDC could also 
construct new and restore abandoned rail lines.  Its preferred business and governance model as 
proclaimed by former Executive Director James Seney was to “rescue, rehabilitate, and 
reprivatize” rail lines back to private railroad companies, and forgo “running a railroad” 
(personal communication, 7-2003) itself. 
ORDC had public-private partnerships with two railroad companies for the operation of 
two rail lines it owned and/or controlled.  In one case, ORDC purchased an unwanted line from 
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Conrail between Minerva, OH-Hopedale, OH, and has long term net leased it to the Ohi-Rail 
Corp.  The private railroad was responsible for its operation, maintenance, improvement, 
liability, taxes, etc., including lease payments.  In a larger second case, Conrail sold a main line 
from near Mingo Jct., OH to Columbus to an investment firm that had no interest in operating it.  
Instead it net leased-to-own the line to ORDC, which likewise was not interested in operating it.  
ORDC franchised the small Columbus & Ohio River Railroad Company to net operate it, and 
later after the lease period concluded, took possession of the line and long term (and no-bid) net 
leased it to the railroad.  However ORDC continued to subsidize the railroad even though it was 
merged into the $B+-valued Genesee & Wyoming Railroad Company’s worldwide conglomerate 
of similar small railroads.  ORDC also authorized C&OR to sublet the line’s right of way 
adjacent to the tracks to telecommunications providers, and the railroad received those lease 
payments instead of ORDC or the State of Ohio. 
 
Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority. 
To expedite rail service between the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long Beach, the 
Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority was created in 2002 to acquire, construct, and 
administer a 20-mile rail line and other transportation facilities that were provided equally to the 
Union Pacific Railroad Co. and BNSF Railroad Co.  The project acquired the existing rail line 
between the ports, removed it, and constructed a concrete-lined trench with new tracks below the 
above street level to replace hundreds of grade crossings with overpasses spanning the trenches.  
This separation eliminated noisy train horns blowing and accident-prone grade crossings while 
permitting faster train speeds and greater throughput.  Use and operating agreements addressed 
responsibilities among the ACTA and its users including operation, maintenance, taxes, liability, 
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security, debris removal, monitoring, etc.  Line maintenance expenses were pro-rated based on 
each railroad’s gross tons-mile.  ACTA contracted out for maintenance, and the railroads were 
responsible for the segment’s dispatching and security.  Project revenues including use fees and 
container charges offset construction debt and administration expenses.  ACTA was assessing 
the railroads $15.79 per 20’ loaded container, $4.21 per empty container, and $8.42 per other rail 
cars (Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority, 2005, p.22).  Theoretically other railroads and 
qualified users had access to and use of the line segment, whereupon all use fees and container 
charges might have been re-assessed proportionately based upon the new traffic. 
 
Akron Metro Regional Transit Authority. 
After the Erie Lackawanna Railroad Co., Conrail, Penn Central Corp., et al. abandoned 
certain rail line segments in the Summit County, OH area, the Akron Metro Regional Transit 
Authority purchased some of those segments to railbank and rehabilitate them for future uses.  In 
2000 CSX Transportation sold Metro the 24.42 mile Akron-Canton segment of its former 
subsidiary Valley Railway Co.’s Cleveland-Zoarville/Valley Jct. main line.  Many government 
agencies in Ohio also owned rail lines though typically net leased them or net franchised line 
administration and carriage service to private railroads.  Metro likewise chose not to engage in 
freight carriage service and franchised the Wheeling & Lake Erie Railway Co. to provide the 
service to local users.  However Metro open accessed the Akron-Canton line segment for the 
non-profit Cuyahoga Valley Scenic Railroad to provide passenger rail services on weekends 
(U.S. Surface Transportation Board, 2003), and reserved for itself providing future rail commuter 
service.  A “Track Coordination Agreement” designated dispatching of trains by Metro, W&LE, 
and CVSR, a formula and percentage determined the charge base revenue per car rates and 
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maintenance fee paid by the railroads, and other agreements dictated line maintenance, liability 
responsibilities, etc. 
 
Consolidated Facilities Corporation (ConFac). 
USRA during its mission to reform PCTC and other affected railroad companies did 
analyze creating both Conrail and a “Consolidated Facilities Corporation”.  Under one scenario 
ConFac was to own and operate the affected railroads’ rights of way, infrastructures, and certain 
facilities while leaving Conrail to provide only carriage service.  In theory the option could have 
permitted open access on ConFac’s system to all railroads.  In both cases, system users would 
have paid access and use charges to help defray the PCTC reformation and other government 
costs involved over time (U.S. Railway Association, 1975, p.49).  However railroad companies 
with their own systems in PCTC’s service area opposed the model presumably because the 
ConFac model might have been more efficient than their own private monopolized distribution + 
carriage service models.  Some opponents also argued that ConFac might have encouraged 
efforts by other solvent railroad companies to likewise “nationalize” their systems (if ConFac 
was to be a government agency or quasi-government agency) (U.S. Railway Association, 1975, 
p.50).  The private railroads were paying property taxes and were subject to U.S. ICC market 
regulations that ConFac and its users might have been exempt from due to its open access model, 
yet those railroads could also have accessed ConFac’s system to equally compete for service and 
lineside customers without being subject to those taxes, regulations, and other responsibilities 
and costs incurred from owning their own systems too.  The ConFac option was ultimately 
dropped in favor of a traditional distribution system + carriage service model for Conrail similar 
to the other railroad companies’ models, although Conrail required significant subsidization to 
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return it to profitability.  Conrail later rationalized and abandoned unwanted line segments that 
might have been preserved under ConFac so that more intercity routes could have been available 
for routing choices and network redundancy, and local communities could have retained their 
network rail access to serve their freight and passenger customers.  ConFac critics incorrectly 
portrayed the separation of the distribution system from carriage service model as 
“nationalization”, where true nationalization involves government ownership and operation of in 
this case a railroad. 
 
Ohio Turnpike Commission Adjacent Rights of Way. 
In addition to providing its tolled highway, the Ohio Turnpike Commission obtained 
additional revenues from leasing its right of way adjacent to the highway infrastructure to 
various telecommunication system providers.  Qwest, MCI, AT&T, and IXC were some of the 
known providers that had marked fiber lines located adjacent to the highway lane, and system 
construction company Gudenkauf Corp. of Columbus, OH workers once said they had installed 
conduits and fiber for Marconi and other providers embedded within concrete median barriers 
that had since been abandoned.  OTC easement fees assessed to MCI as of 7-1-1988 were $1925 
per mile annually (Ohio Turnpike Commission, 1988), although its annual rates c.2009 had 
increased to $3K-$4K (J. Disantis, personal communication, July 15, 2009). 
 
Government-Sponsored End User Aggregation. 
Some local and state government agency programs “aggregate" or pool private utilities' 
consumers together amicably with agreements and then purchase those services on their behalf in 
virtual bulk quantities from select utility providers at prices hopefully closer to wholesale than 
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regular retail prices.  Aggregation supposedly reduces subscriber costs associated with multiple 
individual accounts, and is in effect a quasi public-private partnership where the government 
agency performs some of the private provider’s services for them (Ohio Consumers' Counsel, 
2009).  The concept could theoretically be used by government agencies to acquire wholesale 
speed telecommunication services for local market end users, and has been advocated by 
consultants as a solution to assist rolling out faster speeds to rural areas. 
While aggregation is a method of trying to create market competition and might eliminate 
the monopolies utility providers may have over local service markets, it does so by increasingly 
concentrating a competitive consumer market into a concentrated, perhaps monopsonistic end 
user market.  Should multiple government agencies collaborate in the aggregation program with 
their respective end users, the end user market becomes more concentrated for the utility service 
provider to contend with.  To be more fair, the government agency aggregator should authorize 
its end users to pool together in groups and contract with the service provider of their choices 
from multiple providers instead of the aggregator selecting only one provider for the end users. 
Proponents say aggregation programs save the selected provider on costs such as end user 
billing.  Yet in one model the billing function was merely transferred to the government agency 
and consolidated with their other enterprise service billings.  The provider in effect was being 
subsidized by the government agency or being cross-subsidized by the government agency’s 
other services.  The government agency might also pass along the aggregation program’s costs to 
end users not enrolled in the program who are subscribed to another competitive service 
provider, or to end users not using the particular service at all from any provider in the form of 
various taxes, unless the aggregation program’s costs are required to remain captive to the 
enterprise. 
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The contracts between the government agency aggregator and the provider are typically 
for multiple years in exchange for locked-in rates vs. paying the current going market service 
prices.  Each party believes the locked-in price will benefit their interests depending upon 
commodity exchange price fluctuations.  Yet for example Hurricane Katrina wiping out (then 
constrained) natural gas capacities would have bankrupted numerous aggregation providers had 
they not been permitted to break the lock-ins to raise rates or cease service provision.  The long 
term contracts could also be pointless since oftentimes each party by agreement can break the 
contract prematurely, and end users can also drop out at their convenience and select other 
service providers, thereby proportionally minimizing the aggregation savings. 
Aggregation program providers claim to enable end user leverage against incumbent 
service providers, but it actually introduces more market intermediaries - the government agency 
"represents" the end users as an agent, and possibly becomes involved as another intermediary in 
the market.  Some distribution mode utilities have been merged and acquired by others, and 
thereafter rationalized portions of their networks.  Others have spun off the portions of their 
vertically integrated systems such as “last miles” that deliver services to end users so they can 
concentrate more exclusively upon for example energy exploration, generation, and wholesale 
distribution to third parties taking over as retail distributors.  It is these distributors that 
government agency aggregators in some markets must now contract with and not with the more 
insulated wholesalers, and the distributors are increasingly challenged by pricing power by both 
the wholesale provider and the aggregator. 
 
 
 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 34 
Provider Financing and Subsidies 
Private providers usually fund their own functions to gain entry into a market.  
Government agencies too are required to be funded if they intend to gain similar market entry.  
But if government agencies subsidize private providers for assistance with market entry ability, 
or if the government cross-subsidizes its agencies to enter the market, the market could become 
unfairly skewed against those providers not being likewise subsidized.  Governments typically 
advocate economic retention and development, and therefore advocate providers' fiscal 
successes.  At what point does and/or should a government intervene financially to balance 
providers' returns on investments, market shares, fiscal responsibilities, investment ratings, etc.?  
Worldwide, many governments unabashedly engage in subsidy practices to its private or quasi-
public/private providers, or provide products and services themselves against private providers.  
When those various mixed economic market types then compete against each other in the global 
market, conflicts usually arise from the degree of unfair subsidies, currency exchange rates, 
sovereign government policies and regulations, and other market distortions. 
 
Distribution Market Segment Importance 
End user access to and use of distribution services is increasingly important to the point 
of becoming an inherent right.  “Indeed, today the Internet is largely recognized as a general 
purpose technology, and broadband is regarded as a basic infrastructure, in the same way as 
electricity, water or roads.  Many citizens even consider the Internet as a ‘fundamental human 
right,’ and some countries have started to put in place legislation stipulating that access to the 
Internet is a human right for their citizens.” (International Telecommunication Union, 2010, 
pp.4-5).  “(Based on a survey of 27,000 adults in 26 countries carried out by the British 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 35 
Broadcasting Corporation in 2010, around three-quarters of interviewees considered Internet 
access as a human right.  Countries that have ruled that access to Internet is a human right for 
their citizens include Finland, France and Estonia.)  The U.S. National Broadband Plan reads as 
follows: ‘Broadband, … is a modern necessity of life, not a luxury.  It ought to be found in every 
village, in every home and on every farm in every part of the United States’ [FCC, 2010]”. 
(International Telecommunication Union, 2010, p.18). 
 
Wireline Telecommunications 
Telecommunications can be divided into Wireline and Wireless means, where wireline 
can be defined as telecommunications provision using physical infrastructure such as copper 
wire, coaxial cable, fiber optics, etc. to discretely channel electrons or photons between 
transmitter and receiver equipment.  Wireless can be defined as telecommunications provision 
using the electromagnetic spectrum to transceive electrons or photons without the need for 
physical wireline infrastructure.  Wireline and wireless networks are often commingled with 
each other to provide service over both mediums.  However as mentioned in the Limitations 
section, this study will focus largely upon wireline telecommunication technologies since the 
results cannot be similarly conveyed to wireless telecommunications due to certain physical and 
characteristic differences. 
Information began being conveyed amongst living beings by natural communication 
means, and was further assisted by emerging technologies becoming formal telecommunication 
systems.  Information has since become one of the world’s most valuable commodities.  “In 
multiple sectors - including finance, retail and advertising - free-flowing and interoperable data 
have increased competition, improved customer understanding, driven innovation and improved 
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decision-making.  Fortune 500 companies such as Google and Amazon have based their business 
models on the importance of unlocking data and using them in ways that produce far-reaching 
changes.” (U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2009, p.207).  Thus the systems for 
transporting information have become equally as important, and the goal of a communications 
network is to make it possible for applications to interact through a network (van Schewick, 
2010, p.50). 
The telephone system was developed to transceive analog signals containing voice data 
via wire infrastructures, and the system was eventually adapted to deliver signatures, text, images 
and other variants.  The early telephony market featured numerous individual service providers 
establishing their own infrastructures and providing equipment to customers.  “After telephone 
patents held by AT&T’s parent company expired in 1894, more than 6,000 independent phone 
companies sprouted up.” (Anderson & Wolff, 2010).  Those “end users” subscribed to a 
particular provider, which entitled them access to and service from that carrier to its other end 
user subscribers.  If a customer desired access to other end users not subscribing to that network, 
they had to additionally subscribe to that provider’s network, or be able to interexchange to it via 
each users’ cooperating carriers linking their networks together.  Telephone pole heights 
skyrocketed laden with subscriber line circuits, again with some customers subscribing to more 
than one provider requiring another set of line circuits.  Other end users who were well-financed 
could construct and operate their own private networks separate from telephone system 
providers’ networks. 
After numerous market shakeouts, bankruptcies, mergers, acquisitions, and 
consolidations in the telephony market, and marketplace interexchange difficulties and conflicts 
among providers reminiscent of rail interchange problems and occasional violence among 
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railroad carriers that resulted in the creation of the U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission and 
numerous state railroad regulatory agencies, telecommunication regulators determined that local 
market telephony provision was more efficient (using the state of the art technology at the time) 
under the provision of a sole "common" carrier vs. having an openly accessible marketplace of 
multiple competing carriers utilizing their own separate networks. 
The American Telephone & Telegraph Company formed an early vertical monopoly by 
combining its local market exchanges with longer distance interexchange service and network 
equipment manufacturing and provision.  AT&T then horizontally integrated most of the U.S. 
telephony service market, with a few independent carriers remaining in other market areas 
including the former General Telephone and Electronics Corporation.  “By 1939, AT&T 
controlled nearly all of the US’s long-distance lines and some four-fifths of its telephones.” 
(Anderson & Wolff, 2010).  This structure continued until independent startup company 
Microwave Communications, Inc., began using microwave relay stations to provide competitive 
interexchange service via both wireline and wireless means.  AT&T legally challenged their 
marketplace entry and interexchange ability, but instead a number of court cases broke up 
AT&T’s vertical monopoly.  AT&T was stripped of its “local exchange carrier” function and 
was subdivided into regional LEC Bell operating companies, but was permitted to keep its long 
distance interexchange carriage service.  More providers including Sprint and Qwest then 
entered the interexchange market by acquiring easements for fiber optic-based infrastructures 
buried on railroad rights of way in the mid 1990s, similar to the former telegraph companies 
utilizing aerial easements on poles constructed on railroad rights of way. 
Thus end users desiring telephony access and service had to subscribe to a sole 
government-franchised LEC common carrier provider in their market area, but had a choice for 
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their preferred long distance “for-hire carrier” and “private carrier” provider their LECs 
interchanged with.  End users were charged tolls for any calls that went outside of their local 
exchange and certain adjacent exchanges that constituted “local” service. 
Computers, which are essentially machines to process, transceive, and store data, evolved 
from simple abacuses to mechanical clock-like devices to large mainframe units, digital 
microprocessor desktop units, portable laptop and mobile device units, and infinite variations 
thereof depending upon their intended (and in cases unintended) applications.  Early mainframes 
were capable of simultaneously hosting multiple end user data entry terminal units, and 
monitors, printers, and other peripherals to output data at local or off-site locations.  Those 
systems required Local Area Networks (“LANs”) or Wide Area Networks (“WANs”) depending 
upon the distances between the mainframes and end user equipment.  Mainframe operators often 
had to lease private dedicated data-grade telephony circuits from LECs and/or interexchange 
carriers (“IXCs”) to scale their networks remotely.  But the LEC’s and/or IXC’s networks and 
networking and interfacing equipment were often bottlenecks in mainframes-end users data 
throughput capacities, the disproportionate spread increasingly due to end users upgrading their 
computers with processing capabilities that doubled every few years and carriers unable (or 
unwilling) to keep up an equal pace of newer and more powerful equipment implementation. 
The U.S. Dept. of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency in a quest to 
interconnect its various computers throughout the U.S. developed a WAN dubbed the “Internet”, 
although it was disruptive to the traditional phone system. 
[RAND Corporation researcher Paul] Baran's main motivation was to design a 
system that could not be taken out by the Soviet nuclear arsenal.  Yet the topological 
change advocated by Baran was not the reason everyone from the military to industry 
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vehemently opposed his design.  The objection was to his proposal to break the (network 
traffic) messages into small packets of uniform size capable of traveling independently of 
one another along the network.  This could not be achieved with the existing analog 
communications system.  Thus he advocated a switch to a digital system.  This step was 
too difficult for AT&T, the communications monopoly of his time, to absorb.  Therefore, 
AT&T's Jack Osterman quashed Baran's provision when he declared, "First, it can't 
possibly work, and if it did it, damned if we're going to allow the creation of a 
competition to ourselves."  Baran's ideas, defeated at every step by industry in the 
military, were rediscovered only years later, when the Advanced Research Projects 
Agency, not aware of his results, independently constructed the same vision.  By that 
time, however, the Internet was well along its course of development (Barabási, 2002, 
pp.144-147). 
Soon thereafter other government agencies, universities, etc. interfaced their LANs and 
WANs to this network, thereby increasing its worth with every newly accessible end user and 
their IT equipment.  Email and File Transfer Protocol were initial Internet services were used to 
distribute messages and files amongst users.  “The Internet is the first big communications 
network to make group communication a native part of its repertoire.  The basic logic of the 
Internet, called ‘end-to-end communication’, says that the Internet itself is just a vehicle for 
moving information back and forth – it’s up to the computers sending and receiving information 
to make sense of it.  While the telephone network was engineered for transmission of voice (and 
the phone company fought bitter legal battles to keep it from being used for any other purpose), 
the Internet does not know what it is being used for.” (Shirky, 2008, p.157). 
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The early Internet's routers and sub-networks were interconnected via distribution 
providers' dedicated wholesale long distance lines and/or retail LEC lines, and their traffic shared 
via “peering”.  “Peering allows two providers exchanging large volumes of traffic to save money 
by connecting directly, rather than routing traffic across their paid Internet connections.  Peering 
is often free as long as the amount of traffic exchanged is not out of balance, providing 
substantial cost savings for bandwidth for high-traffic sites and networks.” (Miller, 2009b).  The 
Internet later shifted from a more U.S. government-provided enterprise to greater administration 
by private providers.  “In the U.S., this (privatization) model translated into efforts to shift 
telecommunications from the regulated monopoly model it followed throughout most of the 
twentieth century to a competitive market, and to shift Internet development from being 
primarily a government-funded exercise, as it had been from the late-1960s to the mid-1990s, to 
being purely private property, market based.  This model was declared in the Clinton 
administration’s 1993 National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action, which pushed for 
privatization of Internet deployment and development.” (Benkler, 2006, p.152).  “It was the 
policy of the U.S. to ‘let the private sector lead’ in deployment of the Internet.  To a greater or 
lesser degree, this commitment to private provisioning was adopted in most other advanced 
economies in the world.  In the first few years, this meant that investment in the backbone of the 
Internet was private, and heavily funded by the stock bubble of the late 1990s.  It also meant that 
the last distribution bottleneck - the “last mile” - was privately owned.  Until the end of the 
1990s, the last mile was made mostly of dial-up connections over the copper wires of the 
incumbent local exchange carriers.  This meant that the physical layer was not only proprietary, 
but that it was, for all practical purposes, monopolistically owned.” (Benkler, 2006, pp.398-399). 
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Benkler noted the difference between networks for “dumb” equipment (i.e., televisions) 
vs. “smart” equipment (i.e., computers).  “In the broadcast and telephone era, devices were 
starkly differentiated.  Consumers owned dumb terminals.  Providers owned sophisticated 
networks and equipment: transmitters and switches.  Consumers could therefore consume 
whatever providers could produce most efficiently that the providers believed consumers would 
pay for.  Central to the emergence of the freedom of users in the networked environment is an 
erosion of the differentiation between consumer and provider equipment.  Consumers came to 
use general-purpose computers that could do whatever their owners wanted, instead of special-
purpose terminals that could only do what their vendors designed them to do.  These devices 
were initially connected over a transmission network - the public phone system - that was 
regulated as a common carrier.  Common carriage required the network owners to carry all 
communications without differentiating by type or content.  The network was neutral as among 
communications.” (Benkler, 2006, pp.396-397).  In the early-to-mid 1980s, AT&T laid some of 
the first generation fiber optic lines along various rights of way to better handle the volume and 
improve transmission quality of interexchanged network data, and to increase the capacity of its 
remaining analog voice circuits. 
By the mid-to-later 1990s the costs of network equipment were dropping and its speed 
and capacity capabilities were improving significantly.  The 1996 Telecommunications Act 
encouraged further market entry of third parties to provide IXC, IXC and Internet Protocol 
(“IP”), and IP-only service to compete against the incumbent LECs and IXCs.  Williams, Level 
3, and others then constructed $B+ nationwide and international networks, some with greatly 
excess capacities for future expansion and needs.  Even non-telecommunication distributors such 
as Dominion, Enron, American Electric Power, and Norfolk Southern Railway created 
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subsidiaries to operate their own for-hire and private telecommunication networks along their 
core distribution market rights of way and even physically within some of their infrastructures.  
Some market segment providers leased or sold excess unused “dark” fibers and other 
infrastructure to third party providers and end users without actually providing service 
themselves upon it.  Distribution market incumbents and later market entrants were forced to 
upgrade their decade or so old systems to increasingly newer technologies to remain competitive 
in speeds, capacities, and other services, all the while being saddled with past $B infrastructure 
buildout debts.  AT&T for example acquired smaller network equipment providers and 
telecommunication providers utilizing more advanced networking equipment as an alternative to 
investing in their own network upgrades. 
To recoup their network buildout expenditures, wholesale IXC and IP providers primarily 
targeted high-end end users, some of which could afford to connect directly into their networks 
to receive wholesale service thus disintermediating retail service providers.  Residential and 
small business customers were left to retail service providers, who received service from 
wholesale providers.  However the high-end end user marketplace was extremely competitive for 
a relatively scarce number of those users, forcing intense competition among providers and 
service discounts to gain and retain accounts, which did not assist in paying down their debts.  
Enron as a quasi-wholesale provider believed there would be a shortage of bandwidth service at 
the time, and attempted to establish a bandwidth exchange market where various providers could 
trade capacities akin to regular commodity exchange markets. 
In the later 1990s the industry became fraught with finance and accounting scandals, 
blatant fraud, and dubious revenue generation techniques.  Some wholesalers engaged in a 
lease/leaseback program with network equipment providers where the carriers would provide 
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equipment to end users; however when some carriers could not repay the equipment providers 
they went into default, and in one case the equipment provider acquired the wholesale carrier and 
began providing wholesale service itself. 
Wholesalers under their growing $B buildout debts then sought revenues in the LEC 
markets by providing voice and retail Internet service.  Some wholesalers merged with and/or 
acquired LECs and Regional Bell Operating Companies (“RBOCs” – the seven LECs in 
different jurisdictions formed after AT&T was divested of its LEC function) as a means to 
immediately gain access to the local market vs. constructing their own competitive local 
exchange networks (i.e., Qwest acquiring RBOC US West).  Other wholesalers including AT&T 
attempted to gain access by using the 1996 Telecommunications Act provisions to force access 
onto LEC and cable networks capable of IP and telephony service at rates lower than the LEC's 
or cable provider’s own provision costs.  Other IXCs courted independent private MAN 
(“Municipal/Metropolitan Area Network”) providers with fiber optic ring topology 
infrastructures as alternative intermediaries to LECs to enter local markets. 
In 2004 a U.S. Supreme Court ruling declared local networks to be private property, 
accessible by third parties at the discretion by their owners (akin to railroad trackage rights) 
without any federal or state-regulated discounted access rates.  The USSC then authorized cable 
companies engaging in ISP to control outside access by LECs and ISPs onto their networks to 
provide competitive Internet service, similar to incumbent LECs arguing for equivalent 
restrictions regarding network access by third parties for DSL ISP. 
Yet LECs were authorized to enter the IXC market to essentially rebuild vertical LEC + 
IXC networks.  The incumbent IXCs protested to regulators and courts to no avail, which while 
being locked out of additionally serving the LEC market seriously affected the going concern 
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status of a few of their business units.  Empowered LECs then merged with and acquired a 
number of the financially strapped and market entry restricted IXCs, including for example SBC 
purchasing AT&T (SBC then renamed to AT&T), and Verizon buying MCI WorldCom.  Those 
and similar consolidations resurrected the LEC + IXC vertical near-monopoly model AT&T 
once enjoyed on a national scale, but the model became more monopolistic regionally and 
oligopolistic nationally (also akin to the railroad market that is oligopolistic nationally but 
monopolistic or duopolistic regionally and locally).  The SBC and Verizon buyouts did contain 
some conditions to protect high-end end users who would have been re-intermediated with their 
former LECs to obtain wholesale IXC and/or IP service.  Combined LEC + IXC providers then 
invested more $Bs in installing fiber optic infrastructures from the local central switching offices 
to customers’ curbs or premises in more profit-promising metropolitan markets to provide 
“bundled” (multiple packaged services) LEC, IXC, IP, rebroadcast television, and other 
telecommunication services.  In certain cases individual “naked” services were still offered. 
The cable television industry started as community area towers located at high 
geographic elevations with antennas to capture broadcast television and FM radio signals that 
were distributed to customers over coaxial cable infrastructure networks in lieu of customers 
constructing their own tall towers and big antennas.  Cable companies then started distributing 
television signals from satellite-based networks, and as those networks and terrestrial 
broadcasters were converted to digital transmission formats, cable providers also converted their 
systems to digital and upgraded their networks to fiber optics and hybrid coaxial-fiber optics.  
With the upgrades and relatively similar network equipment technology, cable providers then 
offered bundled and in certain cases naked ISP, LEC, IXC, and other telecommunication services 
to their customers.  Cable providers had their share of scandal and fraud, with the former 
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Adelphia broken up and acquired by other providers as the market continues to consolidate and 
regularly faces market re-regulation.  Time Warner cable was a formal IXC, an advantage over 
other cable companies that must contract with LECs or IXCs for retail/wholesale 
telecommunication service access.  Benkler discussed both the cable and LEC providers’ system 
rollouts.  “The end of the 1990s saw the emergence of broadband networks.  In the U.S., cable 
systems, using hybrid fiber-coaxial systems, moved first, and became the primary providers.  
The incumbent local telephone carriers have been playing catch-up ever since, using digital 
subscriber line (DSL) techniques to squeeze sufficient speed out of their copper infrastructure to 
remain competitive, while slowly rolling out fiber infrastructure closer to the home.  As of 2003, 
the incumbent cable carriers and the incumbent local telephone companies accounted for roughly 
96% of all broadband access to homes and small offices.” (Benkler, 2006, p.399). 
Some public utilities that had entered the wholesale telecommunications market later 
spun off those business units, citing too little revenue from too much competition for too few end 
users, or are leasing their infrastructures to third party operators.  Enron, which entered the 
telecommunications market by leasing fiber lines from other providers to form a national 
network, dissolved the unit after its bankruptcy, and that unit’s officials have since appeared in 
courts on various fraud charges.  Some electric power utilities were trying to offer IP service 
again with new “Broadband over Power Lines” technology using their existing electric 
transmission lines and end user premise electric wiring networks. 
Mid- and higher-end end users were exploring the glut of providers’ extra fiber lines and 
capacities by leasing and buying their own fiber strands and channels for their own WAN use 
and connection to retail or wholesale Internet providers.  Google in particular leased and/or 
purchased dark Williams Communications fibers to potentially provide WAN, ISP, or other 
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expedited access from its databases to end users.  More non-incumbent non-profit corporations 
and government agencies were installing their own infrastructures and networks to provide 
service to other non-profits, government agencies, for-profits, and residential consumers in 
competition with existing market providers. 
 
Rights of Way 
While wireless telecommunications take advantage of transceiving signals through the 
air, wireline signals constrained physical channels require real property to host those support 
infrastructures.  Depending upon the required route of the network segment, rights of way may 
be required through virgin lands and/or developed lands already hosting one or more uses.  If 
routed through developed lands, the installation may have to cross or share the same or adjacent 
rights of way already assigned to other existing infrastructures.  Rights of way can be “Private 
Ways” if the land is privately owned, or “Public Ways” if they are owned by a government 
agency or similar organization.  Usually the infrastructure provider secures easements on the 
right of way vs. purchasing the right of way outright from the private or public landowner.  The 
landowner may require annual fees and certain access and use terms and conditions from the 
infrastructure provider in exchange for an easement agreement, and likewise the provider enjoys 
certain access and use with restricted interference from the landowner and other third parties.  
Thus ownership of the rights of way is critical for determining infrastructure provision. 
Infrastructures may require surface, aerial, or subsurface right of way easements.  
Generally the larger the infrastructure the more expensive the rights of way acquisition and 
easement costs will be, though telecommunication lines, particularly fiber cables, tend to require 
less space than other distribution infrastructures.  Generally, telecommunications lines are 
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mounted aerially or buried for increased security, less conflicts with other infrastructures and 
their users, etc.  Aerial infrastructure installations require rights of way for support structures 
such as poles, electric transmission line towers, buildings, and other means.  Subsurface 
infrastructure installations require rights of way for cables or to host conduits, pipelines, and 
other channels to protect internal cables. 
Sometimes telecommunication infrastructures share rights of way with third party 
infrastructures, available space permitting, while at other times providers prefer secure separate, 
independent easements.  Independent burials may be feasible in rural or more open areas, but in 
urban and highly developed locales available space may be at a premium.  Usually government 
agencies that have developed their rights of way with streets, sidewalks, water/sewer pipelines, 
and with other utilities’ infrastructures loathe having them torn up and reconstructed every time a 
telecommunication infrastructure provider requests using a portion of the rights of way as part of 
their network routes.  Apparently once asphalt streets are excavated for say a water/sewer line 
project, the refilling and asphalt patch is rarely the same quality or physical characteristics as the 
original paving, and consequently the patched trench tends to fail faster than the surrounding 
asphalt on the street.  The reported cure is to remove all the asphalt from the whole street, 
properly fill and tamp any washouts given the opportunity, and repave the street, which if oil 
prices are high and asphalt in short supply can incur great costs.  Thus some government 
agencies have begun insisting upon coordinated infrastructure burials so that only one trench in 
the right of way is dug for all (or similar) distribution providers at one time to better coordinate 
disrupting the existing surface, subsurface, and sometimes aerial infrastructures and their users.  
The technique may be cost effective if multiple providers can be coordinated simultaneously for 
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the project, but it carries a risk of other infrastructures directly interfering with the 
telecommunications installation in the same trench. 
Even if the telecommunications system is not buried in the same trench as other utilities 
and infrastructures, failure of say a water/sewer, gas, or steam line can potentially disrupt not 
only its host right of way but those of other installations tens to sometimes hundreds of feet 
away.  Directional boring techniques are available in place of trenching and filling for some 
challenging or congested segment locations so that installations can be converted from surface or 
near surface to deeper underground, such as a line being bracketed to a bridge to jointly cross a 
river can be bored deeply under the river.  Higher costs to bore at such depths are offset by less 
risk to the infrastructure and disruption of high value network traffic. 
 
Infrastructure 
The following sections generally concentrate upon wirelines and networking equipment 
utilized with buried infrastructures.  Similarly as was stated in the previous section, infrastructure 
ownership is also critical for determining service provision. 
 
Wirelines 
Some type of wireline technology is required to connect or network two or more 
telecommunication devices together if they are desired to communicate with each other, or if a 
substitute wireless connection means is not available.  The type of wireline utilized must match 
or adapt to the interfacing ports on the devices, else a network cannot be formed and the devices 
may remain stranded from communicating with each other.  If the devices transceive electronic 
signals, the wirelines must be able to conduct those signals; likewise if the devices are photonic, 
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a wireline constructed of light-conducting material must be utilized.  Some network equipment 
can be hybrids containing a mix of electronic and photonic transceiving equipment, subsequently 
requiring a mix of electronic and photonic conducive wirelines.  To fulfill the goals of 
telecommunications, wirelines must be designed, produced, and installed to convey information 
from one source to another as quickly and with as near exactness to the original transmission 
construct as possible, minimizing any resistance and noise that might interfere with the signals, 
and reducing the need for additional re-amplification or regeneration equipment if possible. 
Early wirelines were bracketed to poles and other structures with ceramic, glass, and 
other non-conducting materials used as insulators in-between the brackets and the support 
structures.  Later lines jacketed with insulation were attached directly to supports and pulled 
through passageways, pipelines, and conduits.  Newer conduit types featured “innerducts” - 
divided channels and subconduits within conduits - to help separate and organize different 
internal cables.  An advantage of burying conduits containing cables vs. burying cables alone 
was that the cables could be pulled out of the conduits and replaced with new and upgraded 
cables instead of abandoning and trenching in new lines, having saved up to 80% or more in 
construction costs. 
Later wireline technology featured wires covered with insulation and strand sets twisted 
together to reduce interference.  More shielding and grounding were featured in some types of 
“twisted pair” wiring per particular networking applications.  Twisted pair wirelines used almost 
exclusively in end-to-end networks (i.e., end user premise-last mile-middle mile-long haul-
middle mile-last mile-end user premise) were later being phased out by providers in their long 
haul and middle mile network segments in favor of coaxial and fiber optic cables that required 
less regeneration equipment, although they were being replaced more slowly in last mile network 
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segments due to costs and competition from wireless and other means of distributing 
information. 
Coaxial cable conveyed different types of signals than twisted pair, and was designed 
somewhat differently than twisted pair wirelines featuring a center wire core, a layer of 
insulation, an outer layer of shielding wire, and another layer of outer insulation.  Due to its low 
signal loss and better shielding design, signals distributed via coaxial traveled further distances 
than those upon twisted pair cables.  Early mainframe computers used a type of coaxial cable to 
network with other devices, and cable modem telecommunication service used the same coaxial 
cable that distributed cable television signals.  Some providers used coaxial cable to upgrade 
from twisted pair in their long haul and middle mile network segments, though fiber optics 
eventually replaced most coaxial lines.  Cable operators used various types and sizes of coaxial 
cables end-to-end in their network infrastructures, though they too were upgrading more head 
end-to-neighborhood “miles” with fiber optics and using converters to interface with 
neighborhood-to-premise coaxial runs. 
Fiber optic strands were developed from glass and plastics technologies and adapted to 
transmit optical telecommunication signals.  Plastic fiber was originally cost effective for short 
distance connections and low throughput applications, but glass fiber with its higher throughput 
capacities, smaller strand sizes, and greater transmission distances superseded both plastic fiber 
and coaxial cables.  Fiber cables could host a few strands to hundreds of strands each.  Fiber 
optics, first deployed commercially by AT&T and GTE in 1977 (Stix, 2001), were increasingly 
used in long haul and middle mile network segments, and were gradually being utilized in more 
last mile segments and premise networks.  As of 2010, copper wirelines were the most common 
way of carrying wireline telecommunications with a share of about 65%, compared to 20% for 
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coaxial and 12% for fiber (Ricknäs, 2010).  Signal regeneration equipment was required at 
certain intervals to extend reliable transceiving distances, although with improvements in glass 
purity and other network equipment, distribution distances kept increasing with consequent 
reduced regeneration costs. 
 
Networking 
Communication devices were usually produced to network together with other devices.  
Such networking required interfacing ports and communication standards that matched or 
adapted to those in each device to properly transceive data amongst them.  Generally end-to-end 
networking using the same interface technologies and standards provides faster performances 
compared to devices with different standards requiring intermediary converters and adapters to 
network successfully.  If only two devices were to be networked, they could be directly 
connected to each other if each device had at least one interfacing port.  If a device had two or 
more ports, it could be “daisy-chain” networked to the addition devices.  However having the 
devices provide multiple ports to interconnect multiple devices became somewhat inefficient 
when the number of potential networked devices was scaled upward, so dedicated networking 
equipment was created to handle the networking responsibilities instead. 
 
Facilities 
“Facilities” were locations with structures to house telecommunications equipment, staff, 
users, etc. by providers, end users, or shared by both.  Providers typically used facilities called 
Network Operation Centers (“NOCs”) that served as headquarters/control centers for the main 
networking equipment.  NOCs could connect to regional offices serving major cities or multiple 
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states, central offices serving smaller towns, and field facilities including shelters, cabinets, 
vaults, boxes, etc. serving neighborhoods and end users’ facilities.  Some providers built new 
facilities, leased rooms and whole floors in office buildings and high-rises, and repurposed other 
buildings to host various equipment and administrative functions. 
End users and third parties providing networking services to end users could use their 
production facilities to house networking infrastructure, their uses, and users, in addition to some 
of the aforementioned facility types used by providers.  Some end user facilities featured 
specialized application setups such as automated machinery, robotics, telecommuting, telework, 
videoconferencing, distance learning, point-to-multipoint (i.e., digital projectors in theaters), 3-D 
and interactive telepresence rooms, etc.  Other facilities housed various sized server farms, 
supercomputers, etc., while those functions were increasingly integrated into cargo shipping 
containers able to be transported where needed if adequate network connections were available.  
Providers sometimes leased available facility spaces to end users, known as “Co-Location”, 
where end user equipment could be directly connected to providers’ backbones. 
Facility types ranged from security protection levels shared with the rest of the 
production or end user activities to buildings designed and constructed to be practically bomb-
proof (although the 9-11-2001 World Trade Center collapse affecting Verizon’s New York City 
NOC likely caused rethinking of locations being in or next to potential targets without adequate 
redundancy) and other facilities setup in underground tunnels, mines, and similar relatively 
inaccessible locations. 
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Neutral Central Offices and Carrier Hotels 
A facility owned by a provider and used as their control center without being shared with 
other providers and users was usually considered to be their private NOC.  However other 
facilities owned by providers and third parties and shared with other providers and/or high end 
end users were variously called “Neutral Central Offices” and “Carrier Hotels”.  Those facilities 
offered tenants access to multiple providers, co-location, regeneration, regional and network-
wide NOCs, among other functions.  Facilities ranged among regular repurposed office 
buildings, specialized constructs, and hardened nuclear bomb shelters/national defense control 
centers deeply embedded within the Earth that offered the utmost in protection for mission 
critical functions (Buckley, 2000). 
The more successful shared facilities were located in close proximities to multiple fiber 
backbone lines.  Switch & Data Facilities marketing VP Leslie Bateman said, “It is important 
that the facility is strategically located close to where the fiber is.  This is typically near the 
central office of the incumbent carrier and never a big physical distance away.” (Colocation 
chain stores, 2000).  There was no guarantee a backbone provider would connect to the facility.  
John Payne [sic - more likely Telseon CEO and president John Kane] said, “Just because I have 
fiber in the street near your facility does not mean I can or will connect to you.  You could be 
misleading my customers, saying we are somehow going to work together.”  FIBERWORKS 
CEO and president Scott Burkholder said, “One of the greatest challenges is that neutral 
[facility] providers are making choices based on the close proximity of fiber backbone facilities.  
The fact that they are close does not mean they can gain access to these facilities.”  Shared 
facilities also had to ensure that their tenant providers had good peering agreements, or else an 
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affected provider’s traffic throughput rates could be slowed if it had to use less indirect routing 
over the public network (Buckley, 2000). 
The primary concern for high end end users such as application service providers, LECs, 
CLECs, and emerging throughput traders was service, and constructing their own network 
backbones often was not a feasible option so such neutral colocation sites became more attractive 
to them (Buckley, 2000).  Payne [sic] said, “Having the ability to go to a central point and peer 
with whomever you want is a major value-add.”  Equinix CTO Jay Adelson said, “From a 
content perspective, performance is significantly enhanced by being right next to a backbone 
provider.  It’s not subject to points of failure present in the current model of doing business over 
the Web.”  Yipes Communications CMO Ron Young said, “Why wouldn’t you want to connect 
to all these other sources of bandwidth?” (Buckley, 2000) .  Bateman said the major appeal of a 
neutral colocation facility was provider choice and the ability to interconnect with a wide range 
of suppliers.  “The selling point is not so much the neutrality but the choice.  They want to be 
able to choose to get connectivity from any carrier.  They don’t want to be forced into using the 
capacity of the colocation facility owner.” (Colocation Chain Stores, 2000). 
In one facility type case, Switch Communications acquired what was once Enron’s Las 
Vegas multiple-provider high speed service trading hub cheaply, giving them direct access to 
more than 20 primary backbone providers in a single location.  Switch then tied this vast network 
to existing data center hosting facilities, which attracted numerous high end end users.  Switch 
CEO Rob Roy said, “Enron wanted to expand from trading energy.  They wanted to use the same 
type of conceptual algorithm and go trade bandwidth.”  Enron spent $Ms creating a single 
facility that would serve as a hub for all the major U.S. carriers.  Those providers’ lines would 
connect into the Enron building, and Enron would move their throughput around like a 
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commodity.  Roy said, “I don’t think that was ever going to be real, but they thought it was.”  
Enron had already built most of the infrastructure for the facility and had interested major 
providers in accessing it, though just as the rest of its business started to collapse into eventual 
bankruptcy.  Thereafter the facility was placed up for sale.  Roy said, “We were the only ones 
that bid on it.  It should have been the $200B companies that owned it.  We got it for a 
Cinderella story type of figure.” 
Roy said the 407K square foot “SuperNAP” facility was the most energy efficient, tightly 
packed data center on the planet, and expected it to serve Fortune 100 companies, almost every 
technology firm, and major media conglomerates.  The facility had screens dedicated to tracking 
weather across the globe, 15 more that monitored hundreds of security cameras, another one that 
tracked power and networking grids, and “global terrorist activity”.  Switch offered users direct 
access to Verizon, AT&T, Sprint, Cox, XO, Qwest, Time Warner, Global Crossing, and Level 3 
among others, offering throughput rates that rivaled major hubs in New York and Los Angeles.  
Roy said this gave Switch unique pricing and capacity advantages by underbidding other more 
expensive facilities and creating more competition among the providers. 
We built this huge valve system, and we plug all the carriers - 10Gb/sec and 
40Gb/sec - into our big gateway.  Our biggest customers are saying we are selling space 
to them at 44% less than all of their connections.  And my agreements are not just about 
[Las] Vegas.  I can order a link in Germany cheaper than anyone else can.  I can do this 
because we have some of the world’s biggest companies looking to get into the 
SuperNAP.  And the carriers are hearing about this and seeing the volume of bandwidth 
these customers want.  And I can go and price out that bandwidth with a bunch of 
different carriers.  So, Carrier X comes and says, “Okay, we’ll play ball.”  You know, 
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you can take wholesale, and we’re 30% below that.  We are just alone in a very unique 
spot in the world because of the Enron building.  We have clients that come in and save 
more on connectivity than they pay for the entire data center in a month.  So, it almost 
makes their data center free. 
Roy’s SuperNAP model was possibly just the starting point for Switch, as its investors urged him 
to build ten more similar centers worldwide (Vance, 2008). 
In a similar model, major end user Google purchased a carrier hotel that afforded it with 
direct access to the multiple providers located within the facility. 
Originally known as the Inland Freight Terminal, the 2.3M square foot 111 Eighth 
Avenue building in New York City was designed to relieve congestion around West Side 
piers by serving as a “post office for freight,” as Gov. Franklin D. Roosevelt said when 
he broke ground for the project in 1931.  Atop this terminal, the Port of New York 
Authority, as it was then known, built offices and industrial lofts.  When the Port 
Authority of NY and NJ moved its headquarters to the World Trade Center in 1973, the 
subsequent owners leased space to various commercial ventures (Dunlap, 1997). 
The structure sits almost directly on top of where the Hudson Street/Ninth Avenue 
fiber highway makes a dog-leg to the right before heading north-east toward the Upper 
West Side.  The building’s previous owners, a consortium led by Taconic Investment 
Partners, knew that proximity to the fiber lines would be attractive to companies, so they 
tricked out the building with something called a network-neutral “Meet-Me” room, which 
is literally a room filled with networking equipment that allows the tenants to connect 
(peer) with each other - and the fiber-line.  Thus, 111 Eighth Avenue has become known 
as one of the most important so-called telecom carrier hotels on the Eastern seaboard, if 
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not the entire U.S.  Google, which had upgraded its NYC presence from its first office at 
a Starbucks on 86th Street, was leasing space in the facility, but in late 2010 purchased it 
outright for ~$1.9B, and had Taconic continue the leasing and management operations of 
the building (Gustin, 2010). 
 
End User Devices and Uses 
End users were utilizing an increasing number of devices, device types, and applications.  
IMS Research, which tracked the installed base of equipment that could access the Internet, 
reported “Sometime this month, the 5Bth device will plug into the Internet.  And in 10 years, that 
number will grow by more than a factor of four.  Today, there are over 1B computers that 
regularly connect to the Internet.” (Cox, 2010).  The following were some examples of devices 
and applications with ever improving technologies, more features, more powers, more 
throughput, and more storage requirements that continued to test end users’ and providers’ 
network capabilities when interconnecting and networking them, especially for interactive and 
symmetric throughput operations.  Access and service to these more technologically 
sophisticated end users was therefore of increased importance moreso than to previous 
telephone- and/or television-only users. 
Computers and servers were becoming faster to process more information, and were 
being equipped with an increasing number of CPU “cores” in each unit.  Optically-based CPUs 
promised greater processing powers and throughputs than electronic CPUs particularly if such 
units could be networked optically end-to-end.  Individual computers could be connected 
together and controlled with custom software to create clustered supercomputers with 
capabilities on par if not exceeding traditional supercomputers.  High end end users had 
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estimated server counts including Google with 450K units (although that number was at least 
three years old dating from 5-14-2009), Microsoft with 218K c.mid-2008, eBay with likely more 
than 50K due to its 8.5PB data load, Hewlett Packard with 380K (Miller, 2009), and Facebook at 
180K c.8-15-2012 (Miller, 2012). 
Digitizing scanners and digital cameras produced digital still images from object views.  
Consumer models over time featured improved resolutions to equal or surpass 35mm 
photography at 13.3-20 megapixels per photo with faster digitizing times while dropping in 
price.  Both means required users to manage increasingly large file sizes and the increasing 
number of images easily being produced.  Other emerging digital camera technology featured 
multiple lenses per device, multiple simultaneous view focuses, and multi-gigapixel file sizes. 
Digital video cameras were likewise developed to mimic motion picture cameras.  
Initially used for broadcast television productions, they evolved into more portable units and 
incorporated recording live video streams to various media types in analog and digital formats.  
Technological improvements included higher resolutions, faster frame/second rates, more 
individual recorded colors, and connectivity to data networks where video was available as a file, 
played from the file source upon demand, or able to be viewed live.  Digital video was displayed 
in devices including large screen displays, multiple individual displays forming one screen, video 
projectors, videoconferencing, videocameras, and video streaming. 
End users were recording and sharing more events in their lives using various multimedia 
digital devices, and increasingly doing so 24/7/365.  Microsoft researcher Gordon Bell conducted 
a MyLifeBits project to scan, capture, and log all personal data he generated in his daily life 
since 2001, including websites he visited, photos and videos taken, documents written and read, 
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telephone conversations, automatic photos taken with a SenseCam strung around his neck, and 
music listened to (Leckart, 2009). 
More data was being created by end users and their devices, with increasing amounts 
requiring longer term storage particularly by commercial users for legal and regulatory reasons.  
A 2010 IDC report (financed in part by storage systems provider EMC Corp.) said in 2010 the 
volume of digital information created and duplicated in a year would reach 1.2ZB, and estimated 
that the number of files to be managed would grow by a factor of 67 between 2009 and 2020.  
IDC’s 2007 report predicted that the volume would reach 988EB by 2010, indicating that the 
growth had exceeded their projections (Miller, 2010). 
Google added new information to its estimated 900K servers c.2010 (Koomey, 2011) at 
the rate of hundreds of thousands of GBs daily, and was increasing its capacity to index on the 
order of 100PBs (Gohring, 2010).  Google’s YouTube video sharing website expanded its 
capability to host 4096x2304 pixel resolution (“4K”) videos, although users were warned that to 
watch those videos they would require “ultra-fast high-speed broadband connections.” (Sarukkai, 
2010).  In 2010 the European Laboratory for Nuclear Research’s Large Hadron Collider particle 
accelerator generated 1.25GB of data per second that was collected and distributed to researchers 
worldwide through the LHC Computing Grid composed of more than 100K processors at 130 
organizations in 34 countries (Ohio Supercomputer Center, 2010). 
Videogame systems were utilizing custom hardware consoles essentially as powerful as 
regular computers.  Videogame titles were featuring increasingly sophisticated software to 
generate extensive virtual worlds and simulations that required higher display resolutions, 
multiple viewing dimensions, and faster rendering engines for better performances and to more 
closely imitate reality. 
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Social Networks evolved from the early CompuServe and former market leader MySpace 
to current favorites Facebook and Google+ with hundreds of millions of users.  The sites also 
offered digital photo and video sharing services that required vast data storage and throughput 
needs. 
"Telepresence" can be defined as a virtual environment for users to experience being 
fully present at a live real world location remote from one's own physical location, which could 
further reduce the need for actual travel to those locations.  Variants included advanced 
videoconferencing with some systems using holographic 3-D displays and multipoint-to-
multipoint connectivity, telecommuting, and telemedicine applications such as video 
consultations between doctors and patients and remote surgery.  Educational providers including 
preschool-12, adult and higher education, and R&D efforts were likely to benefit from using 
telepresence technologies. 
As sophisticated systems get better and less expensive, the movement of high-
quality telepresence into the mainstream of education could have social, economic, and 
pedagogical impact on students, faculty, and administrators.  It promises to open new 
kinds of shared instruction, as niche courses can be offered at associated institutions or at 
main and satellite campuses simultaneously.  Decreased costs and increased access to 
facilities by various academic disciplines and campus groups have the potential to open 
up new uses and new audiences. 
Telepresence (could) merge with virtual worlds, resulting in a robust hybrid 
system that can support avatars, mobile media, simulated environments, and other 
augmented reality.  Broader course offerings will be enabled as mobile telepresence 
comes online.  Students in criminology could join detectives at crime scenes, for 
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example, without the risk of contaminating the area.  Botany students might join curators 
at botanical gardens in distant cities.  Artists-in-virtual residence might demonstrate their 
craft for students in their fields.  The technology could see increased use in research, 
perhaps incorporating teleoperation so that researchers at remote locations can 
manipulate items in live-lab scenarios. 
If only a few students in a department want to study an obscure language or 
uncommon dialect, they might be able to join classes at partner colleges or universities 
via telepresence or, where feasible, join native speakers.  Similarly, the technology holds 
promise for demonstrations in areas such as dance, drawing, and design, as well as 
presentations in laboratories and kitchens.  Mobile options could extend the audiences for 
field studies, allowing those on-site in remote rainforests, botanical gardens, or 
archeological digs to examine specimens and artifacts.  Telepresence can be blended with 
virtual or augmented reality in building and architecture courses where demonstrations of 
techniques or explanations of the tensile strength of materials might take place in high-
definition virtual construction labs that accommodate both on-campus and remote 
viewers. 
Costs, particularly for high-end systems, can be an obstacle … institutions must 
(also) ensure that adequate bandwidth is available.  When lower-cost, high-performance 
suites emerge that put telepresence systems in the hands of new types of users, 
experimentation should yield novel uses and reveal even more vivid and compelling 
learning engagements.  (7 things you should know about … Telepresence, 2009). 
The amount of throughput for some telepresence functions could require Tb/sec to Pb/sec rates. 
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Direct Neural Interconnection technology is progressing in connecting living organisms’ 
brains and nervous systems together and/or to computers via wireline networking.  Although in 
its infancy, the amount of eventual throughput required will be enormous as larger brains are 
successfully interconnected. 
The developing fields of Quantum Computing will create new computers based upon 
quantum physics using “qubits” instead of “1” and “0” bits for greatly improved processing 
powers.  The related field of Teleportation could enable remote “reproduction” of products.  
Already the networking and routing needs for those applications were being anticipated. 
 
Upstream Networks 
End users were most likely interested in connecting their own devices and premise 
networks to other nearby and remote end users possessing similar devices and networks to access 
and share information and communications to (except in particular cases) avoid being “islands” 
not networked to other end users.  To do so, end users could acquire, construct, operate, and 
maintain their own rights of way, infrastructure, and facilities, or they could subscribe to 
telecommunication providers that specialized in distributing those services to end users.  
Outsourcing various telecommunication functions to providers and third parties usually saved 
end users in costs, expertise, responsibilities, etc., and did not require separate individual 
networks connecting each end user desiring access to another select end user.  Numerous types 
of networks have since evolved and scaled to connect up to multitudes of end users with various 
uses.  Some of the high end academic, research, and governmental networks included National 
Research And Education Networks, the Internet, Internet2, National LambdaRail, TeraGrid, U.S. 
Unified Community Anchor Network.  Such high capacity networks were considered to be 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 63 
strategic infrastructure, intended to contribute to high and sustainable economic growth and to 
core aspects of human development (N. Anderson, 2009). 
Although the Internet was increasingly multi-purposed, other networks were dedicated 
more to entertainment services.  Disney/ESPN began streaming live and stored content online, 
which then evolved into a model where it requested ISPs to subsidize select “value added” online 
programming provision from ISP subscription fees whether the ISPs’ subscribers viewed the 
programming or not, else the ISPs were blocked from accessing those feeds.  ESPN also 
provided Microsoft’s video game console Xbox 360 with a free ESPN3 stream to Xbox users 
that also subscribed to its value added membership service Xbox Live (Stetler, 2010).  The 
model was similar to the cable and satellite television models where a portion of subscribers’ 
fees went to each channel carried by the distributor, with some content providers demanding 
higher fees than others.  Netflix also distributed various information via physical media, 
downloading, and online streaming to end users available for viewing on a multitude of device 
types. 
Videogame consoles and computers running videogames were increasingly reliant upon 
faster speed Internet and networking with fewer delays to interconnect game servers and other 
game players.  Some game providers’ facilities required server farms to keep up with the 
increasingly fast processing and throughput demands with minimal delays to achieve seamless, 
life-like play.  In addition to playing games, Sony also contracted with Major League Baseball’s 
live video streaming service viewable on its PlayStation 3 console (Stetler, 2010). 
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Telecommunication Market Issues 
U.S.-based telephony and cable systems started with numerous providers that eventually 
consolidated into fewer providers per market while being granted sanctions by governments as 
natural utilities.  Although the AT&T breakup resulted in new entrants into the long distance 
market segment, the local exchange market monopolies were essentially preserved with local 
system and service provision continued by regional Bell Operating Companies.  Those RBOCs 
eventually reconsolidated horizontally and vertically by acquiring certain distressed long 
distance providers in that market.  The market effects of consolidation then re-emerged.  “At the 
physical layer, the transition to broadband has been accompanied by a more concentrated market 
structure for physical wires and connections, and less regulation of the degree to which owners 
can control the flow of information on their networks.” (Benkler, 2006, pp.24-25).  The 
following issues briefly examined in this section were considered to be significant problems in 
the local and last mile telecommunications markets, some of which can be attributed directly to 
those markets’ reconsolidation. 
 
Wireline Telecommunication Market Goals 
Maslow proposed a personal needs hierarchy (Maslow, 1943).  The needs to manually 
move and communicate should qualify as “Physiological Needs - Other Physical Activities”, and 
immediately thereafter should also be required the needs of technology-assisted mobility 
(transportation) and technology-assisted communications (telecommunications).  Any lack of the 
more basic needs would require attention moreso than the other needs such as 
telecommunications, except that technology and technology-enhanced distribution is 
increasingly aiding the other basic needs.  Contemporary economies, governments, and societies 
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would most likely cease to function without the availability of distribution systems, thereby 
greatly affecting personal needs.  Distribution services (in particular access to the Internet) were 
being increasingly regarded as end users’ inherent rights.  If individuals, businesses, 
governments, organizations, etc., sought to continue their existences and advance their positions 
in respective market sectors, their basic needs must be attained and their growth continued.  
Establishing goals could assist with those needs and desires. 
A primary goal should be perfect competition.  “The textbook case of perfect competition is an 
ideal model of a competitive market.” (International Telecommunication Union, 2011).  
Mathiessen stated, “The (perfect market economy model) demonstrates that what is good for 
providers and consumers is also good for society.” (Mathiessen, 2011).  However, perfect 
markets and perfect competition in reality are obviously not achievable.  “Perfect competition 
rarely (if ever) occurs in practice.  It is more an ideal than a market reality, and so is not useful as 
a standard for analyzing the performance of real world markets.” (International 
Telecommunication Union, 2011)  However, can the necessary conditions to achieve a perfect 
market also be used as the basis to achieve a more perfect telecommunications market or more 
closely approximate one?  
MIT researcher and onetime Internet chief protocol architect David D. Clark said if a new 
Internet architecture is desired, the job must start with the setting of goals.  "My goal in calling 
for a fresh design is to free our minds from the current constraints, so we can envision a different 
future.  The reason I stress this is that the Internet is so big, and so successful, that it seems like a 
fool's errand to send someone off to invent a different one."  He said whether the end result 
would be a whole new architecture - or just an effective set of changes to the existing one - may 
not matter in the end.  Given how entrenched the Internet (structure) was, the effort would have 
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succeeded if it at least got the research community working toward common goals and helped 
"impose creep in the right direction." (Talbot, 2005).  Thus to help achieve a perfect market, 
restructuring the market and its participants may be a solution. 
 
Economic and Financial Issues 
A number of significant economic and financial issues were involved in the provision of 
telecommunication systems and services in the local and last mile markets. 
 
Subsidized Business Models 
Some providers competed in markets against other providers that were using cross-
subsidized, advertising, loss-leader, and similar business models to absorb service provision 
costs and shift them to their other provided products and services.  A typical example included 
free wireless Internet provided by restaurants, airports, and other establishments as a public, 
value-added service for the customers of their core business.  Such competition was not 
“standardized” – fair and equally head-to-head per service – and involved the virtual bundling of 
two or more services by combining the prices.  Other for-profit providers in the same market 
were thus placed at significant competitive disadvantages against those subsidized models, 
particularly when the competitor was better financed or more diversified to handle loss leaders, 
unless they too engaged in similar practices. 
Anderson posed that government taxation was a type of subsidization that resulted in a 
“Free” business model.  “As the nation-state emerged in the 17th century, so the notion of 
progressive taxation, by which the rich gave more so the poor could pay less and receive services 
for free.  This establishment of government institutions to serve the people created a special kind 
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of Free: You may not pay for government services yourself, but society at large does, and you 
may never know exactly which of your own tax dollars come back to you directly." (C. 
Anderson, 2009, p.37).  He then noted such subsidization techniques could reduce product and 
service prices significantly if not to zero, while those costs could be transferred and assessed 
elsewhere.  “The most common of the economies built around Free is the three-party system.  
Here a third party pays to participate in a market created by a free exchange between the first two 
parties.” (C. Anderson, p.24).  “Economists call such models ‘two-sided markets,’ because there 
are two distinct user groups who synergistically support each other: Advertisers pay for media to 
reach consumers, who in turn support advertisers.  Consumers ultimately pay, but only indirectly 
through the higher prices on products due to their marketing costs.” (C. Anderson, p.25).  “From 
the point of view of the monetary economy it all looks free - indeed, it looks like unfair 
competition - but that says more about our short-sighted ways of measuring value than it does 
about the worth of what's created.” (C. Anderson, p.27).  “Today, we know that the most 
disruptive way to enter a market is to vaporize the economics of existing business models.  
Charge nothing for a product that the incumbents depend on for their profits.  The world will 
beat a path to your door and you can then sell them something else.  Just look at free long-
distance calling with mobile phones, which decimated the fixed line long-distance business, or 
think what free classifieds do to newspapers." (C. Anderson, p.43).  He then advised providers 
that “Sooner or later you will compete with free.  Whether through cross-subsidies or software, 
somebody in your business is going to find a way to give away what you charge for.  It may not 
be exactly the same thing, but the price discount of 100% may matter more.” (C. Anderson, 
p.242). 
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Other subsidization models included service and content providers injecting advertising 
and similar techniques into data traffic, resulting in increased throughput on networks and 
requiring more network equipment to adequately handle loads.  Likewise some providers were 
analyzing traffic (i.e., deep packet inspection) for advertising and subsidization purposes, 
creating privacy concerns especially when such observations were unbeknownst to end users. 
 
End User Creamskimming 
Wholesale providers' strategies had been to concentrate service provision primarily for 
more highly capitalized, high-end end users vs. lower capitalized middle- and smaller-end end 
users, thus "creamskimming" customers.  According to Metcalfe's Law, providers should want as 
many end user subscribers (connections) as possible to increase the overall value of the network.  
In reality it seems those providers adhered to Odlyzko and Tilly’s strategy (Odlyzko & Tilly, 
2005), and instead wanted as many higher-end end user subscribers as possible so as to charge 
them premium rates, thus skewing the overall network value and usefulness away from lower-
end end users.  Commercialized urban, populated, and wealthy areas were also more likely to 
have access and service prioritization than did depressed urban, rural, sparsely populated, and 
marginal areas had, again to reduce the risk of uncertain revenue returns.  These access and 
service redlining decisions in turn hindered rural areas' economic retention and development 
efforts vs. local, regional, and global competition in other market segments, cost of living 
improvements, and their potential long-term survival. 
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Barriers to Entry 
Traditionally the arguments against more perfect competition centered on barriers to 
market entry including the significant costs for competitors constructing their own local and last 
mile systems from scratch.  “Building (wireline) networks … requires large fixed and sunk 
investments.  Consequently, the industry will probably always have a relatively small number of 
facilities-based competitors.  Bringing down the cost of entry for facilities-based wireline 
services may encourage new competitors to enter in a few areas, but it is unlikely to create 
several new facilities-based entrants competing across broad geographic areas.” (U.S. Federal 
Communications Commission, 2009, p.36).  If every (provider) has to dig its own holes, the 
price of entry is too high and competition falters; over time, innovation lags, and the goal of 
broader and better access suffers (Benkler, 2010).  The idea is that the cost of replicating the 
underlying physical plant: digging trenches, laying ducts, pulling copper/cable/fiber to each and 
every home is enormous; it therefore deters competitors from entering the market in broadband 
services (Benkler, 2009, pp.11-12).  However a competitor better capitalized to absorb the initial 
losses or using a cross-subsidization model could potentially implement a system and 
successfully compete in an established market. 
 
Multiple Telecommunication Markets Provision 
If a provider has an advantage in or has cornered one market segment, a possibility exists 
for it to take advantage of or corner another market segment, with increasing potential effects to 
end users.  Level 3 Communications was a competitive provider in the long distance, Tier I ISP, 
and city-wide fiber networking markets.  Its CEO James Q. Crowe hinted though that Level 3 
could look to acquire providers with large urban area local networks.  "Our feeling is we're a 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 70 
logical consolidator.  If you own just long distance and you don't own local you're going to have 
trouble managing your costs." (Verma, 2010).  Conversely as mentioned, some local providers 
have acquired upstream providers (such as Verizon buying MCI Inc.) for increased vertical 
integration. 
 
Identifying Telecommunication Market Type Problems 
As discussed, telecommunication markets may have providers (i.e., Served Markets) or 
may not (i.e., Unserved Markets).  Served Markets may be considered Under-Served, Partially- 
or Quasi-Served, or Fully-Served based upon the number of active providers in a market.  Under-
Served and Quasi-Served Markets may be restricted due to oligopolies, duopolies, or monopolies 
per the provided modes and/or services (i.e., an LEC and cable provider both offering high speed 
Internet service).  Fully-Served Markets may exist if there are competitive providers for all 
available modes and services. 
 
Provision Taxation 
Real and personal property taxation regulations and assessments upon providers’ systems 
varied in each of the U.S. states and often by local governments for system and service 
provision.  A taxation issue arose when local governments decided to provide systems and 
services in competition to private sector providers.  Normally government infrastructure 
providers were exempt from taxes, such as for streets.  Some legislation was being proposed and 
enacted to force local governments to likewise be liable for telecommunication provision taxes.  
However would those governments also have to pay taxes if they provided only ROW, 
infrastructure, and certain facilities, but opened up their systems to one or more providers to 
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offer service competitively without competing against them for service provision?  In a related 
railroad industry model, some rail lines were publicly owned, but their government owners did 
not desire to provide carriage service on them, so they franchised the service provision to private 
railroad companies.  Often the agreements were “net leases”, where the railroad companies also 
assumed all taxes, liability, maintenance, and other rail line responsibilities.  Note that even 
though the rail line was public, taxes were still being assessed against it.  Was this because the 
line was franchised (quasi-privatized) to a sole private carrier – in essence a government-
sanctioned monopoly for a public utility common carrier?  Alternatively if the rail line was self-
administered by the government for equal access to and use by all railroad companies and other 
qualified users, should all users instead be considered competitive “private carriers” or “for-hire 
carriers” without the government provider nor the line users being assessed taxes, just like 
private- and for-hire truck carriers did not pay public utility real and personal property taxes for 
using public roads?  Although the business and governance model of a local and last mile 
telecommunications system could be changed to one where a government provided the system 
and multiple providers (but not the government) offered competitive service over the system to 
end users, taxation authorities (and their respective legislative bodies) might first have to revise 
the tax codes to eliminate real and personal taxes on such a system construct to ensure similar 
modal taxation equality. 
 
Provision Pricing 
Service pricing depended largely upon the amount of competition in the 
telecommunications markets, with those markets being more competitive likely to have lower 
prices than those that were less competitive.  “Competition” was also dependent upon the 
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amount of competition in competing telecommunication modes (i.e., cable vs. DSL) vs. 
competition in the same mode (i.e., multiple providers equally using a shared fiber optic system).  
Who owned the system in either case – be it a private sector provider, government provider, PPP, 
etc., and whether they assessed third party providers access leases that ranged among for-profit, 
non-profit, or subsidized models ultimately resulted in varying pricing to end users.  
Governments subsidized some system provision and/or service provision also creating pricing 
inequalities particularly if select providers received the subsidies vs. all providers in a market.  
Even then the true price for provision would have been shadowed and cross-subsidized by other 
government enterprises, funds, taxes, etc., and potentially could have been hard to “de-bundle” 
and account for especially if those other budgets became tight. 
 
Telecommunications Market Competition 
The FCC believed “competition is crucial for promoting consumer welfare and spurring 
innovation and investment in broadband access networks.  Competition provides consumers the 
benefits of choice, better service and lower prices.” (U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 
2009, p.36)  Benkler discussed the evolving philosophy of telecommunications market 
competition. 
In the U.S., AT&T became a de facto monopoly in the second decade of the 
century.  The theory throughout this period was one of natural monopoly.  Because the 
fixed investments necessary to create a telecommunications network were so high, while 
the marginal costs to serve each subscriber over time relatively lower, and because it was 
valuable to subscribers to be connected to all other subscribers, it was thought to be most 
efficient to have a single network connect everyone, and then subject the carrier to 
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regulation to assure that it would not abuse this monopoly by charging high prices for 
poor service. 
By the end of the twentieth century this model was globally seen as a failure.  The 
state-run telecommunications carriers were seen as inefficient and bloated.  In the U.S., 
the Bell System repeatedly outwitted the FCC and the Department of Justice, preventing 
competitors from entering into competitive lines of business that depended on the core, 
hard-to-replicate facilities of the local copper loop, and continued to capture rents that, in 
theory, should have been regulated away (Benkler, 2009, pp. 80-81). 
Regarding international competition, the ITU noted “In a number of countries, the 
Internet market, and particularly the backbone infrastructure and international gateway, remain 
under the monopoly of the incumbent telecommunication operator.  Limited competition and 
scarce international Internet bandwidth tend to keep prices for Internet access high and often 
unaffordable in the area of fixed broadband access.” (International Telecommunication Union, 
2010, p.201).  Domestically, the FCC reported “The U.S. market structure is relatively unique in 
that (end users) in most parts of the country have been able to choose from two wireline, 
facilities-based broadband platforms.  Approximately 4% of residential end users units were in 
areas with three wireline providers, 78% had access to two wireline providers, about 13% had 
access to a single wireline provider, and 5% had no wireline provider, although rural areas were 
less likely to have access to more than one wireline broadband provider than other areas.  In 
general, broadband subscribers appear to have benefited from the presence of multiple 
providers.” (U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2009, p.37).  However Benkler 
responded, “(High speed service) affordability is the hard part - because there is no competition 
pushing down prices.” (Benkler, 2010). 
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Telecommunication Service Issues 
“The delirious chaos of the open Web was an adolescent phase subsidized by industrial 
giants groping their way in a new world.  Now they’re doing what industrialists do best - finding 
choke points.  And by the looks of it, we’re loving it.” (Anderson & Wolff, 2010).  A number of 
these real and arbitrary “choke points” often resulted in significant service issues. 
 
Provider Control Over Systems and Services 
The U.S. Supreme Court once ruled that providers’ networks are private property, and as 
such those providers were entitled to control over their systems and services.  Benkler noted, 
“Existing local (incumbent providers) argue that they deserve control over a market because 
they’ve sunk enormous amounts of money into digging trenches and laying cables for their 
telecommunications network.  And to be fair, it is expensive.” (Benkler, 2010).  Government 
regulation of sanctioned natural utilities was thus required as a primary means to control market 
prices in lieu of competitors providing their own separate equivalent mode systems and services. 
 
Out-of-Routing 
One potential practice of provider control was indirect traffic “out-of-routing”, which 
could cost end users more for the additional route mileages, additional equipment utilization, 
potentially more delays, and increased contingency risks.  Sometimes ISPs did not exchange 
traffic directly with their competitors because of tariffs, pricing anomalies, or corporate politics, 
etc., and instead interchanged traffic with other ISPs in “Tromboning” routing arrangements 
where traffic between two cites in one country flowed (often out-of-route) through other nations’ 
routers (Rerouting the web, 2008). 
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Similarly, railroads found that controlling traffic routing could be used for network and 
equipment rationalization, prioritization of certain services, and increased pricing power.  In the 
case of the former Pittsburgh-St. Louis “Panhandle” main rail line, Conrail c.1983 decided to 
consolidate its various main rail lines west of Pittsburgh and Buffalo onto only a few remaining 
routes, excluding the Panhandle’s route.  Direct Pittsburgh-Mingo Jct., OH Panhandle traffic was 
first re-routed to Pittsburgh-Rochester, PA-Mingo Jct., and the bypassed former main line 
segment from near Pittsburgh-Weirton, WV was later liquidated.  Conrail diminished and 
eliminated 99.8% of the Panhandle’s remaining traffic between Pittsburgh-Columbus by re-
routing it to its Pittsburgh-Rochester-Crestline, OH-Columbus line, or allowing truckers to carry 
it via adjacent roads and highways (including the now congested I-70) to help them justify 
abandonment to the U.S. ICC.  Conrail also considered abandoning that Alliance, OH-Chicago 
“Ft. Wayne Line” route, and tried shifting the Panhandle’s and Ft. Wayne Line’s traffic to the 
even longer Pittsburgh-Cleveland-Columbus and Pittsburgh-Cleveland-Chicago routes.  The 
direct Pittsburgh-St. Louis route was ultimately replaced with the much less efficient Pittsburgh-
Cleveland-Indianapolis-St. Louis route, leaving the Pittsburgh-Columbus-Indianapolis corridors 
largely unserved by intercity rail for the first time since the U.S. Reconstruction era.  Conrail 
officials apparently admitted later their rationalizations and abandonments were mistakes, but the 
damage to the rail network and the high costs to replace it lingered on even after Conrail was 
split up and acquired by CSX and Norfolk Southern. 
 
Telecommunication System Technical Issues 
A number of technical issues were involved with the provision of ROWs, infrastructure, 
and certain facilities for local and last mile telecommunications systems. 
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Peering Interconnections 
Although numerous networks, particularly the Internet, consisted of interconnected 
networks, the terms and conditions for interconnections were not always equivalent.  Larger 
providers could discriminate against smaller providers, forcing them to seek other networks and 
routes for their traffic.  The FCC recognized the problem, but had little authority to regulate 
peering. 
The FCC should clarify interconnection rights and obligations and encourage the 
shift to IP-to-IP interconnection where efficient.  For consumers to have a choice of 
service providers, competitive carriers need to be able to interconnect their networks with 
incumbent providers.  Basic interconnection regulations, which ensure that a consumer is 
able to make and receive calls to virtually anyone else with a telephone, regardless of 
service provider, network configuration or location, have been a central tenet of 
telecommunications regulatory policy for over a century.  For competition to thrive, the 
principle of interconnection - in which customers of one service provider can 
communicate with customers of another—needs to be maintained.  There is evidence that 
some rural incumbent carriers are resisting interconnection with competitive 
telecommunications carriers, claiming that they have no basic obligation to negotiate 
interconnection agreements.  In particular, the FCC should confirm that all 
telecommunications carriers, including rural carriers, have a duty to interconnect their 
networks (U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2009, p.49). 
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Last Mile Segments 
The “last mile” - typically the network segment from a provider’s central network office 
in the local market to an end user’s premise - was an example of necessary provider 
intermediation because in most cases end users were not located immediately adjacent to the 
other intended end user or to the provider’s main network switching equipment.  Thus an 
additional link was required to “remotely” connect end users to a provider on one end of a route, 
and from a provider to the intended end user on the other end of the route. 
In some cases the last mile segment could become a “bottleneck” in end users’ supply 
chains, WANs, etc., especially if the provider’s network equipment was inferior or inefficient 
compared to the end users’ own equipment.  Larger end users were increasingly concerned with 
those bottlenecks that restricted last mile throughputs to their connecting end users.  “Google is 
also concerned about the speed limitations imposed by wires that run to the home … that would 
deliver Internet content to residential subscribers at speeds of 1Gb/sec.” (Heinrich, 2010).  The 
consensus of opinions has discouraged multiple competitive intra-modal systems in a market as 
being duplicative and inefficient vs. a single system owned and operated by a natural utility 
sanctioned monopoly provider.  Somewhat better-served markets had separate multi-modal last 
mile systems such as for both telephony and cable.  However each of these modes were often 
still monopolized, and although those markets may have had multi-modal duopolistic 
competition for say Internet, it was usually not enough to persuade the providers to continuously 
upgrade their network equipment to help eliminate the throughput bottlenecks.  Competitors with 
potentially better network technologies seeking access to incumbent providers’ local market 
systems for last mile access to end users (without building their own last mile systems) may have 
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also experienced bottlenecks if the providers’ systems were not able to properly accommodate 
the better equipment. 
 
System Rationalization 
System Rationalization was a strategy where a provider abandoned, spun off, or 
liquidated various unwanted or inefficient portions of its system such as rights of way, 
infrastructure, and/or certain facilities.  Providers often eliminated select duplicated and 
overlapping elements especially after mergers and acquisitions with other providers to increase 
their overall efficiencies and reduce overhead, labor, costs, etc.  System liquidations could 
eliminate potential future competition from the provider’s former service area thus affecting end 
users' choices of providers, reducing or restricting services, or losing all access to any area 
systems.  End users could then face workarounds including the need to redefine their business 
models, relocate to served areas with more competitive markets and sufficient services, construct 
and administer their own systems to network traffic with other remaining providers, or cease 
business altogether. 
 
End User Use Empowerment 
Some end users were installing their own miniature wireline systems and last miles to 
other adjacent end users, just as some higher end end users were constructing whole end-to-end 
WANs independent from existing private providers’ systems.  Benkler noted the impetus. 
The combination of observations regarding market concentration and an 
understanding of the importance of a networked public sphere to democratic societies 
suggests that a policy intervention is possible and desirable.  The relevant intervention is 
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to permit substantial segments of the core common infrastructure - the basic physical 
transport layer of wireless or fiber and the software and standards that run 
communications - to be produced and provisioned by users and managed as a commons 
(Benkler, 2006, p.241). 
My point here … is to highlight the implications of the emergence of a last mile 
that is owned by no one in particular, and is the product of cooperation among neighbors 
in the form of, “I’ll carry your bits if you carry mine.”  At the simplest level, neighbors 
could access locally relevant information directly, over a wide-area network.  More 
significant, the fact that users in a locality co-produced their own last-mile infrastructure 
would allow commercial Internet providers to set up Internet points of presence anywhere 
within the “cloud” of the locale.  The last mile would be provided not by these competing 
Internet service providers, but by the cooperative efforts of the residents of local 
neighborhoods.  Competitors in providing the middle mile could emerge, in a way that 
they cannot if they must first lay their own last mile all the way to each home.  The users, 
rather than the middle-mile providers, shall have paid the capital cost of producing the 
local transmission system - their own cooperative radios.  The presence of a commons-
based, co-produced last mile alongside the proprietary broadband network eliminates the 
last mile as a bottleneck for control over who speaks, with what degree of ease, and with 
what types of production values and interactivity (Benkler, 2006, p.404). 
 
Government Involvement in Telecommunication Markets 
The ITU once called for greater government involvement in telecommunications markets, 
“In order to make services more affordable and increase the spread of the Internet and 
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broadband, governments need to encourage greater market liberalization in the Internet market, 
and ensure particularly facilities-based competition.” (International Telecommunication Union, 
2010, p.25).  Government involvement evolved and occurred in various forms. 
 
Government Agency WANs 
Most government agencies and institutions as end users created and utilized their own 
WANs for internal MIS/IT needs, and found that their proper utilization could assist with 
additional missions, including economic development, societal well being, education, and 
helping to address the other needs listed in Maslow's needs chart.  Such WANs were typically 
dedicated to production and services (in this case government administration functions), and if so 
desired could interface with public end users at certain designated points via websites and other 
portals, while keeping general and unauthorized end users out of certain designated areas.  In 
many cases, Internet service was also provided on the same WANs. 
Thus with telecommunications technology being utilized by other end users for various 
purposes, with certain economic and societal problems being traced to issues within the local and 
last mile telecommunications markets, and with prodding from networking and equipment 
producers to multi-purpose their products beyond in-house MIS/IT (and in return increasing 
those producers' profits), governments were not surprisingly tempted to additionally provide 
external telecommunication systems and services as competitive providers.  For example, most 
municipalities owned and administered their own rights of way to provide government 
enterprises including streets and sidewalks.  Some of those municipalities providing electric 
power additionally owned electric poles located upon their rights of way, and public power 
providers were increasingly encouraged to offer MAN provision using those poles to co-host 
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aerial MAN lines.  “As of October 2009, there were 57 fiber-to-the-premises (FTTP) municipal 
deployments, either in operation or actively being built, in 85 towns and cities in the U.S.  These 
deployments collectively serve 3.4% of the FTTP subscribers in North America.” (U.S. Federal 
Communications Commission, 2009, p.153).  In those situations, private telecommunication 
providers desiring to serve the municipal markets had to lease public right of way easements to 
host their infrastructures upon, and if they did not construct their own poles they had to lease 
access upon the municipality’s poles.  Issues occurred if the municipalities charged private 
providers higher pole access rates than they charged their own telecommunication provision 
enterprises, with the advantage that providers were more willing to pay those lease rates than 
construct and administer their own new support infrastructures.  Some municipalities bundled 
and cross-subsidized their electric and telecommunication enterprises (and possibly the street 
enterprises that were responsible for maintaining the rights of way), which likely resulted in 
unfair competition vs. private providers. 
However after the Nixon, Attorney General Of Missouri v. Missouri Municipal League, 
et al. (Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 2004) case, numerous states restricted or prohibited 
political subdivisions from provision (U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2009, p.153).  
The FCC thus recommended that Congress should authorize political subdivisions to provide 
systems and services, particularly if “local entities … decide to offer services when no providers 
exist that meet local needs.  These local entities do so only after trying to work with established 
carriers to meet local needs.  In the absence of (government subsidies to private providers), they 
should have the right to move forward and build networks that serve their constituents as they 
deem appropriate.” (U.S. Federal Communications Commission, p.153). 
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University of Wisconsin Internet Provision. 
A number of universities utilizing Internet services were also ISPs to their users, other 
state and local agencies, and in certain cases to the public, where they might have competed 
against private providers.  WiscNet was a non-profit state-level spinoff from CSNET - an 
affordable IP-based infrastructure that linked to computer science departments across the U.S. - 
and contracted with UW's Division of Informational Technology to administer its system.  
WiscNet received additional NSF grants to extend Internet provision to all WI colleges, 
universities, 75% of all state school districts, 95% of all state libraries, and to local governments.  
Like CSNET, WiscNet became a model for other educational systems across the country, for 
example in Ohio where Ohio State University’s Ohio Supercomputer Center was similarly a 
WAN provider and ISP for state and local agencies, with the potential to offer ISP to the public. 
In 10-2010, the Wisconsin State Telecommunications Association denounced a UW plan 
to use federal stimulus funds to expand WiscNet's presence in four WI communities as 
competitors to the incumbent private sector providers.  WSTA Executive Director William 
Esbeck said, “A duplicate network will increase costs for everyone and impact the ability of local 
telecommunications providers to invest in their communities.  With scarce state resources, do we 
really need UW using government money to stifle private sector investment and threaten local 
jobs and businesses?  UW does not belong in the telecommunications business.”  WI Statute 
§16.972(2)(a) (2011) required that no state agency: 
… may offer, resell, or provide telecommunications services, including data and voice 
over Internet services, that are available from a private telecommunications carrier to the 
general public or to any other public or private entity. 
However §16.972(2)(b) (2011) was an exception to (a) as departments could: 
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… provide such computer services and telecommunications services to local 
governmental units and the broadcasting corporation and provide such 
telecommunications services to qualified private schools, tribal schools, postsecondary 
institutions, museums, and zoos, as the department considers to be appropriate and as the 
department can efficiently and economically provide. 
WSTA advocated proposed WI state legislation containing the following positions. 
• Required that WiscNet separate itself from the UW Division of Information Technology. 
• Barred WiscNet from accepting any funds from UW, including $1.4M for FY 2012-13. 
• Prohibited UW from accepting National Telecommunications Information Agency service 
provision stimulus grants. 
• Prohibited UW from joining with any entity that offered service to the general public. 
• Prevented the WI Board of Regents or UW System from providing telecommunications 
services “that are available from a private telecommunications carrier to the general public or 
to any other private entity” to anyone except the UW system itself. 
• Prohibited the UW System from “becoming or remaining a member, shareholder, or partner” 
with any entity that “offers, resells, or provides telecommunications services to members of 
the general public.” 
• Forced WiscNet clients to instead use Badgernet - WI's state WAN primarily provided by 
AT&T. 
State Superintendent of Public Instruction Tony Evers said, “If our schools and libraries 
must use other Internet providers, most will pay at least 2-3 times more than what WiscNet now 
charges.”  UW responded to the "duplication-of-services" charge by stating that 100Mb/sec 
BadgerNet service was $6K per month, and 1Gb/sec was $49.5K per month – “still … too high.”  
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Unlike WiscNet, clients would have been charged for their throughput use under BadgerNet.  
UW Chief Information Officer Ed Meachen said WiscNet cost the UW system $2M annually vs. 
BadgerNet’s comparative $8M.  In addition, the higher service charges would have made UW’s 
access to Internet2 unaffordable (Lasar, 2011). 
 
Government System Provision 
van Schewick said an alternative solution (vs. waiting for providers to roll out advanced 
telecommunication networks) may be to think about public provision of infrastructure (van 
Schewick, 2010, p.370).  Wyckoff elaborated on a similar public infrastructure provision 
proposal for U.S. rail lines during the Penn Central bankruptcy crisis - decoupling track 
ownership (the predominantly fixed-cost portion of railroading) from operating companies 
(Wyckoff, 1976, p.128) – that could possibly be emulated for certain telecommunications 
systems and services. 
I propose that the federal government undertake the project to purchase major 
segments of railroad track and right of way for the purpose of developing a modern, high-
speed railroad track system for public use.  This would mean the purchase of some of the 
existing track and right of way, although that is not mandatory.  The railroad would be 
allowed to continue to own and operate as a private right of way any of its track.  
Similarly, the federal system would not be obligated to buy undesirable track.  The 
railroads would be responsible for development of classification yards and track 
connecting their own roads [rail networks] with the federal track system.  Traffic control 
through signaling systems would be provided by federal traffic controllers in a role 
similar to that of the air traffic controllers of the FAA (Wyckoff, 1976, p.130).  What I 
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am considering under this alternative is not simply the old proposition of the passive 
purchase of the roadbed [sic, Wyckoff here refers to roadbed collectively being the right 
of way and track vs. the industry’s technical term for a certain portion of the earthwork 
supporting the tracks] as a means of creating a capital infusion for sick railroads.  (The 
public tracks) would be made available to private carriers, as well as authorized for-hire 
carriers as alternative routes of convenience (Wyckoff, p.129). 
Wyckoff compared the required investments in rail rights of way and infrastructure vs. 
those for carriage operations. 
The greatest concern to me in examining the nature of the railroad management 
task is the massive fixed cost associated with track ownership and maintenance.  In many 
respects, it is the ownership, construction, and maintenance of private rights of way by 
railroads that make them natural monopolies and drive them towards increasingly larger, 
but less manageable, enterprises (Wyckoff, 1976, p.130).  It is relatively easier for 
railroads to attract capital for rolling stock [i.e., rail vehicles] than for improvement of 
roadbed.  Given the present financial conditions of many railroads that most need track 
improvement, a lender is wise to demand the security of the pledge of easily retrieved 
property.  The minimum security might be something that the lender can physically take 
possession of and make alternative use of in case of the failure of the lendee.  Rolling 
stock certainly meets this requirement much better than improvements in roadbed.  It is 
questionable whether a prudent private lender would consider track improvement as a 
reasonable risk at any interest rate without adequate guarantees from the federal 
government (Wyckoff, p.129). 
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He then discussed the market advantages of separation vs. right of way and infrastructure 
+ carriage provision. 
Once the ownership of the right of way is separated from the operations, it 
appears that many markets can support several competitors because of the reduced fixed 
costs.  The best way to reduce the variable costs of a short-haul carrier are to reduce its 
volume of transactions.  The best way to reduce the costs of the long-haul carrier is to 
increase its freight density.  Both are possible once railroading is shifted from a fixed-
cost-oriented to a variable-cost-oriented business.  Charges for the use of this track 
system would be made on a user-tax basis, again shifting fixed costs of railroading into 
variable costs, more like the costs structure of the motor [commercial trucking] carriers.  
As it would be a government-provided facility, it makes sense for several operators to use 
it jointly.  In fact, there are several instances in which railroads are already exchanging 
trackage rights to each other [i.e., line and facilities leasing in telecommunications] 
(Wyckoff, 1976, p.130). 
By creating a public track system, there is the opportunity to salvage the concept 
of private enterprise in the operation of for-hire transportation.  Certainly many railroads 
do need cash inflow to supply working capital, rolling stock, and improvement of 
classification and assembly yards.  The purchase of some portions of the track to re-
supply it to the railroads in an improved condition on a pay-as-you-go basis would 
generate necessary cash flow.  This will also secure assets for the government in the 
event the railroads do eventually fail (Wyckoff, p.131). 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 87 
Such railroad company failures often saw the abandonment of their rights of way and tracks, 
resulting in constricting the scale of the overall rail network.  Wyckoff then compared 
transportation business and governance models. 
Such a system would mirror the concept of the well-designed, safe, high-speed, 
super-highway system (Wyckoff, 1976, p.129).  This proposal of nationalization of tracks 
is certainly preferable to nationalization of railroads, including tracks and operating 
companies.  The federal government has demonstrated greater competence as a developer 
and provider of facilities than as a manager of operating organizations (Wyckoff, p.130).  
Also, the government has had success in such development projects that were too large 
an undertaking for any single firm or group of firms in the private sector.  The Federal 
Highway System is a good case in point.  Other examples of the skill of the federal 
government in providing transportation facilities that are then used by firms in the private 
sector and providing private and for-hire transportation are the federal airways and inland 
waterways.  The record of the government acting as cashier for and developer of large 
transportation facilities has been excellent (Wyckoff, p.131). 
Wyckoff concluded noting the proposal’s increased potential for competition. 
With the separation of the track ownership and operating company ownership, the 
barriers of entry for the protection of the existing natural monopolies are no longer as 
justified.  So this may only be a disadvantage to the existing business entities that 
certainly would like to perpetuate themselves (Wyckoff, 1976, pp.132-133). 
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Mixed Economies 
As listed previously, government agencies had already engaged in other distribution 
enterprises.  Contentions occurred when government agencies used their WANs and network 
equipment to likewise enter telecommunication markets and provide various services as 
"enterprises", thereby creating mixed economies.  Government agencies could not tolerate 
unserved markets, which invited their intervention and provision.  Market deficiencies in earlier 
U.S. history were addressed with government agency-sponsored rural electrical and “good 
roads” programs.  For under-served and quasi-served markets affected by market cornering, 
oligopolies, duopolies, or monopolies, government agencies could decide to compete against 
incumbent providers for telecommunication service provision, even if those providers were 
franchised.  A quasi-served market competition scenario might have involved a government 
public MAN offering high speed Internet vs. an ISP offering dial-up speed Internet via an LEC's 
telephone system.  Fully-served markets ideally would not have required government 
intervention, yet their market entry was always a reserved option with certain inherent 
advantages governments.  Those advantages would most likely have achieved governments’ 
missions and market goals, albeit enjoying unfair market competition.  While governments could 
enter a telecommunications market to provide a sole service to achieve their missions and goals, 
they risked becoming more Socialistic when they additionally expanded into multiple markets 
and offered converged service packages. 
 
Government Enterprise Cross-Subsidization 
Some governments providing their own telecommunication systems financed them with 
cross-subsidizations from other enterprises.  Dover, OH and Provo, UT as to be discussed later in 
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further detail bundled their telecommunication systems into their electrical power system 
enterprises to cross-subsidize their construction, financing, debt ratings, and risks.  Electric 
power systems and telecommunication systems were technically distinct modes of distribution, 
as much as say municipal water/sewer departments were from municipal street departments.  
Dover and Provo end users subscribing to private telecommunication providers nonetheless 
subsidized the public MANs with their public power subscriptions, and public power users not 
subscribing to any telecommunication services were still subsidizing the MANs.  In Dover since 
only select commercial end users were being offered MAN service, all other electric end users 
were subsidizing them.  When Provo's telecommunication enterprise bonds were scheduled for 
retirement, the excess revenues thereafter were to be transferred to their general fund vs. being 
dedicated to system cost reductions, system upgrades, contingency funds, redundant routes, etc.  
The general fund was used to cross-subsidize other municipal enterprises, services, and 
entitlement programs, thereby increasing their reliance upon the MAN enterprise's success and 
revenue generation.  Dover's contingency plan in case of catastrophic systemwide line breaks 
was to ask for technical assistance from the City of Wadsworth, located 43 miles away with a 
minimum 75 minute drive time (pending good weather conditions including through secondary 
back roads).  Their plan could be considered another type of cross-subsidization with another 
municipality, as both were members of AMP-Ohio, an organization acting as a co-
operative/wholesaler/lobbyist for member public power municipalities. 
If governments that desired becoming competitive providers in their local 
telecommunications markets had established them as separate independent enterprises, bond 
counsels may have recommended against those projects if incumbent private providers were 
already present in and serving local markets; thus bundling the systems under the public power 
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or other existing municipal enterprises was most likely necessary to avoid counsels’ negative 
opinions and credit ratings.  Further risks were possible with the U.S. Supreme Court’s Nixon v. 
Missouri Municipal League ruling (Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 2004) that authorized 
states to prohibit their political subdivisions from public provision, which if enacted by states 
and enforced upon municipalities with existing MANs might force those enterprises to cease 
provision.  Further effects could include the municipality privatizing their systems, retiring any 
remaining system construction debts from other enterprises, default risks, state and/or federal 
bailouts, etc.  An opinion requested from the State of Ohio Auditor by this author regarding their 
recognition of municipal electric power and telecommunication systems being considered 
distinct enterprises with separate independent funds has to date gone unanswered. 
 
Government Oversight of Telecommunications Markets 
U.S. Congressional, FCC, and state telecommunications policies were in a constant flux 
of being enacted, revised, and overturned by courts ad nauseam.  van Schewick noted how the 
U.S. legal system affected technological development and implementation, and often did not 
maintain equal pace with technological developments with subsequent effects upon market 
participants. 
Technical systems may effectively displace laws, and changes in technology can 
undercut a law's effectiveness even if the law's text remains unchanged (van Schewick, 
2010, p.26).  Laws can affect the technical environment by regulating technical systems, 
or by encouraging the development of specific technologies by letting public entities 
participate in standard setting, funding the development of desired technologies, or 
restricting public procurement to the technologies the state wants to foster.  By imposing 
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constraints, the architecture of a complex system affects the economic system for its 
development, production, and use - that is, the actors who will develop, produce, or use 
the system, the relationships among them, the governance structures they use to interact 
with one another, and the behavior of these actors.  And by changing existing 
architectures or creating new ones, economic actors can change the constraints that 
architecture imposes (van Schewick, p.28). 
Benkler opined upon the telecommunications market regulation mindset c.2006. 
Much of the formal regulatory drive has been to increase the degree to which 
private, commercial parties can gain and assert exclusivity in core resources necessary for 
information production and exchange.  At the physical layer, the shift to broadband 
Internet has been accompanied by less competitive pressure and greater legal freedom for 
providers to exclude competitors from, and shape the use of, their networks (Benkler, 
2006, p.384). 
The critique of concentration in this form therefore does not undermine the claim 
that the networked information economy, if permitted to flourish, will improve the 
democratic public sphere.  It underscores the threat of excessive monopoly in 
infrastructure to the sustainability of the networked public sphere.  The combination of 
observations regarding market concentration and an understanding of the importance of a 
networked public sphere to democratic societies suggests that a policy intervention is 
possible and desirable (Benkler, p.241). 
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U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996 Issues. 
Harvard University’s Berkman Center for Internet & Society discussed portions of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 that sought to create and increase market competition using 
“forced open access”, and the subsequent legal challenges against those provisions. 
The most innovative idea at the core of the 1996 Act was that in order to enable 
competition to develop, incumbents would have to open up access to components of their 
networks to competitors.  The Act introduced unbundling, interconnection, collocation, 
and wholesale access as elements of open access.  Unbundling in the 1996 Act initially 
had little to do with Internet access.  It dealt mostly with letting new entrants enter 
telephone markets. 
By the fall of 2001 (under the G.W. Bush Administration) a new FCC had 
changed course.  The FCC passed a series of decisions that abandoned the effort to 
implement open access, and shifted the focus … from the idea of regulated competition 
within each wire - competition over the copper plant of the telephone company and over 
the coaxial cable of the cable company - to competition between the owners of the two 
wires.  The theory was that two competitors with a strong base in a technology they own 
were enough to discipline each other, and much preferable to the uncertainties of 
unbundling and the price regulation and continuous monitoring of anticompetitive abuses 
that it entailed.  The two facilities-based competitors would drive each other to invest, 
would discipline any monopoly pricing, and would not suffer the negative incentives of 
knowing that some of their investments in upgraded networks would go to subsidize their 
competitors.  The model of inter-modal competition (competition between firms, each of 
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which uses a different technological mode to provide its service) seemed to work well 
(Benkler, 2009, pp.82-83). 
If a provider was required by say a government to open its network for access to and use 
by third party providers, the incumbent provider could potentially ration certain services and 
impose restrictions to discourage, inhibit, and possibly eliminate the competition.  The USSC’s 
Brand X ruling however restricted the U.S. federal government from mandating such forced 
open access, although left the decision to each state whether to impose such access requirements 
or not. 
Benkler also discussed the various back-and-forth rulings regarding the 1996 Act’s 
authorization of municipal telecommunications provision. 
The incumbent broadband providers have not taken kindly to the municipal 
assault on their monopoly (or oligopoly) profits.  When the City of Abilene, TX, tried to 
offer municipal broadband service in the late-1990s, Southwestern Bell persuaded the 
Texas legislature to pass a law that prohibited local governments from providing high-
speed Internet access.  The town appealed to the FCC and the Federal Court of Appeals 
in Washington, D.C.  Both bodies held that when Congress passed the 1996 
Telecommunications Act, and said that, “no state … regulation … may prohibit … the 
ability of any entity to provide … telecommunications service,” municipalities were not 
included in the term “any entity.”  As the D.C. Circuit put it, “any” might have some 
significance “depending on the speaker’s tone of voice,” but here it did not really mean 
“any entity,” only some.  And states could certainly regulate the actions of municipalities, 
which are treated in U.S. law as merely their subdivisions or organs.  Bristol, VA, had to 
fight off similar efforts to prohibit its plans through state law before it was able to roll out 
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its network.  In early 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court was presented with the practice of 
state preemption of municipal broadband efforts and chose to leave the municipalities to 
fend for themselves.  A coalition of Missouri municipalities challenged a Missouri law 
that, like the Texas law, prohibited them from stepping in to offer their citizens 
broadband service.  The Court of the Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed with the 
municipalities.  The 1996 Act, after all, was intended precisely to allow anyone to 
compete with the incumbents.  The section that prohibited states from regulating the 
ability of “any entity” to enter the telecommunications service market precisely 
anticipated that the local incumbents would use their clout in state legislatures to thwart 
the federal policy of introducing competition into the local loop.  Here, the incumbents 
were doing just that, but the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit decision.  
Without dwelling too much on the wisdom of allowing citizens of municipalities to 
decide for themselves whether they want a municipal system, the court issued an opinion 
that was technically defensible in terms of statutory interpretation, but effectively invited 
the incumbent broadband providers to put their lobbying efforts into persuading state 
legislators to prohibit municipal efforts.  After Philadelphia rolled out its wireless plan, it 
was not long before the Pennsylvania legislature passed a similar law prohibiting 
municipalities from offering broadband.  While Philadelphia’s plan itself was 
grandfathered, future expansion from a series of wireless “hot spots” in open area [sic] to 
a genuine municipal network will likely be challenged under the new state law.  Other 
municipalities in Pennsylvania are entirely foreclosed from pursuing this option.  In this 
domain, at least as of 2005, the incumbents seem to have had some substantial success in 
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containing the emergence of municipal broadband networks as a significant approach to 
eliminating the bottleneck in local network infrastructure (Benkler, 2006, pp.407-408). 
 
Government Provision Opposition 
A government’s active provision of telecommunications systems and/or services in a 
market may have elicited opposition to their involvement for various reasons.  Models that 
featured a government being the sole provider of both systems and services were essentially 
public monopolies, and while likely welcomed by participants in markets that were unserved by 
private sector providers, incumbent providers in other served markets usually opposed them.  
Such government provision was also opposed by providers in competitive markets, while similar 
provision in more uncompetitive markets as an attempt to break up cornering, monopolies, etc., 
was also opposed by the market leading providers.  Private providers generally argued that 
government provision was unfair competition and unnecessary market intrusion, citing their own 
usually for-profit return on investment requirements, taxable corporation statuses, usually worse 
debt ratings with higher borrowing costs, and their sunk costs in constructing their own systems.  
Providers inherently wanted to protect their market shares, subscriber bases, system values, and 
merger and acquisition value potentials from unnecessary competition.  End users in unserved 
markets or affected by uncompetitive provision likely supported government provision, though 
objections were possible particularly if users were forced to use the government service or a 
government’s select provider vs. other private providers they had used previously, particularly if 
bundled service packages were involved. 
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Benkler discussed a number of political subdivisions that went beyond provision of their 
own MIS/IT systems and entered local telecommunications markets as competitive providers of 
systems and/or services. 
One alternative path for the emergence of basic physical information transport 
infrastructure on a non-market model is the drive to establish municipal systems.  These 
proposed systems would not be commons-based in the sense that they would not be 
created by the cooperative actions of individuals without formal structure.  They would 
be public, like highways, sidewalks, parks, and sewage systems.  The basic thesis 
underlying municipal broadband initiatives is similar to that which has led some 
municipalities to create municipal utilities or transportation hubs.  Connectivity has 
strong positive externalities.  It makes a city’s residents more available for the 
information economy and the city itself a more attractive locale for businesses.  The 
initial drive has been the creation of municipal fiber-to-the-home networks.  The town of 
Bristol, VA, is an example - … the residents of the town, fed up with waiting for the local 
telephone and cable companies, built their own, municipally owned network.  The idea in 
Chicago is that basic “dark fiber” - that is, the physical fiber going to the home, but 
without the electronics that would determine what kinds of uses the connectivity could be 
put to - would be built by the city.  Access to use this entirely neutral, high-capacity 
platform would then be open to anyone - commercial and noncommercial alike (Benkler, 
2006, pp.405-406). 
Benkler then noted the opposition to those and other projects mounted by incumbent providers as 
previously discussed U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996 section (Benkler, 2006, pp. 407-
408). 
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Of interest in those cases (and in general) was exactly what provision from the 
government the private providers opposed - rights of way, infrastructure, facilities, services, or 
any market entry at all.  A question is would providers oppose an alternative model where a 
government provided rights of way, infrastructure, facilities, and open access to all providers 
equally, together with public last miles to municipal end users who could choose among 
providers, similar to say a municipality’s street enterprise that was openly accessible for use by 
all qualified vehicle operators?  If a municipality were unserved, or was technologically deficient 
(i.e., a provider’s system in the market was unable to provide high speed Internet) and the 
municipality’s system was technologically superior and could provide high speeds, the provider 
might be somewhat open to the government buying out its existing system if it could use the 
government’s system too since it would not have to build a newer, higher-tech system solely by 
itself.  The loss of customers to the new competition might still be a pricing power issue, and the 
loss of its system plus its captive customers would reduce its merger and acquisition value 
potential too.  However if a market were already served with a high speed service provider and a 
government chose to provide a high speed openly accessible system, the incumbent provider 
would likely oppose the government’s system and any new competitors that used it to provide 
their services.  The incumbent might relent though only if the government bought out its system 
at a certain price that could be at market rates depending upon how advanced its technology 
utilization was, the subscriber base count, and other valuation factors. 
Some school districts and other local government agencies reliant upon public utility 
common carrier real and personal property taxation assessments as part of their general operating 
budgets could oppose the decrease or loss of those taxes if a telecommunications market 
reorganization was implemented.  Any resulting shortfalls would have to be compensated for in 
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other ways, including government enterprise cross-subsidies, various tax increases, decreased 
government services provision, reliance upon more state and federal subsidies, etc.  In a similar 
example the West Virginia Turnpike once compensated counties that were supposedly denied the 
benefits of displaced local traffic re-routed onto its interstate.  The benefits of market 
reorganization therefore had to offset tax loses, perhaps in reduced governments-as-end users’ 
telecommunication costs and their greater utilization of online services. 
 
Telecommunications Market Provision Privatization 
Most telecommunication provision in the U.S. has traditionally been by private providers.  
Benkler argued that privatization of public system and service provision led to market 
consolidation by private providers. 
The result of the push toward private provisioning and deregulation has led to the 
emergence of a near-monopolistic market structure for wired physical broadband 
services.  By the end of 2003, more than 96% of homes and small offices in the U.S. that 
had any kind of “high-speed” Internet services received their service from either their 
incumbent cable operator or their incumbent local telephone company.  Less than 2% of 
homes and small offices receive their broadband connectivity from someone other than 
their cable carrier or incumbent telephone carrier.  More than 83% of these users get their 
access from their cable operator.  Moreover, the growth rate in adoption of cable 
broadband and local telephone DSL has been high and positive, whereas the growth rate 
of the few competing platforms, like satellite broadband, has been stagnant or shrinking.  
The proprietary wired environment is gravitating toward a high-speed connectivity 
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platform that will be either a lopsided duopoly, or eventually resolve into a monopoly 
platform (Benkler, 2006, pp.152-153). 
However when those services were publicly provided, the government agency was essentially a 
public monopoly, as it was unusual for multiple government agencies to offer competing systems 
and/or services against each other. 
 
Government Apathy 
While there were issues with various government solutions, some problems may have 
been caused or continued by government officials reluctant to have their offices explore 
telecommunication market solutions.  As explained by an anonymous regional government 
official (who conferred with local government officials on a daily basis) to this author, those 
officials acted more as politicians who hesitated to make what they perceived to be risky 
decisions for fear those solutions could fail and would reflect negatively upon them come a 
future election day.  The official also stated their academic and/or business backgrounds often 
did not include beyond a basic knowledge or appreciation of distribution market technologies, 
nor related issues of the day.  Some however were willing to learn, but others were not or did not 
have time to do so and instead relied upon incumbent providers and hired consultants who could 
shoulder the blame should a solution fail even though they were still paid (often with 
government funds) for their efforts.  Industry lobbyists also influenced government officials as 
witnessed by the author at numerous public meetings, hearings, and conventions sometimes 
sponsored in part by telecommunication providers.  Verizon recommended government 
subsidization of existing wireless market providers (where those markets often lacked robust 
competition) vs. increased regulation (and by inference government market provision) since 
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numerous studies showed the benefits of deregulation in other countries (U.S. Federal 
Communications Commission,2009).  Large providers could follow-up their recommendations 
with lobbying of key legislators and judges for sympathetic legislation and rulings that could 
further help entrench their market positions.  Lesser-capitalized competitors were often not in 
similar positions of power to lobby effectively for government-mandated market competition. 
Some progressive communities were actively interested in the telecommunications 
market, while others were catching up after hearing about the benefits that advanced 
telecommunications provided.  However the non-adopters risked being uncompetitive much less 
remaining relevant and potentially dying out much like ghost towns when their minerals and 
other area natural resources ran out, particularly in the face of significant international 
competition for faster throughputs at cheaper rates.  In another case, one former mayor 
proclaimed telecommunication provision was the sole responsibility of the incumbent LEC and 
as such he had no interest in municipal involvement in the local market.  Meanwhile the 
neighboring municipality was busy establishing its own MAN and hoping to provide competitive 
telecommunication services to its business and residential end users.  Many communities, 
including Lorain County, OH as evidenced in their 2002 Digital Economy Task Force broadband 
report, and in personal discussions with officials from the Ohio cities of Steubenville and 
Zanesville and the villages of Bratenahl and Sugarcreek had no idea their jurisdictions hosted or 
were immediately adjacent to major Tier I intercity backbone lines.  This was akin to them not 
knowing say the Autobahn was located in or nearby their towns, even though the fiber lines were 
buried and marked with numerous small “Do-not-dig-here” warning signs with the providers’ 
names along their routes.  The political subdivisions could be excused as the Tier I providers did 
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not actively wholesale market access of and service to lower-end end users and left that market 
to retail ISPs. 
Governments have claimed to dislike dysfunctional markets, yet rarely have they 
proposed substantive, alternative, potentially more optimal solutions to achieve supposedly 
desirable market goals.  They seemed to tolerate if not advocate or sanction monopolization just 
short of market cornering vs. more perfect competition, accepting it as merely natural or as a 
necessary evil.  The laissez-faire attitude may favor what Hayek termed a "catallaxy" - a market 
where “spontaneous order” emerged when no centralized control source (government) overrode 
decisions of individuals pursuing their own ends (von Hayek, 1989).  Perhaps the ideologies of 
the political parties in control of governing agencies at the time eschewed market involvement 
much less oversight, with some extremists questioning the need for governments at all. 
The FCC seemed complacent with the market structure and competition. 
The lack of a large number of wireline, facilities-based providers does not 
necessarily mean competition among broadband providers is inadequate.  While older 
economic models of competition emphasized the danger of tacit collusion with a small 
number of rivals, economists today recognize that coordination is possible but not 
inevitable under such circumstances.  Moreover, modern analyses find that markets with 
a small number of participants can perform competitively; however, those analyses do 
not tell us what degree of competition to expect in a market with a small number of 
wireline broadband providers.  Given that approximately 96% of the population has at 
most two wireline providers, there are reasons to be concerned about wireline broadband 
competition in the U.S.  Whether sufficient competition exists is unclear and, even if such 
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competition presently exists, it is surely fragile (U.S. Federal Communications 
Commission, 2009, p.37). 
Benkler critiqued the FCC’s stance with the following excerpts. 
It does not address the source of the access problem: without a major policy shift 
to increase competition, broadband service in the U.S. will continue to lag far behind the 
rest of the developed world.  The plan acknowledges that only 15% of homes will have a 
choice in providers, and then only between Verizon’s FiOS fiber optic network and the 
local cable company.  (AT&T’s “fiber” offering is merely souped-up DSL transmitted 
partly over its old copper wires, which can’t compete at these higher speeds.)  The 
remaining 85% will have no choice at all. 
The FCC gave in, deciding that competition between one telephone incumbent and one 
cable incumbent was enough. Senior FCC staff members have essentially conceded that 
lobbying pressure from the monopolies is too strong even to begin exploring (an 
alternative solution of) open access right now (Benkler, 2010). 
Governments not continuously advancing their telecommunication markets risked falling 
behind competitively to others that were making such investments.  Australian Prime Minister 
Julia Gillard said her country could not sit back and let others build infrastructure similar to its 
proposed National Broadband Network to achieve an advantage.  She said, "Singapore, Korea, 
and Japan have the benefits of this technology," Opposition Leader Tony Abbott "wants to shun 
the technology", that he did not understand the NBN, and that his thinking was limited to only 
that of downloading music and movies.  “It showed how little he understands modern health care 
and education.”  PM Gillard said how foolish it would have been to say typewriters and fixed 
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line phones were good enough, and those advocates were “condemning Australia". (LeMay, 
2010). 
Various studies indicate the U.S. lagged among developed nations in high speed 
provision.  Google CEO Eric E. Schmidt and other technology and government leaders pointed 
to the trailing high speed performance as a danger to American competitiveness that threatened 
to saddle the nation with an “innovation deficit” compared with other countries (Lohr, 2010).  
Regardless, when presented with projects where such advancements had been made, some critics 
doubted whether those improvements were too much too soon.  Higher-speed Internet service, 
experts agreed, was an important national goal, but it was less clear whether moving quickly to 
very-high-speed service was worth the cost.  Much of the economic gain could be achieved and 
consumer demand met by moving on a “more measured path”.  Some experts said the demand 
for 1Gb/sec service could be minuscule.  Nonpartisan research group Information Technology 
and Innovation Foundation president Robert D. Atkinson said, “I can’t imagine a for-profit 
company doing what they are doing in Chattanooga (offering symmetrical 1Gb/sec for 
$350/month), because it’s so far ahead of where the market is.” (Lohr). 
 
Select Telecommunication Projects 
A sample of numerous recent telecommunication system projects provided under various 
domestic and international governance and business models were analyzed in terms of local and 
last mile market competition goals. 
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ACCESS/Columbiana County (OH) Port Authority System 
In Ohio, 26 Columbiana and Mahoning County school districts, two educational service 
centers, 20 non-public schools, and two Special Education Regional Resource Centers 
coordinated to form the Area Cooperative Computerized Educational Service System 
(“ACCESS”). (http://www.access-k12.org 2010).  ACCESS was one of 23 governmental 
computer service organizations serving more than 900 educational entities and 1.4M students in 
the state.  Information Technology Centers (ITCs) provided IT services to school districts, 
community (charter) schools, joint vocational, career and technical schools, educational service 
centers, and parochial schools.  The ITCs, service organizations, and their users formed the Ohio 
Education Computer Network.  Such sites in conjunction with the Ohio Department of Education 
comprised a statewide system to provide comprehensive, cost-efficient accounting and other 
administrative and instructional computer services for participating state entities (State of Ohio 
Auditor, 2010). 
ACCESS constructed a 344-mile SONET-based WAN to serve its member schools and 
institutions (Columbiana County (OH) Port Authority, 2004), which was later upgraded to a four 
loop, 10Gb/sec Ethernet WAN with 1Gb/sec interconnecting each members’ facilities. 
(http://www.access-k12.org/15681092714358197/site/default.asp 2010)  A 2004 proposal by the 
Columbiana County (OH) Port Authority sought to lease for $1.2M with an option to purchase 
two strands of ACCESS’s fibers made available for commercial use containing at the time 
360Gb/sec of capacity.  CCPA was to construct a new or retrofit one of their existing facilities 
for use as a NOC for $3M available for other end users to co-locate their network equipment to, 
and as a potential new business incubator with direct connection access to on-premise providers 
utilizing the ACCESS network (Columbiana County (OH) Port Authority, 2004)  CCPA later 
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acquired two more ACCESS strands for free as part of the lease, which were then used by a 
NOC provider that had located into the port authority's industrial park for increased connectivity 
to its end users (Giambroni, 2011). 
 
Municipal Electric Enterprise-Subsidized MANs 
The following cases were examples of municipalities that provided their own public 
electric power and additionally entered the local and last mile telecommunications markets by 
establishing cross-subsidized public MANs. 
 
Dover (OH) MAN. 
The City of Dover, OH which generated and distributed its own electric power to 
municipal businesses and residents, added Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition 
(“SCADA”) telemetry services to its grid for improved system monitoring and reliability.  The 
city's electrical consultants recommended using new fiber optic cables for the SCADA network 
to also remotely monitor and control a secondary substation located across town from the power 
plant’s NOC.  SCADA signals had low bit rates easily handled by copper lines or dialup ISP 
service to control and monitor relatively few electrical equipment units.  The consultants though 
further recommended Dover consider acquiring and installing cables containing many more fiber 
optic strands than required to host SCADA for potential use as a future public 
telecommunications MAN.  Dover City Council agreed and approved a municipal bond issuance 
for both projects to be repaid by electrical and MAN subscriptions (Mizer, 2002).  Dover's MAN 
infrastructure was based upon a design recommended by the same consultants for the City of 
Wadsworth, OH and other municipalities featuring aerially-mounted multi-strand fiber optic 
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cables bracketed to power poles arranged in various looped routes around the city, with hybrid 
fiber-coaxial cable network equipment to serve end users, similar to cable operators’ cable 
modem service.  Dover's electric enterprise owned and operated the power poles and pole rights 
of way that hosted the power grid and street traffic control signal infrastructures.  Extra pole and 
right of way space was available for lease to other providers and end users for their system 
infrastructures.  The MAN infrastructure was to be owned and operated by the electric enterprise 
utilizing their rights of way and poles. 
Dover's MAN provided WAN, dark fibers, and retail ISP to the city’s various 
departments for their MIS/IT and Internet needs, to the Dover City School district’s facilities, 
and to select lineside industrial and commercial end users within the jurisdiction.  In a State of 
the City review, Dover Mayor Richard Homrighausen discussed the MAN project. 
One of the more major accomplishments during my term has been the installation 
of Dover’s fiber optics system.  The city has over 3.1 miles of 48-strand fiber optic cable 
and an additional 7+ miles of 96-strand fiber optic cable.  At present, the city is using the 
fiber to power our telecommunications infrastructure, as well as about a dozen businesses 
within the community.  For over eight years, the Dover City Schools have had the benefit 
of being connected to our fiber optic system, at no charge, for their telecommunications 
services as well as for the use in their distance learning lab.  This past year the city of 
Dover, in conjunction with the Tuscarawas County Community Improvement 
Corporation, consummated a high-speed connectivity agreement with the State of Ohio 
and their Ohio Supercomputer Network.  This connection makes Dover the only 
municipality in the State of Ohio to have such a connection.  This also gives Dover a 
competitive edge over other communities in our area in the way of attracting business and 
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industry, since we are the only community that can meet the ultra high-speed 
telecommunications demands of today at tomorrow’s high speeds.  Additionally, this 
connection is allowing Dover to serve as the telecommunications “head-end” for the 
CIC’s tech park project in [adjacent city] New Philadelphia – and any other business, 
industry, and educational institutions along the way that are able to connect to the fiber 
the county is installing to the park. 
Q. What do you consider to be the major disappointments of your administration 
over the past 16 years? 
A. While Dover’s fiber optics initiative is listed above as a major 
accomplishment, at the same time it is a major disappointment in that we have not moved 
forward with deploying the fiber throughout the city for all residents, business, and 
industry to take advantage of.  I had thought that by this time we would have available a 
“triple play” fiber program where residents, business, and industry would have voice, 
video, and data services available over our fiber optic cable.  Even though it is 
disappointing that we are not yet able to provide these services city-wide, our plans are to 
move in that direction.  We are fortunate to be in the position to even offer these services 
and I would rather take the slow approach to get everything right than to forge ahead and 
do something that we will be sorry for in the long run. 
Q. What are your forecasts and predictions for 2008? 
A. We plan on requesting proposals and bidding the engineering services for the 
full deployment of Dover’s fiber optics system with the intent to service the entire 
community with this cutting edge technology (Q&A with Dover Mayor Richard 
Homrighausen, 2008). 
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The Dover MAN was reportedly connected to only a T1 backhaul service, as no private 
wholesale providers were available locally (or possibly willing) to provide faster services and 
network interconnections.  Dover City Schools were subscribing to six LEC T1 circuits at the 
time, which would have taxed the MAN’s capacity if they switched entirely over to service from 
the MAN.  However as Homrighausen discussed, OARnet later branched from their neighboring 
New Philadelphia POP a few miles southwest of Dover to provide the city’s MAN and its end 
users with state agency WAN connectivity and faster Internet service. 
Dover’s MAN competed against previously established LEC Verizon, cable operator 
Adelphia, and local wireless providers Tusco.Net, Wilkshire.Net, and Lightspeed Wireless in the 
same municipal market, offering much the same telecommunication services and speeds, WAN, 
and in the wireline cases dark fiber availability.  Why bond counsel recommended the city 
construct the new system and provide similar services in a rather well-served market, potentially 
hampering repayments of their bonds thus requiring cross-subsidizations from other municipal 
enterprises if not additional taxes and privatization of city assets, was unknown.  Homrighausen 
prohibited WISP Lightspeed Wireless from collocating antennas for its regional network on city 
infrastructures, as they represented market competition to their MAN.  This restriction hampered 
Lightspeed and other WISPs from utilizing the MAN as a potential backhaul for their system to 
other upstream providers.  Dover tried using proposed zoning changes to force residents and 
businesses building new homes and facilities to construct and finance their own connections to 
Dover's MAN, even if those end users planned to subscribe to services with other providers, or 
did not desire accessing such services at all.  The measure was later tabled by council if not 
dropped entirely. 
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As noted, Dover used their public power business and governance model as being the 
sole producers and distribution providers of power to its businesses and residents to help justify 
their MAN project.  The State of Ohio General Assembly once proposed an anti-competitive 
telecommunications law to prohibit public MANs from competing vs. private providers, but 
continued to authorize public power providers to lock out private power providers from 
accessing and serving the same markets. 
 
Provo (UT) iProvo MAN. 
The City of Provo, UT’s Energy Department - Telecommunication Division constructed 
and owned a public MAN initially intended for SCADA and WAN for municipal department 
MIS/IT needs, though it was expanded into a FTTP/FTTH MAN that afforded open access for 
various competitive providers for WAN and IP services to end users.  Retail provider Veracity 
offered MAN end users symmetrical 10Mb/sec and 100Mb/sec system-wide, bundled service 
packages only, and required end users use custom network equipment.  Another retail provider 
Mstar Metro offered end users $40/month symmetrical 10Mb/sec and also required end users use 
custom network equipment.  LEC/IXC Qwest and cable operator Comcast were still providing 
Provo end users services via their own independent systems, but both were invited by the city to 
access and use the MAN as part of their network for competitive service provision. 
To construct the system, Provo issued a type of municipal bonds. 
Zion’s Bank, the City’s financial advisor on the project, recommend that the City 
issue Sales Tax Revenue Bonds to finance iProvo because it obtains the highest possible 
bond rating, the lowest premium for bond insurance, and possibly eliminates the need for 
a funded debt service reserve, which if waived by the rating agency would lower the 
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amount of bonds to be issued.  They also examined other financial instruments and 
determined these other options would leave the City with the same level of responsibility 
for the bonds while adding to the overall cost of the project.  The total bonding amount is 
expected to be $39.5M (http://www.provo.org/util.iprovofaq.html 2010). 
The Energy Department cross-subsidized the MAN enterprise.  After the bonds were to be 
retired, MAN revenues received from leasing capacity to competitive providers were then 
earmarked for the City’s general fund (http://provo.org/util.iprovofaq.html 2010) where they 
would theoretically be used to subsidize other municipal enterprises and services. 
 
Chattanooga (TN) MAN. 
In 1935 the City of Chattanooga, TN established the non-profit municipal utility and 
enterprise fund Electric Power Board for the sole purpose of providing electric power.  In 1938 
EPB received its first power transmitted by the federal government-owned independent 
corporation Tennessee Valley Authority, and shortly thereafter began reselling that electricity to 
169K customers in the surrounding 600 square-mile area (http://epbfi.com 2011).  The TVA 
when created restructured a portion of the U.S. electric power market in the Tennessee River 
valley region.  As a power supplier (power generator + distributor), regulatory agency, and 
economic development agency, the TVA forced a number of private power providers (power 
generators + distributors) that had previously controlled nearly all of the production + 
distribution markets out of business.  In 2009 EPB residential electric rates were $0.0947 per 
kWh, 18.5% less than the national average, with the TVA setting the wholesale electric rates.  
Those low electric rates likely encouraged EPB to further expand into telecommunications 
provision (Electric Power Board, 2009). 
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In 1999, EPB received approval from the Tennessee Regulatory Authority to provide 
telecommunications services, in 2002 it received approval from the State of Tennessee to provide 
Internet services, and in 2007 the Chattanooga City Council authorized EPB to provide 
telephone, Internet, and video services to users via its MAN (http://epbfi.com 2011).  EPB via its 
MAN offered naked symmetrical 1Gb/sec service for $350/month 
(https://epbfi.com/enroll/packages/# 2011), in addition to bundles including a digital television 
package with 300+ channels, a digital recording unit, 55 digital music channels, 60 HDTV 
channels, and on demand channels among other features, and digital telephony service with local 
and long distance (the premium package included free unlimited long distance) and other add-on 
services (http://epbfi.com 2011).  Business service rates were slightly higher than residential 
rates due to potentially higher throughputs, and were determined by EPB representatives on a 
per-case basis.  EPB assessed no throughput caps, issued end users static IPs, and permitted end 
user hosting.  AT&T, Level 3, and Sprint supplied the MAN with upstream service.  The EPB 
system was constructed in a served market, and cable provider Comcast did protest their entry.  
None of the incumbents were using the EPB system as part of their own system, and were still 
assessing their users higher rates than EPB was for similar IP services (K. Mena personal 
communication, 2011, December 20). 
EPB CEO Harold DePriest did not expect immediate demand for the 1Gb/sec service, 
and when asked why EPB offered it he replied, “The simple answer is because we can.”  
DePriest added the higher speed service could be provided at minimal additional expense once 
the fiber optic MAN was installed and the network equipment was functional.  “We don’t know 
how to price a gig.  We’re experimenting.  We’ll learn.  The overriding consideration is that this 
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is a real tool for economic development for our community.  It is the basis for creating the 
products and services of the Internet of the future.  And it’s in Chattanooga today.” (Lohr, 2010). 
EPB’s telecommunication enterprise was bundled with its electric power enterprise, 
which was a retailer/reseller of TVA-generated power.  The telecommunications service was 
piggybacked on top of the EPB electric grid’s SCATA network, which was the initial reason for 
installing the fiber optic cable to users.  EPB was awarded a $111M U.S. Energy Department 
grant thereby accelerating its “smart-grid” plan, but DePriest said the federal funds did not 
subsidize the high-speed Internet service (Lohr, 2010). The two services likely did cross-
subsidize each other, as neither were structured as stand alone independent enterprises 
(http://epbfi.com 2011). 
 
Dublin (OH) DubLink 
In 1996, the City of Dublin, OH appropriated $96M for street and right-of-way 
improvement and beautification projects to help resolve traffic problems created by increased 
sprawl, but hesitated in seeing their finished work torn up by future utility installations, 
potentially numerous times by multiple telecommunication providers.  Telecommunications 
systems provision therefore factored significantly into their planning process (Intelligent 
Community Forum, 2011).  Dublin thus assembled a team comprised of a telecommunications 
attorney, a telecommunications engineer, and the city service director to develop a business and 
governance model for the project, and they suggested a number of options. 
• A publicly-owned utility that would provide telecommunications services. 
• No government regulation whatsoever. 
• A PPP model to provide telecommunications services. 
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• A PPP model to provide conduit infrastructure but not telecommunications services. 
The publicly-owned utility option was dismissed as Dublin lacked the expertise to provide 
complex telecommunication services.  The city, while willing to take some risks, was not willing 
to assume the financial and managerial risks of owning (i.e., owning ROW, infrastructure, and 
facilities) and operating a telecommunications company (i.e., administering the system and 
assumedly providing carriage services).  The “No Regulation” option was dismissed because it 
would not help achieve the goal of preserving the city’s expensive right-of-way improvements, 
even though the option could encourage more rapid deployment of telecommunications services 
(Dunn & McDaniel, 2011).  The team considered establishing a competitive provider to deliver 
all telecommunications services, but the city was unwilling to bear the risks of building and 
operating a company, among other complexities.  The legal counsel advised it might also run 
counter to the 1996 Telecommunications Act by stifling provision competition (Intelligent 
Community Forum, 2011).  It was also difficult for them to devise a regulatory scheme that 
prevented private providers from constructing infrastructure in the city’s rights-of-way that did 
not violate the 1996 Act or antitrust laws. 
The team therefore decided that creating a conduit system was the best choice.  The plan 
conceptualized that the city or some private entity would build a conduit system throughout the 
high-density business district where virtually all the initial demand for competitive services 
would initially occur.  The system would feature conveniently placed manholes, a ring design, 
and redundant building entrances extending from the manholes.  Providers would not be 
permitted to cut into streets or build in city rights-of-way, and would be required to lease space 
from the conduit system.  Lease rates would have to be low enough so that no provider could 
complain that the rates were a barrier to entry, as prohibited by the 1996 Act (Dunn & McDaniel, 
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2011).  Dublin contracted with the Fishel Company to construct the DubLink buried conduit 
system within its business district, and franchised them as the conduit provider for 25 years with 
an additional 25 year renewal option.  Fishel leased the municipal right of way and owned the 
conduit system, which they made openly accessible for providers and other users that included 
SBC/AT&T, Teleport Communications Group, Time Warner Communications, ICG, and 
NextLink Ohio.  Fishel self-financed construction of the $10M system, and assessed users $7.27 
to $9.80 per foot annually ($38,385.60 to $51,744.00 per mile respectively), with those rates 
regulated by the City.  The 30.5 mile system featured 1.25” and 4” buried conduits, with the 
larger ducts containing innerducts within them, and reportedly 12 1.25” conduits installed per 
trench. 
The network saved users time and money by providing an existing infrastructure within 
the business district so that users could lease rather than construct their own lines and systems 
(DataCenter.BZ, LLC, 2009).  A few competitive providers opposed the DubLink system 
ordinances claiming the lease rates were too high and that they could build their own systems 
cheaper and more efficiently as demand warranted.  Dublin City Council was not convinced, as 
they were essentially proposing to do what Dublin wanted to prevent - haphazardly cutting 
expensive streets and rights-of-way with considerably short planning horizons and self-serving 
fiscal concerns (Dunn & McDaniel, 2011).  Incumbent LEC SBC Ameritech required two policy 
positions: its existing systems needed to be “grandfathered” in place rather than be forced to join 
with the conduit system, and that it retained the right to build systems anywhere and whenever it 
wanted.  Dublin Council then passed a right-of-way control ordinance that established a 
“DubLink District” encompassing the entire business district of the city.  All new 
telecommunications infrastructure construction within the district was banned, and providers 
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desiring to deploy systems were required to use the DubLink conduit system.  Dublin agreed to 
“grandfather” Ameritech’s existing facilities and exempt them from the DubLink regulations, 
giving them various advantages over Fishel and competitors forced to use DubLink.  It also 
authorized any provider to build its own systems if there was no DubLink conduit in that 
location, provided that it also allowed DubLink conduit to use the same trench (Intelligent 
Community Forum, 2011).  Dublin waived Fishel’s franchise and other fees in exchange for free 
conduit access.  The city itself offered no services to end users except access to certain 
governmental services for public use.  For other services, it leased either conduit space or used 
its own dark fiber to providers serving the local market (The invisible bridges of Dublin, 2011). 
Dublin partnered with the Ohio Supercomputer Network in the Central Ohio Research 
Network to provide advanced computing power and robust fiber infrastructure that connected 
area governments, schools, and businesses to Ohio colleges, universities, major research 
institutes, and Federal laboratories.  It also provided capacity to the Online Computer Library 
Center, which supported more than 69K libraries in 112 countries, and had partners with two 
carrier hotels in Columbus to give DubLink users low-cost access to Tier I and other providers 
(Intelligent Community Forum, 2011).  Dublin was further considering deployment of a 
“DubLink II” network for high-speed services to its residential areas situated outside of the 
DubLink area (Dunn & McDaniel, 2011).  Dublin provided transit to the Columbus Fibernet and 
received capacity on that network in return (Intelligent Community Forum, 2011).  The CFN 
duct system consisted of 70 miles of 20 1.5” innerducts connecting the downtown commercial 
business district with high-speed users outside of I-270 and high tech business parks in the 
Columbus suburbs of Dublin, Easton, Gahanna, Hilliard, Polaris, Westerville, and Worthington 
(http://www.columbusfiber.net 2011).  In 2009 DataCenter.BZ, a Tier IV data center located in 
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Columbus, agreed to bring DubLink’s dark fiber to its facility located in nearby Worthington.  
The benefit was direct fiber connectivity to the data center, enabling DataCenter.BZ users to 
cross-connect to the provider of their choice, and utilize the data center’s other services that 
included collocation, physical security for IT equipment, Tier IV power, 24 x 7 managed 
services, virtualization, and cloud computing.  DataCenter.BZ president Gordon Scherer said, 
“Not only is this an economical way for companies to privately connect to IT and 
telecommunication solutions, it eliminates the restriction of bandwidth that is often created by 
telecom carriers, or any solution that isn’t operated over dark fiber.  Utilizing dark fiber, 
businesses have complete control over their bandwidth and can increase or decrease their speeds 
based solely on the equipment they choose to operate.  Companies will be able to access the best 
pricing available from the carrier(s) of their choice, forcing the providers to compete in order to 
win the business.” (DataCenter.BZ, LLC, 2009). 
 
Butler County (OH) Fiber Network 
The Butler County, OH Fiber Optic Initiative was a project to provide the county and 
Miami University with a fiber optic network, and was thereafter expected to connect with and 
serve most of the county’s other communities.  The network featured 100 miles of 96-strand 
fiber cables routing throughout the county.  Butler County originally owned 12 of the strands, 
Miami University leased 12 strands, provider iFiber of Middletown, OH leased two strands for 
five years, and a Columbus, OH-based investor owned the balance.  Six more strands worth 
approximately $1M were purchased and donated to Miami University, giving them connectivity 
to the State of Ohio’s OARnet/Third Frontier Network.  iFiber open accessed and sublet their 
leased strands to competitive third party providers including DONet, Nuvox, and Inter-Tel.  The 
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project was jointly financed by Butler County, Miami University, and Cincinnati Bell, with one 
source stating the project cost $10M, while another listed the county’s investment at $2.75M 
with $100K annual costs for operation and maintenance services provided by Cincinnati Bell 
(http://www.butlercounty.biz/Fiber.htm, http://www.ifiber.net 2006). 
A 2010 update on the network reported Butler County paid $5.7M for the system.  Of the 
96 strands, the county owned 34 and leased 12 of them to Miami University.  Butler used 16 of 
its strands to provide high-speed Internet connections to 38 county government sites, while its 
remaining six strands were not used.  Other network owners included iFiber (30 strands); 
Cincinnati Bell Telephone (12 strands); NI Solutions (12 strands); Miami University (6 strands); 
and the City of Hamilton, OH (2 strands).  MU’s network connected its main Oxford, OH 
campus with its branch campuses in Hamilton, Middletown, and West Chester Township, OH.  
Butler County IT director Greg Sullivan said Butler County’s WAN improved communications 
between county government offices as well as between county offices and state offices in 
Columbus, and allowed the county to provide connections to its emergency communications 
center and Emergency Management Agency.  “It has raised the quality of life in Butler County.  
There are still a lot of advantages for us to use this network.”  The county had explored 
providing connections to residential users but found the cost was prohibitive, according to 
County Commissioner Chuck Furman. 
Butler County financial director Bob Lowery said the network cost the county $274K a 
year, and its debt for the system c.2010 was about $4M.  The county received $300K annually in 
lease payments from MU, but those only partially offset the $214K a year the county paid 
Cincinnati Bell to maintain the network and the $350K a year required for debt payments.  
Lowery pointed out that if the county didn't have its own network, it would be paying Cincinnati 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 118 
Bell or another provider for similar service, and he didn't know how much that service would 
cost but it probably would be less than $274K.  The financial challenges raised questions about 
what the county should do with its one-third ownership of the system. Commissioner Furmon 
said, “We need to know if we should keep the system and expand it.  Or should we cut our losses 
and sell it for what we can get out of it and move on?”  County Commissioner Don Dixon said, 
“There's no way for taxpayers to get their money back.  We need to deal with this issue, because 
it's a constant financial drain.”  He also said there was no interest from the private sector in 
buying any of the 34 county-owned strands.  Further complicating matters, Dynus Corp., which 
was trying to acquire a contract to improve the network, took out $6.5M in loans in the county's 
name without the county commissioners' knowledge.  Over the past 2.5 years, the subsequent 
scandal resulted in the criminal convictions of three Dynus officials, former Butler County 
Auditor Kay Rogers, and the indictment of former Butler County Commissioner Mike Fox 
(Kemme, 2010). 
 
North Georgia Network 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 allocated $7.2B for expanding 
high speed telecommunications access, with the first $4.7B directed to the U.S. Department of 
Commerce’s Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP) to provide high speed 
access to underserved communities and public institutions, and stimulate demand for high speed 
services in general.  Local groups could apply for BTOP funding for “last mile projects” to bring 
high speed Internet service to census blocks where a majority of users were not served by 
higher!speed service or had less than 3Mb/sec speeds.  Much like the U.S. Rural Electrification 
Administration, the goal of the government’s programs was to subsidize infrastructure in 
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underserved and rural regions and create jobs during the economic downturn then.  At the time, 
the programs distributed approximately $200M in grants and loans for infrastructure buildouts 
including a “$33.5M grant with an additional $8.8M in matching funds to deploy a 260!mile 
regional fiber!optic ring to deliver gigabit broadband speeds, reliability, affordability, and 
abundant interconnection points for last mile service in the North Georgia foothills.” (Chettiar & 
Holladay, 2010, p.36).  In 2009 the North Georgia Network Cooperative, Inc. was the first 
applicant to receive a stimulus grant for an 80% match to their 20% investment in the “North 
Georgia Network” to help develop a new technology-based economy for GA’s 12 northern 
counties.  The project proposed to build 135 miles of new fiber connecting to 125 miles of 
existing fiber to create a middle mile ring.  NGN was a member-owned cooperative, with part 
owners including the Habersham Electric Membership Corp. and the Blue Ridge Mountain 
Electric Membership Corp.  Both electric utilities had already constructed locally-based fiber 
infrastructures and were to be further involved in the NGN (North Georgia Network 
Cooperative, Inc., 2009). 
The NGN featured dual-route redundancy and supported last mile fiber to the home.  
“NGN is an open network that will feature approximately 2,600 interconnection points along the 
route, where independent service providers will be encouraged, on a non-discriminatory basis, to 
interconnect with the system in order to build out their own fiber services to end users.  
Interconnection for independent service providers will be enabled through an access company 
that will be a member and owner of NGN.  The plentiful interconnection opportunities will result 
in an abundance of broadband capacity, give consumers a choice of providers, and bring pricing 
in the region down to the more affordable levels typically enjoyed in non-rural areas” (North 
Georgia Network Cooperative, Inc., 2009).  NGN was fully symmetrical 
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(http://northgeorgianetwork.com/technology/ 2011) and provided a minimum 1Gb/sec at the 
connection points (NGN Trailwave Technology Overview, 2011). 
 
Australia’s National Broadband Network 
Australia had slower and more expensive telecommunications access than many other 
developed countries c.2008, and officials warned the country might have become less 
competitive without faster, nationwide coverage.  About 64% of homes had high speed service, 
although Australia’s vast distances and its inhospitable terrain made full penetration difficult.  
The Australian government then proposed a A$9.4B (US$8.8B) high-speed fiber optic-based 
network with minimum speeds of 12Mb/sec to access 98% of Australian homes.  The network 
architecture for the last mile would have either delivered fiber to neighborhood "nodes" in each 
street or directly to end users’ premises (Thieberger, 2008). 
In 2009, Minister for Broadband, Communications, and the Digital Economy Sen. 
Stephen Conroy announced sweeping reforms to Australia’s existing telecommunications 
regulations as the government also rolled out its upgraded $43B National Broadband Network to 
bypass incumbent Telstra's existing copper system and go straight to end users’ premises, and 
moved Telstra towards becoming part of the NBN.  The following was paraphrased from the 
official announcement. 
The reforms would drive future growth, productivity and innovation across all 
sectors of the economy by: 
• Addressing Telstra’s high level of integration to promote greater competition and 
consumer benefits. 
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• Streamlining and simplifying the competition regime to provide more certain and 
quicker outcomes for telecommunications companies. 
• Strengthening consumer safeguards to ensure services standards are maintained at a 
high level. 
• Removing redundant and inefficient regulatory red-tape. 
Telstra was one of the most highly integrated telecommunications companies in 
the world across the fixed-line copper, cable, and mobile platforms.  Sen. Conroy said, 
“The reforms address the structure of the telecommunications market and provide Telstra 
with the flexibility to choose its future path.  It is the Government’s clear desire for 
Telstra to structurally separate on a voluntary and cooperative basis.”  The reforms would 
also promote competition and strengthen consumer safeguards.  Sen. Conroy continued, 
“The existing telecommunications anti-competitive conduct and access regimes have 
been widely criticized as being cumbersome, open to gaming and abuse, and provide 
insufficient certainty for investment.”  Since the commencement of the regime in 1997 
there have been more than 150 telecommunications access disputes compared to only 
three access disputes in other regulated sectors, including airports and energy sectors. 
The legislation addressed Telstra’s vertical integration by allowing the provider to 
voluntarily … structurally separate.  If Telstra chose not to structurally separate, the 
Government could impose a strong functional separation framework on Telstra.  The 
legislation required Telstra conduct its network operations and wholesale functions at 
arm’s length from the rest of Telstra; provide equivalent price and non-price terms to its 
retail business and non-Telstra wholesale customers; and such equal treatment be made 
transparent to the regulator and competitors.  The legislation addressed Telstra’s 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 122 
horizontal integration by promoting competition across telecommunications platforms.  
Telstra would be prevented from acquiring additional spectrum for advanced wireless 
broadband while it remained vertically integrated and owned a hybrid fiber coaxial cable 
network and maintained interest in provider Foxtel.  The legislation authorized the 
Minister to remove either or both of the second and third requirements if Telstra 
structurally separated.  The legislation also reformed the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (“ACCC”) so it could address breaches of competition law and 
conduct damaging to the telecommunications market.  Failure by Telstra to meet the 
minimum performance benchmark requirements would expose Telstra to a civil penalties 
of up to $10M (Conroy, 2009). 
Sen. Conroy added, “These historic fundamental reforms address the long-standing inadequacies 
of the existing telecommunications regulatory regime," and said Telstra had been too highly 
integrated for too long, and previous governments from both sides of politics had failed to reform 
the telecommunications sector (Rodgers, 2009). 
The proposed A$43B NBN would provide service to approximately 93% of the 
population.  NBN would give competitors an even platform to compete over, with many of the 
smaller, more nimble companies backing themselves to be able to outmaneuver Telstra if its 
dominance of the infrastructure was ended (Bathgate, 2010).  NBN was c.2013 providing 
100Mb/sec downstream and 40Mb/sec upstream, with prices ranging from A$40 to A$164.95 
per month and data limits on all plans.  As more end users subscribed to NBN over time, those 
prices were projected to decrease, with wholesale prices in regional and metropolitan Australia 
set at the same rate.  NBN’s initial pricing objective was to pay off the network and to gain a 7% 
return on investment for the government (Taylor, 2012).  Mike Quigley, CEO of NBN Co. - the 
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company building the NBN - said NBN would eventually launch 1Gb/sec services in the future.  
"We will have one consistent set of products across the whole national footprint.  And that means 
consistent ubiquitous service up to 1Gb/sec.  Everyone keeps talking about 100Mb/sec.  But 
that's obviously when we're talking about residents.  For business, we are allowing for a certain 
percentage in our dimensioning to structure point-to-point services up to 1Gb/sec." (Taylor)  
Quigley said increasing the speed would not add to the $43B construction price tag and the fiber 
could be upgraded to provide even faster speeds in coming years.  The faster capability was 
already built into the equipment, which the company was installing in homes, and Quigley said 
he decided to enable it after discussions with ISPs and the competition watchdog.  NBN Co. 
would offer unlimited download capacity at 1Gb/sec wholesale rates to retail ISPs, but provider 
Internode said it was not reasonable to give consumers unlimited downloads (Battersby & Sharp, 
2010).  Minister Conroy also stated that when a consumer purchased speeds of 50Mb/sec or 
100Mb/sec that is what they would get consistently - those speeds represented a consistent rate 
and not peak speeds (LeMay, 2010). 
The NBN proposal implementation was affirmed after the Labor Party took control of the 
Australian government in 2010.  Member of Parliament Tony Windsor said, “In relation to the 
NBN there will also be equity in terms of wholesale pricing across country areas.”  MP Rob 
Oakeshott added, “And it will be a roll-in, not roll-out – it’s now a broadband roll-in,” referring 
to a system buildout strategy where rural areas would receive NBN fiber services first vs. 
metropolitan areas.  Ovum research director David Kennedy added, “Under Labor's policy, 
where we’re clearly heading is a structurally separated industry.  While both of them agree on 
the need to tighten competition rules on Telstra, they don’t agree about whether - Telstra in 
particular and the industry in general - should be structurally separated.  Labor would take us 
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strongly in that direction.”  Quigley retorted to opponents of the government network, “NBN can 
provide an acceptable return for the government.  Taxpayers will get their $27B investment back 
with interest and they will get a network they can use for decades.  This is, I believe, a much 
better option for the Australian public than giving billions of dollars of taxpayer funding to 
subsidize commercial companies to marginally improve today’s broadband networks.” (Pitcher, 
2010). 
The Alliance for Affordable Broadband, comprised of a group of providers and other 
interested parties, proposed an alternative "NBN Version 3" model and denoted a number of 
principles upon which the Australian Government should structure its NBN policy.  AAB’s 
numbered issues that differed from the Government’s policies were paraphrased as follows. 
1. The Australian government’s primary role should be setting policy frameworks that 
incentivize providers to build systems themselves.  Governments should assist or 
directly invest in universal service as private providers typically could not provide 
100% service coverage. 
2. Providers were better managers of capital and technology risk than governments 
were (a direct contradiction to the Australian Labor Party's policy that its country’s 
telecommunications market had failed).  Infrastructure-based competition - not 
infrastructure monopolies with retail competition - was the preferred business and 
governance model.  Existing infrastructure competition should be preserved - such as 
metropolitan hybrid fiber-coaxial networks - and stranding or crowding out such 
infrastructure assets by the NBN was opposed. 
3. A national fiber-only network was unnecessary.  For the short to medium term, 
globally, there was no demonstrated mass requirement for “up to 1Gb/sec” speeds to 
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homes and small offices/home offices.  The greatest priority instead should be 
serving markets, not faster service to those markets that were already served. 
9. A market based approach would be the best solution.  An alternative national 
broadband network called “NBNv3” could include fiber-based network segments for 
areas of demonstrated need provided there was a commercial return on investment, or 
where there was a demonstrated and justifiable improvement in productivity and/or 
social equality to justify taxpayer contributions. 
10. A public/private business and governance model should be explored for NBNv3, 
which, where practical or endeavored to include and recognize competitive 
providers’ existing network investments and incentivized providers to upgrade their 
networks and rollout services. 
14. Any substantial investment by taxpayers for any national network(s) must be subject 
to serious investigation and independent cost estimations, cost-benefit analysis, 
genuine industry and public consultation, as well as a review of its impact on the 
Australian competitive telecommunications landscape (Ashton, et al., 2010). 
Critiques of AAB’s proposal included its exclusion of FTTH, significantly limiting its capacity 
to deliver speeds of 100Mb/sec or higher.  Telecommunications analyst Paul Budde said, “The 
future as everybody around the world agrees is FTTH and so you need to develop a plan that in 
the end will lead you to FTTH.  It will be a backwards step."  Optus spokesman Maha 
Krishnapillai warned there were questions over whether AAB’s plan would limit competition 
and entrench Telstra's market dominance.  “What it doesn't do is fundamentally reshape the 
game, which is the ability for Telstra to continue to control access to that last mile.” (Coalition 
broadband plan causing concern, 2010). 
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In August 2011, ACCC said Telstra's separation plan could not progress in its current 
form and called for certain changes, though analysts said only minor delays to the restructuring 
effort were expected.  Arnhem Investment Management fund manager Theo Maas said ACCC's 
concerns focused mainly on the transition period during which Telstra would convey its fixed-
line assets to NBN.  "With NBN being a 10-year process, Telstra will have reasonable power to 
disadvantage competitors from access to their old copper network during the roll-out period." 
(Bendeich, Somasundaram, Paul & Thieberger, 2011)  Telstra then advised its shareholders 
ahead of an October 2011 vote on its plan to convey its fixed-line assets to NBN that it would be 
$5B better off in working with NBN than competing against it.  Independent investment and 
advisory group Grant Samuel & Associates Pty Ltd. said, "Overall, the advantages of the 
proposal outweigh the disadvantages.  Accordingly … the proposal is in the best interests of 
Telstra and its shareholders.”  The endorsement came after ACCC called for changes in the terms 
of Telstra's plan.  Shareholders were waiting to vote for the company's plan to separate its fixed-
line assets, looking to end two years of uncertainty that sent its shares to record lows sparked by 
the Labor government's shake-up of the industry.  Tyndall Investment Management analyst 
Michael Maughan said, "The majority of the market seems to be in favor of the deal.  In fact, you 
could argue the share price has performed better the more certain the deal has become.”  Telstra 
CEO David Thodey said the board was unanimous in advising shareholders to back the plan.  
"We think it is the better overall financial outcome.  It does give us a more stable regulatory 
environment and greater strategic flexibility going forward.”  Grant Samuel valued the payments 
Telstra would receive from the government for its infrastructure assets at A$12.8B (US$13.7B).  
The only alternative for Telstra would have been to compete against NBN, which would have 
required it to increase investment in its own networks and face losing access to newer 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 127 
government network technologies.  Grant Samuel estimated Telstra would save A$3.5B by not 
having to invest in its own networks, while it would lose A$11.6B in cashflows.  Altogether, the 
company would be A$4.7B better off by cooperating with NBN Co. than competing against it.  
Grant Samuel considered the implications of the network failing or being abandoned, and 
concluded that Telstra would also be better off under this scenario than one where it chose to 
compete with a successful network (Paul, 2011). 
 
Canada 
In December 2008 the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission 
issued an order that gave wholesale ISPs access to the faster networks of major providers 
including Bell and Telus, but in 2009 the Canadian government ordered CRTC to reconsider the 
decision by Industry Minister Tony Clement (CRTC approves usage-based internet billing, 
2010).  The government relented to lobbying from the large providers and ordered the review on 
the grounds that CRTC had failed to consider a number of issues including how the matching 
speeds would diminish the large providers’ incentives to invest in new infrastructure, and 
whether there was sufficient competition to protect end users without the requirement of 
matching speeds.  Smaller ISPs including Teksavvy and Execulink had argued that without 
requirements to offer matching speeds, the large providers would put them out of business.  Bell 
and Telus were offering connections of up to 25Mb/sec and 15Mb/sec respectively over newer 
fiber-based networks, but smaller providers could typically offer speeds of no more than 
5Mb/sec over older copper-based infrastructures.  In August 2010, CRTC confirmed that Bell 
and Telus must offer smaller wholesale ISPs that rented portions of their networks whatever 
speeds the big providers themselves sold to their own retail customers, despite the previous 
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disagreement from the government.  CRTC said the requirement was necessary to maintain 
competition and reasonable prices for high speed services.  CRTC also authorized large 
providers to charge smaller ISPs an extra 10% mark-up to use their newer infrastructures to help 
recoup the costs of their investments.  CRTC chairman Konrad von Finckenstein stated, “Access 
to broadband Internet services is a key foundation for the digital economy.  The large telephone 
and cable companies are bringing their fiber networks closer to Canadian homes and businesses, 
which allows for faster Internet connections.  Requiring these companies to provide access to 
their networks will lead to more opportunities for competition in retail Internet services and 
better serve consumers.”  Teksavvy CTO Marc Gaudrault said regarding the additional provision 
preventing ISPs from circumventing download limits or throttling imposed on uses such as P2P 
by large providers, "The CRTC's approach will entrench the duopolistic nature of the 
communications wireline services industry in many important markets and stifle the ability of 
competitors to provide new and innovative services.  In this environment, it will be very difficult 
for competitors to attract the capital necessary to innovate, grow, and contribute to the greatest 
extent possible to the competitive landscape and increase consumer choice."  Bell Senior VP of 
regulatory and government affairs Mirko Bibic said the decision discouraged investment in its 
networks and showed there was a lack of clarity in public policy.  The allowed 10% mark-up "is 
mere tinkering and does not create an environment which allows us to maximize the returns on 
our very significant fiber network investments.  We need to know, which is it?  Do we want as 
much network investment in Canada as possible, or not?  Last year, (the Canadian Government) 
Cabinet sent this issue back to the CRTC for reconsideration.  Clearly, this isn't the decision 
Cabinet was looking for."  CRTC also said it would consider the phase-out of mandated Internet 
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access when alternatives such as wireless and satellite became more accepted as substitutes 
(Nowak, 2010), which could risk reversion back to modal monopolies or duopolies. 
In May 2010 CRTC approved Bell Canada's request for usage-based billing vs. unlimited 
downloading on both its wholesale users that rented its lines and retail end users based upon how 
much they download each month.  Bell however was required to usage-base bill all of its retail 
end users before it could usage bill its wholesale users.  The CRTC also required Bell to make 
any "usage insurance plans," which gave its own retail customers extra monthly usage for a small 
fee, available to wholesale ISPs.  Bell was to then charge wholesale ISPs a flat fee for connecting 
to its network and for a set monthly usage limit per end user.  Beyond those set limits, users 
would be charged per GB, depending on their connection speeds.  It argued that usage-based 
billing was necessary to control the congestion caused on its network by heavy downloaders.  
CRTC commissioner Candice Molnar dissented on the ruling saying the requirement on Bell to 
move all of its customers off unlimited downloading plans was unnecessary because a vast 
majority were already on usage-based services.  Small ISPs regarded the CRTC's approval of 
Bell's plan as inevitable, but opposed it saying it would make them indistinguishable from Bell.  
ISPs including Teksavvy offered plans with hundreds of GBs of usage, whereas Bell's most 
popular services limited users to 50GB or 75GB.  Teksavvy president Rocky Gaudrault said, 
"The rates are absolutely atrocious.  How the hell are we doing above one dollar for extra usage?  
It's in the thousands of multiples beyond what the costs are," and added that Bell also continued 
to have an advantage over smaller ISPs as it was able to offer superior speeds (CRTC approves 
usage-based internet billing, 2010). 
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Sweden 
A 2004 updated Swedish IT policy bill noted three central objectives. 
• IT must contribute to a better quality of life and help improve and simplify everyday life for 
people and companies. 
• IT must be used to promote sustainable growth. 
• An effective and secure physical infrastructure for IT, with high transmission capacity, must 
be available in all parts of the country so as to give people access to, among other things, 
interactive public e-services. 
The plan called for the government to take responsibility in organizational, logistical, and 
technical issues in order to meet the coordination objective (Benkler, 2009, p.217).  Increasing 
demands for more robust telecommunication systems were driven by the need for greater 
capacity, which was a result of end user demands for telecommunication services.  High speed 
service was required by nearly every household, business, and public sector service 
(http://www.stokab.se 2011).  Certain provider-owned networks or markets where the traditional 
telephone network was the only alternative were utilized to their maximum capacities and could 
not cope with additional end users, which in certain innercity areas caused a shortage of services 
that previously had only been a problem in sparsely populated areas (http://www.stokab.se 
2011). 
In 1999 the Swedish government committed over EU!600M for the installation of a 
national backbone (Benkler, 2009, p.218), and in 2000 Sweden’s IT Bill 1999/2000:86 set the 
goal of “an information society for all.” (Atkinson, Correa, & Hedlund, 2008, p.20)  The 
National Rural Development Agency led an effort to eventually rollout advanced services via 
provider-neutral networks to rural areas and small towns, and required state-owned corporations 
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including the government-owned power company Svenska Kraftnät to build a fiber optic 
backbone infrastructure to 289 municipalities comprising about 70% of the country’s population.  
Government program grants were limited to communities with no existing providers, the 
procurement process had to be open and provider-neutral, and municipalities had to provide at 
least 10% of the cost of building the network (Atkinson, et al., pp.29-30).  Tax break subsidies 
were also used to incentivize buildouts (Benkler, p.218), and other government subsidies to 
municipalities guaranteed municipal investments in case no private providers wanted to offer 
services (Benkler, p.121). 
In February 2007 the Swedish telecommunications regulator Post och Telestyrelsen 
(“PTS”) announced a “Proposal for Swedish Broadband Strategy” for all Swedish customers to 
have high speed access of at least 2Mb/sec by 2010, and for most if not all end users to have a 
choice of several providers.  To achieve this, PTS proposed minimum service requirements for 
infrastructure supported by government funds, imposed regulations to ensure networks were 
open to competition, encouraged municipalities to work together to provide networks, and 
treated Internet access as a universal service (Atkinson, Correa, & Hedlund, 2008, p.G2).  
Municipalities also helped reduce difficulties in obtaining permits to site equipment and duct 
access (Benkler, 2009, p.165).  However the Swedish IT Policy and Strategy Group questioned 
whether it was economically feasible for government-supported providers to create parallel high-
speed broadband infrastructure in rural areas (Atkinson, et al., p.30). 
Sweden’s broadband regulatory policy was influenced by its government-sanctioned 
fixed telephony monopoly Telia (later TeliaSonera) (Atkinson, Correa, & Hedlund, 2008, p.G2), 
which in 1996 had a 71% share of the telecommunications market after the Swedish market for 
local, long-distance, and international telephony was liberalized in 1993 opening the 
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telecommunications markets to competition (Benkler, 2009, p.215).  Because the Swedish 
government also controlled other communications infrastructures such as power, railroads, and 
broadcasting, it had a precedent to involve itself in administering distribution networks.  
However, Sweden had since deregulated these markets but did retain ownership of some 
infrastructures remaining subject to competition through access regulations or parallel privately-
owned infrastructures (Atkinson, et al., p.G2). 
In 2000 PTS required TeliaSonera to unbundle its local loop to allow non-discriminatory 
access to competing service providers (Atkinson, Correa, & Hedlund, 2008, p.34, p.G3).  In 2002 
the Swedish government owned 45.3% of TeliaSonera and Finland owned 13.7% (Atkinson, et 
al., p.G2), and in 2003 the government owned 78% of the country’s high speed network 
infrastructure (Atkinson, et al., p.G2).  Since incumbent provider TeliaSonera owned the 
majority of Sweden’s telecommunications infrastructure, it had the advantage of being able to 
bid low for rollout projects as it could simply upgrade its existing network, and thus won 65% of 
the bids.  Other providers were government-owned energy and broadcasting companies, allowing 
them to offer lower service prices since they did not have to meet the revenue expectations of 
TeliaSonera being a publicly-traded company (Atkinson, et al., p.G2).  Government ownership 
of TeliaSonera was a key consideration in Sweden’s high speed strategy because increased 
competition required competing DSL providers to be able to access TeliaSonera’s network at the 
local loop.  Thus, the Swedish government’s strategy included policies to ensure that 
TeliaSonera’s competitors were afforded access to its network on terms that didn’t favor 
TeliaSonera’s retail operations and were available at reasonable interconnection rates (Atkinson, 
et al. p.G3). 
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The 2003 Electronic Communications Act further strengthened and expanded the 
regulatory authority of PTS to intervene when providers with significant market power were 
hindering competition for high speed services, and it essentially sought to open markets 
primarily controlled by TeliaSonera (Benkler, 2009, p.216).  In 2003 PTS required TeliaSonera 
to lower its prices for competitors to access its local loops because the company had been using 
discriminatory pricing practices, for example favoring some providers over others.  In 2004, PTS 
determined that TeliaSonera had significant market power and required it to meet all reasonable 
requests from competing operators for access.  TeliaSonera appealed the decision in court, but in 
2007 the Supreme Administrative Court ruled for PTS.  In 2005, PTS determined that 
TeliaSonera must also offer naked DSL, allowing end users to access fixed telephony and 
Internet services from different providers (Atkinson, Correa, & Hedlund, 2008, p.G3).  PTS then 
forced TeliaSonera to accept functional separation in 2007 (Benkler, p.213). 
The market that currently deals predominantly with access to TeliaSonera's 
metallic loop is not a functioning marketplace … the authority can conclude that there is 
neither sufficient transparency nor equal treatment in the market.  The current situation 
falls far short of the goals of effective and competition-neutral access, nor does it 
establish adequate conditions to gradually loosen the regulation to promote competition 
on the route to more sustainable competition.  [PTS proposed as a remedy] that the ability 
of the public authority to impose functional separation on a dominant stakeholder should 
be introduced, meaning that the parts of the operation representing bottleneck resources 
should be separated from the rest of the organization (Benkler, p.219). 
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In 2008, TeliaSonera formed TeliaSonera Skanova Access to provide wholesale services, 
and during the same year the government empowered PTS to require functional separation 
(Benkler, 2009, p.92). 
As a result of the Swedish government’s strong regulatory policies, the country had one 
of the most active unbundled local loop markets.  The first major competitor to TeliaSonera was 
Bredbandsbolaget (“B2”).  A strategic partnership with the National Swedish Rail 
Administration gave it an advantage as it could use the railway’s communications infrastructure.  
B2 concentrated mainly on providing Ethernet and DSL services, beginning with 10Mb/sec and 
later offering 100Mb/sec (Atkinson, Correa, & Hedlund, 2008, p.G3), but it used little of its own 
network infrastructure and focused largely on urban apartment dwellings where it served more 
end users at lower costs (Atkinson, et al., p.35).  In 2003 the other major competitor Bostream 
leased TeliaSonera’s network to provide DSL services, though in 2004 B2 acquired Bostream, 
giving B2 23% of the market.  By 2007, TeliaSonera’s market share shrank to 38%, B2 had 18%, 
Com Hem had 17%, and Glocalnet had 7% (Atkinson, et al., p.G3).  Telenor became the second 
largest broadband provider at 21.5%, competing with TeliaSonera throughout the country by 
buying several other providers, some of whom relied exclusively on unbundling to startup and 
build their customer bases (Benkler, 2009, p.91).  However some competitive providers that 
appeared to be facilities-based competitors were mostly using the incumbent’s or municipality’s 
networks (Atkinson, et al., p.34).  As reflected in the prices and service options, the level of 
competition in Swedish markets was strong, and the rise in high speed users coincided with a 
continued increase in the number of independent ISPs competing for residential and business end 
users, which cut into the incumbent’s market share (Benkler, p.213). 
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A more popular business and governance model was the requirement that large providers 
provide services on a wholesale basis to multiple retailers.  Most municipal networks such as (the 
State of) Utah Telecommunications Open Infrastructure Agency and the (Province of) Alberta 
SuperNet operated on a wholesale basis and allowed competitors to resell the network to end 
users.  Sweden followed this model in encouraging their municipalities to construct fiber 
networks (Windhausen, 2008, p.52).  Municipalities, housing associations, and local utility 
providers built many of the country’s fiber networks and then opened them up to providers 
including ISPs, cable, and telephone companies (Atkinson, Correa, & Hedlund, 2008, p.G3).  
Those networks created more competition in local markets and lowered service prices, while end 
users received access to “future!proofed” fiber optic platforms, greater service choices, and 
competitive prices (Windhausen, p.50).  The City of Stockholm created the municipally-owned 
corporation Stokab after Telia refused to offer fiber capacity (Benkler, 2009, p.218), and hoped 
the new provider would more rapidly introduce advanced telecommunications services to its end 
users (Windhausen, p.50).  Stokab was tasked with developing a competition-neutral 
infrastructure able to meet future communications needs, stimulate competition, promote 
diversity, offer end users freedom of provider choice, and minimize the need for infrastructure 
excavations (http://www.stokab.se 2011).  The project started in 1999 and grew to 1.2M kms of 
dark fiber (Press, 2009a) installed in commercial districts and large industrial areas (Atkinson, et 
al., p.G3) that reached every block in the city (Press, 2009b).  Stockholm did not serve end users 
— ISPs leased access to the network on a competition-neutral basis. 
Municipal networks can play an important role in enhancing competition in fiber 
networks.  If these develop, governments should encourage them to be open networks, 
that is providing dark fiber to service providers rather than becoming themselves service 
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providers.  Nor should the existence of a municipal network providing dark fiber mean 
that investment in other fiber networks in that municipality should be prevented (Press). 
Stokab leased its dark fibers to various providers and users including telecommunication 
providers, ISPs, cable TV companies, mobile telephony providers, network capacity providers, 
banks, insurance companies, retailers, media companies, universities, urban networks, property 
owners, and computer and IT companies (Windhausen, p.50).  ISPs, including the incumbent 
telephone and cable companies, owned and operated relatively cheap network equipment that 
was frequently upgraded as the technologies improved (Press, 2009b).  Stokab CEO Jörgen 
Kleist said regarding their system, “Because new players on the market need neither to invest in 
new infrastructure nor to lease it from their competitors, the barriers to establishing themselves 
in Stockholm become low.  With a fiber connection, residents are not only given access to a 
long-term viable connection with high transfer capacity, but, even more importantly, to an 
increasing range of options when it comes to service suppliers.  In order to provide residents with 
the greatest possible freedom of choice, it is important that property owners also build fiber 
networks within their properties that make possible direct connection between the operator and 
the household via fiber.” (http://www.stokab.se 3-2011). 
Some Swedish end users received 100Mb/sec service in locations that switched to fiber 
optic networks (Windhausen, 2008, p.16).  However 75 year old Karlstad, Sweden resident 
Sigbritt Löthberg received the world's fastest Internet connection at 40Gb/sec - the first time ever 
then that a home user accessed such a high speed.  Karlstad Stadsnät network official Hafsteinn 
Jonsson said, “This is more than just a demonstration.  As a network owner we're trying to 
persuade Internet operators to invest in faster connections.  And [Ms. Löthberg‘s renowned son 
and Cisco technician] Peter Löthberg wanted to show how you can build a low price, high 
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capacity line over long distances." (Sigbritt, 75, has world's fastest broadband, 2007).  
Interestingly, many Swedish end users still kept their dial up account – which was very cheap if 
not free – even when they subscribed to higher speed services (Atkinson, Correa, & Hedlund, 
2008, p.G3). 
Regarding Sweden’s models, Press concluded, “Many factors determined the cost of 
Internet connectivity, but the ownership model was significant, and it seemed the Stockholm 
model was superior to those in the U.S.” (Press, 2009b).  Benkler et al. noted, “In … Sweden, 
unbundling and open access worked exactly as they ‘should’ have, according to the underlying 
theory that supported unbundling.  Innovative entrants opened up markets; some continued to 
operate; others were bought out by pan-European or pan-Nordic players and became the basis for 
entry by those players.  The risks - that incumbents would disinvest, that entrants would never 
graduate to independent competitors - did not materialize.” (Benkler, 2009, p.90).  Atkinson, 
Correa, and Hedlund added, “One reason Sweden and certain other European nations adopted 
this model was because providers were prohibited from attaching their cables aerially onto poles.  
The cost of laying cables underground was quite high and in many cases borne by the 
governments.  The inherent costs in deploying telecommunications infrastructure, including high 
speed networks, reinforced the argument that telecommunications providers had natural 
monopoly characteristics, thus encouraging multiple independent deployments could lead to a 
waste of resources (Atkinson, Correa, & Hedlund, 2008, p.28). 
 
Amsterdam’s CityNet 
Amsterdam's CityNet project sought to connect 37K households throughout the city, with 
long term plans to pass all 400K households.  The network was to be point-to-point FTTH, 
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where about 10K households would each be connected directly by its own fiber to each Internet 
points of presence (POP).  The system was designed to operate in three distinct layers.  The first 
layer was the “passive network infrastructure” that included ducts, fiber, and street cabinets.  The 
second layer was the active wholesale layer that included network management, control, and 
maintenance systems such as switches, routers, and optical splitters, all managed and maintained 
by a wholesale network operator contracted by the city.  The third layer was the retail layer that 
consisted of providers who would buy capacity on a non-discriminatory basis from the two lower 
layers and provide retail services to end users.  Each provider invested in their own service 
platform - equipment, services, and billing/customer care. 
The passive layer was owned by the Glasvezelnet Amsterdam partnership (“GNA”), 
whose members included the City of Amsterdam with a one-third share; five social housing 
corporations (being a non-profit model for housing ownership of apartment buildings and owned 
about one-third of the apartments in the covered area) with a one-third share; and two one-sixth 
shares were split between two for-profit investors ING real estate and Dutch open fiber networks 
provider Reggefiber.  The shares reflected the actual share of investments made by each of the 
parties in the !18M project.  GNA bid out construction to bury the ducts and pull the fibers, and 
bid for a concessionaire to operate the wholesale layer.  Telcom Italia’s subsidiary BBned was 
awarded the contract, and was to invest in the active wholesale layer components that it would 
then own and operate while also operating, but not owning, the passive layer.  BBned was 
required to pay fees per connected household to GNA, and to sell wholesale access services to 
third party service providers on an open access, nondiscriminatory basis.  The retail providers 
would then sell services to end users and pay fees to GNA.  BBned also had retail affiliates that 
would sell services too (Benkler, 2009, p.166). 
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CityNet managing director Herman Wagter said, “In the switch house [central office] or 
interconnection point, we provide for different racks for different operators, because on a line by 
line basis customers could sign up for different combinations of offerings.” (Slater & Wu, 2008, 
p.7).  In a 2010 interview, Wagter further elaborated upon CityNet’s technology that provided 
for open access. 
Unlike in the U.S. and Japan, stringing fiber along poles is not an option in 
European capitals.  Every fiber cable must be buried below the pavement, then 
distributed inside a building to apartments; no wires can be exposed on the outside.  The 
density of these old cities is quite high, and real estate is expensive, leaving little room 
for cabinets with active equipment on the street level.  The majority of the housing 
consists of multi-dwelling-units (“MDUs”) with up to 500 individual apartments per 
building. 
When the design of the Amsterdam fiber network started in 2005, it became clear 
that there was little experience in the market with this type of deployment.  Contractors 
were used to either putting copper wires or coax lines in new buildings, or digging long 
stretches of big high density polyethylene (“HDPE”) tubes for backhaul purposes.  Most 
fiber packaging was optimized for backhaul and for metro networks; few products were 
specifically designed for fiber-to-the-home in these conditions.  The experience in 
Amsterdam and other European cities has resulted over the years in products like 
miniature direct burial cables, special high-rise cables with break-out windows to allow 
very fast builds inside MDUs, fibers that can bend sharply, easy-install Fiber Termination 
Units (“FTUs”) inside apartments, and so on. 
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Deploying buried cables to every apartment in a dense city is a disruptive process.  
A point-to-point fiber topology runs individual fibers from each apartment back to the 
local aggregation point (think of the phone system model); it's the most flexible and 
future-proof topology.  Point-to-point will support all known technologies (GPON, active 
Ethernet, lambda, RF video overlay, and others) by patching individual fibers in the 
aggregation point.  It allows for easy unbundling of individual lines. 
So [GNA] decided to go for point-to-point in Amsterdam: it did (and does) not 
make sense to be “penny wise and pound foolish,” by saving on fiber upfront but running 
the risk of having to redo the outside fiber plant in a decade or two.  Paying a slightly 
higher cost (estimated at 5% or less of the total CAPEX budget for the project) for more 
fiber length and more connectors/patches was considered an acceptable insurance 
premium against potential premature technical obsolescence. 
The second decision was to build an open access, passive fiber plant that would 
support multiple ISPs in competition.  In practice this translates to: 
• Unbundled dark fiber access lines, which can be rented individually by an ISP who 
wants to serve that particular customer. 
• ISPs can get access to APOPs to install their line cards and related equipment, patch 
in their customer access line, and connect to their own backhaul network (Wagter, 
2010). 
The E.C. sanctioned Amsterdam's investment in GNA determining that the 
municipality’s investment was similar to what a private company might have invested in the 
project.  E.C. Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes commented, “Business activities of 
public authorities in the liberalized electronic communications sector have to be analyzed 
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carefully because of the potentially distortive effect of any state aid on the business of private 
operators, especially in metropolitan areas.  However, in this particular case, our investigation 
found that the municipality of Amsterdam invests on market terms and that several private 
parties make significant investments in the project." (http://www.citynet.nl 2011)  The E.C. 
reviewed the following issues. 
• The co-investment by two private companies, on equal terms, one a real-estate development 
firm that had plausible reason to invest in improving the broadband infrastructure of its real 
estate holdings, and the other a company specializing in open fiber infrastructure. 
• The fact that the investment was in passive elements, which were expected to last for thirty 
years and therefore could be sustained with the relatively lower rates of return expected by 
GNA. 
• The fact that the City of Amsterdam was to be reimbursed all of its pre-project investments, 
with interest, as part of the project costs, all of which were intended to be paid from user fees 
paid by the wholesale users, and ultimately by the retail subscribers. 
• A close review of the business plan: the E.C. submitted the GNA business plans to one 
independent review by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and the Dutch authorities submitted a 
report from a consulting firm and Delft University, both of which confirmed that the GNA 
business plan was sound, that the internal rate of return for the project was “within the 
market expectations for companies active in the telecommunications market,” and that it was 
robust to a wide range of sensitivity tests based on penetration rates, cost evaluations, and 
other market contingencies (Benkler, 2009, p.167). 
The public-private model however became more private than public (Benkler, 2009, p.121) when 
Reggefiber, as part of its joint venture with incumbent KPN, bought out most of the shares of the 
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city and the social housing corporations, raising its ownership stake to 70% in 2009.  By then the 
project was planning to roll out to 100K more homes beginning in the summer of 2009 (Benkler, 
p.167). 
 
Mexico 
In early 2013, Mexico was undertaking rapid restructuring of its telecommunications 
markets.  America Movil owned by Mexican telecomm tycoon Carlos Slim had market shares of 
70% of mobile phone subscribers and 80% of landlines (Cattan & Martin, 2013).  Rival Televisa 
had about 60% of the broadcast TV market (Graham & Gutierrez, 2013).  Mexican President 
Enrique Pena Nieto said the lack of competition “reduces productivity in Mexico, limiting its 
capacity to grow and generate better-paying jobs.”  Communications and Transportation Minister 
Gerardo Ruiz Esparza said the proposed Federal Telecommunications Institute would be able to 
regulate competition and “will be able to mandate the divestiture of assets of market participants 
to the extent necessary to eliminate anticompetitive effects.” (Cattan & Martin).  Congressman 
and member of the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution Julio Cesar Moreno said, "In our 
country there is just one territory and it is not the territory or property of any one telephone 
company.  Neither can we continue being held hostage to monopolists.” (Graham & Gutierrez). 
The goal of the legislation was to create more competition in the country’s 
telecommunications industry (Cattan & Martin, 2013).  The bill sought to boost foreign 
competition and give regulators the power to force firms to sell assets if they had more than 50% 
of the market (Alper, 2013).  In the lower house, PRI lawmakers sought to amend the bill 
ensuring that Mexico followed a reciprocal approach to opening up its market to foreign 
investment.  The size of holdings foreign firms could take in Mexico would not be allowed to 
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exceed the share Mexican firms could hold in that country's market.  The bill also proposed 
allowing foreign investors to take up to 49% ownership of TV or radio broadcasters, pending a 
review by a foreign investment commission.  Some major economies did not allow foreign firms 
such a large holding share.  Some lawmakers opposed a provision that the president had to be 
consulted on telecommunications concessions.  A separate provision of the bill pledged to create 
a new independent telecommunications regulator (Graham & Gutierrez, 2013).  The regulator 
would possess the power to set maximum prices for provider interconnections, currently 
considered to be a severe obstacle to competitors in the fixed-line and wireless markets.  The bill 
also permitted existing television networks — the duopoly consisting of Televisa and TV Azteca 
- offer their free over-the-air programming at no cost to cable operators, which will allow Slim to 
compete against his rivals for the first time.  America Movil could then offer “triple play” 
bundled service packages including television, Internet, and phone (Estevez, 2013). 
America Movil accounted for more than 15% of the Mexican stock market (Bases, 2013) 
and had lost about $19B year-to-date in market value (Alper, 2013).  Its shares fell 22% in the 
year to date on investor fears that new regulations would force them to sell assets.  BullTick 
Capital Markets head of research Alberto Bernal said, "It is complicated news for American 
Movil itself in the short-term, but clearly this is a positive development from the standpoint of 
potential growth.” (Bases, 2013).  However America Movil stood to gain more by entrance into 
the paid TV sector - from which it had been barred by Mexican regulators - than it might lose by 
ceding its shares of the telephone and Internet markets.  Also, Standard and Poor's cited 
promising chances for the government to complete its reforms, which would likely lead to an 
upgrade of its low investment grade rating of BBB (Graham & Gutierrez, 2013) decreasing its 
borrowing interest rates. 
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Slim said he welcomed the plan as a boon for competition.  "The telecommunications law 
… coincides with everything this (broadband commission of the International 
Telecommunication Union) has sought: universal service, better prices, higher speeds, and 
convergence.”  Asked whether he thought the bill would increase foreign and domestic 
investment, Slim said "Hopefully." (Alper, 2013).  Slim said that the work of the Commission 
would “pressure” governments to provide “universal access” to their people and called for an 
increased investment in broadband around the world.  To do this, governments needed to work 
with the private sector and learn from other best practices around the world (Estevez, 2013). 
 
Google Fiber 
Major end user Google had been purchasing dark fibers and remotely locating more of its 
servers further downstream to increase provision efficiency.  However the local and last mile 
markets were still bottlenecks inhibiting end users’ access to Google’s services.  Google then 
announced it would provide ISP service via fiber in select markets.  Experts considered two 
possible reasons why Google was launching a fiber network.  Google wanted to see what end 
users would do with a gigabit network connection, and Google’s YouTube was streaming movies 
and TV shows, so the service would benefit from faster network speeds and fewer delays.  
Others speculated that Google’s move was its answer to attacks on network neutrality by 
providers including Comcast, Verizon, and AT&T who complained about the price of upgrading 
and maintaining their network, and wanted to charge large end users like Google premium rates 
to allow end users faster access to its sites.  Google might have wanted to prove that faster 
networks could be provided at more reasonable prices (Merrell, 2012). 
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Independent telecommunications analyst Jeff Kagan said Google’s entry into the market 
would bring true competition through price cuts from providers that would be terrified of 
Google's potential success.  Consumers wanted lower prices to combat what has been a doubling 
of cable TV prices every ten years, he said.  "It has been falling on deaf ears with the cables 
companies until competitors started coming in.  If Verizon and AT&T were the only competitors, 
I'm afraid that wouldn't be enough to change things.  Now that Google is making waves this is 
where the cable TV industry is either going to be fixed or stay broken."  Both Google and Apple 
caused similar large impacts when they moved into the wireless market where neither had any 
previous experience in before.  Kagan said, "Now they are one and two in that market.  They 
could do the same thing with television.  And if they do, it's going to throw Comcast and Cox 
and other cable providers into a whirlwind, a death spiral, as their customers leave.  This is what 
we could see in the next few years."  That potential scenario could be the only way to lower 
prices for consumers, said Kagan.  "If and when [Google] gets this right, it's going to send 
quakes of terror through the cable TV industry." (Weiss, 2012).  Forrester Research analyst 
Charles Golvin said, "In general, efforts like … Google Fiber that create new models for 
bringing higher speed broadband to customers are good for the market and for disrupting what is 
primarily a duopoly in broadband access in most markets.” (Farivar, 2012).  However, Google is 
likely not interested in being an ISP, but rather in fostering a competitive climate in which 
ultrafast service becomes the norm (Hardy, 2012).  It may have just wanted to encourage existing 
ISPs to offer higher speed services across the U.S. (Finley, 2013a). 
Google chose the Kansas City area as the place to start their Google Fiber project after 
asking communities across the nation if they'd want to be the test site for the project.  Google 
Access general manager Kevin Lo wrote, "More than 1,100 cities raised their hands, and those of 
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you in Kansas City, KS and Kansas City, MO won us over with your enthusiasm for better, faster 
web connections.  Google Fiber works better when communities are connected together.  So 
we’ve divided Kansas City into small communities we call ‘Fiberhoods.’  We’ll install only 
where there’s enough interest, and we’ll install sooner in fiberhoods where there’s more interest 
(Weiss, 2012). 
Google chose an aerial installation for the fiber lines upon public power poles.  CapStone 
Investments senior Internet analyst Rory Maher said, “Kansas City owns a lot of the 
infrastructure needed to build out the fiber network.”  In the portion of the metro area located in 
the State of Kansas, the majority of power poles were controlled by the Board of Public Utilities 
rather than by private providers.  Thus Google likely had an easy time negotiating with BPU for 
the right to string wires across their poles, and reportedly paid 50% less per pole than its 
competitors.  Poles in other towns were usually owned by private providers, thus Google chose 
not to negotiate with them (Koerner, 2013, pp.28-29) initially in those areas.  Broadpoint Amtech 
analyst Benjamin Schachter estimated that Google’s Kansas City network could cost over $1B to 
build.  GigaOM reported though that Google saved on its deployments in various ways, such as 
piggybacking on existing power line infrastructure and building its own network equipment 
(Finley, 2013a).  The fiber network facilitated data at speeds more than 100 times faster than 
what most U.S. end users had at the time, according to Google (Weiss, 2012).  Google executive 
chairman Eric Schmidt said Google was delivering 760Mb/sec to and taking 720Mb/sec from 
end users (Hardy, 2012). 
Google offered three service plans to end users. 
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• For $120 per month, end users received unlimited data up to 1Gb/sec upload and download 
speeds, and Google's IPTV service — a Nexus 7 tablet, TV Box, Storage Box, Network Box, 
and 1TB of storage on Google Drive on a two-year contract. 
• For $70 per month, end users received unlimited data on up to 1Gb/sec upload and 
download, the Network Box, and 1TB of Google Drive storage. 
• For $0 per month (but including the $300 upfront construction fee payable in $25 monthly 
installments), end users received up to 5Mb/sec download and up to 1Mb/sec upload, with 
unlimited data and the Network Box included.  Google promised to keep this option free for 
at least seven years.  The latter package was targeted to Kansas City residents who may not 
have had high speed services already (Taylor, 2012). 
 
A difference in Google Fiber’s deployment from other competitors’ roll outs might have 
been its incentive to pay for the rollout by encouraging end users who wanted service to 
encourage their neighbors to sign-up in advance, thereby lowering the risk of deploying to a 
particular neighborhood (Finley, 2013a).  If between 40 and 80 people in one area registered in 
six weeks, Google would then roll out fiber to their locale.  During the introductory period for 
two of the plans, Google waived a $300 down payment requirement for end users to have the 
fiber installed (Taylor, 2012).  Lo said neighborhoods with higher numbers of pre-registrations 
were the first ones to get the services.  Google said, "The first homes will get service shortly 
after the rally ends, and all qualifying neighborhoods will receive service before the end of 
2013."  As part of the program, Google said it would also connect community buildings 
including schools, libraries, and hospitals with free Gigabit Internet if the fiberhoods reached 
their pre-registration goals (Weiss, 2012). 
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As previously discussed, gigabit speeds enabled new uses for end users.  Google 
executive chairman Eric Schmidt said, "All of the distinctions, like HD, DVD, that we grew up 
with, go away.  You really imagine that your computer is really in a data center.  
Teleconferences will become holographic.  People take advantage of this kind of increase."  
Google found the more people that were on the Internet, the more they searched for things, 
which benefited Google's core advertising business.  Schmidt said Google Fiber changed the 
landscape of cities where it was deployed.  "There are all sorts of bizarre things.  We started 
wiring one neighborhood, and a whole bunch of start-ups bought houses in the neighborhood so 
they could get faster bandwidth.”  Schmidt added that although the project was "good for real 
estate values, I'm not sure that's (a) sustainable real estate strategy." (Hardy, 2012).  Lesa 
Mitchell, vice president at the multi-$B non-profit Kauffman Foundation that was aiding local 
start-ups and officials turn around Kansas City, said “What Google is providing is a catalyst.  
This infrastructure is enormously important to create a ripple effect of entrepreneurial activity.” 
(Google’s Kansas City experiment begins to yield start-ups, 2013).  Fiber to the Home Council 
of the Americas President Heather Burnett Gold said of the gigabit rollout, “It will spur 
innovation.  It’s like improving your highways.  It’s something you need to do.” (Canon, 2013).  
GigaBit Squared president and co-founder Mark Ansboury believed that the more important 
issue might be inaction.  “Not having this infrastructure is why certain businesses haven’t moved 
in, or have left.” (Finley, 2013a). 
Startups and other ventures in Kansas City were exploring the consumer applications of 
gigabit connections, such as gaming and streaming media (Finley, 2013b).  Kansas City Public 
Library officials were investigating virtual software checkouts.  Traditionally, end users required 
a computer with sufficient processing power.  Then the software of choice could cost say another 
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$300.  But with the high speed connections, the library could instead keep the software on its 
servers and let end users remotely access and use it.  On ordinary Internet service, working 
remotely with such bulky programs and large files was impractical.  Kansas City Public Library 
digital branch manager David LaCrone said over gigabit connections, “It’s just putting the 
software in front of you.  You’d see your 8-year-old computer do amazing things.”  Google said, 
“We’ve heard from graphic designers, video producers, transcriptionists, people who work from 
home, students and lots of other folks who are obviously benefiting from faster speeds right now.  
We’ve been really excited about some of the ideas we’ve seen coming out of KC, and we can’t 
wait to see those ideas develop into cool new products.”  U.S. Ignite executive director Bill 
Wallace said, “So far, developers have been working in an environment of scarcity.  Only in the 
last couple of years have developers begun to imagine an environment of abundance.” (Canon, 
2013).  In other examples, 18-year-old game developer Nick Budidharma drove with his parents 
from Hilton Head, SC to live in a “hacker home” connected to Google’s Fiber network.  Synthia 
Payne relocated from Denver to launch a start-up company to let musicians jam real-time online.  
Their sleepy weekly gathering for Web entrepreneurs recently attracted a standing-room-only 
crowd of 260 businesspeople, investors, and city officials (Google’s Kansas City experiment 
begins to yield start-ups, 2013). 
In response to Google’s market entry, Time Warner Cable in Kansas City placed posters 
in its headquarters there asking employees to provide any information they heard about Google 
Fiber (Merrell, 2012).  Time Warner Cable chief technology officer Irene Esteves downplayed 
the importance of offering service to compete with Google.  “We’re in the business of delivering 
what consumers want, and to stay a little ahead of what we think they will want.  We just don’t 
see the need of delivering that (gigabit service) to consumers.”  Esteves thought only business 
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customers would need that kind of service, and she noted that Time Warner already offered 
gigabit to businesses in some markets.  She did say that if demand and applications increased, 
Time Warner would be interested in offering faster service to communities. 
Some thought however it might have been too late for Time Warner and other 
incumbents to match Google.  Experts believed that their reluctance had less to do with a lack of 
customer demand and more to do with protecting their high margin ISP businesses.  Bernstein 
Research analyst Craig Moffet said Time Warner Cable made approximately 97% profit on its 
existing services (Finley, 2013b).  Verizon began offering FiOS fiber-based Internet in some 
states in 2005 and stated its investment was $23B.  But some questioned the claim, and investors 
were uneasy about their investment all along.  Verizon later confirmed that it would not expand 
FiOS service to other states or roll out to additional neighborhoods (Finley, 2013a).  FiOS was 
also more expensive than Google Fiber (Finley, 2013b).  DSL Reports author and ISP industry 
watcher Karl Bode believed Verizon had a change of heart regarding FiOS.  “I think ex-Verizon 
CEO Ivan Seidenberg was very bullish on fiber.  But after retirement, he was replaced by 
executives who wanted to focus more heavily on wireless, given the lower cost of deployment 
and the absolute killing that can be made charging users a significant amount per gigabyte.”  
Bode also blamed “money men”.  “Investors in this country are simply too myopic to wait the 
required length of time to see adequate returns.  These services are certainly profitable, they’re 
just not profitable enough quickly enough for short-sighted investors.”  Bode added Verizon was 
neglecting not just FiOS, but all of its other fixed line services in favor of wireless services.  “I 
think both Verizon and AT&T have made the decision to hang up on any further fixed line 
broadband competition and are happily letting those users flee to cable.  “Cable in turn will help 
them by directing their users to wireless services.  We’ve effectively just seen the birth of a 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 151 
significantly less competitive broadband market where cable has a monopoly on fixed line 
broadband, and nobody appears to have noticed.”  Ansboury also said, “Competitors (such as 
Verizon) have been overbuilding, investors are wondering where the returns are.  What you’re 
seeing is an entrenchment, companies leveraging what they already have in play.” (Finley, 
2013a). 
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY 
The study’s research question was investigated by conducting an experiment emulating 
various wireline telecommunications local and last mile market segment constructs addressing 
the question’s equal open access and competition concerns.  The experiment could have been 
tried and tested upon live real world networks, but researchers experimenting with protocol 
improvements inadvertently disrupted the Internet (McMillan, 2010).  The more specific the 
design of an experiment, the more improved the quality of the data it should obtain.  Thus for the 
feasibility of this study, smaller scale versions of sample contemporary local and last mile 
markets were modeled and emulated using standard network technology and off-the-shelf end 
user equipment in a laboratory-like environment to possibly predict effects prior to any real 
world implementation. 
Modeling and emulation have been acceptable for use in other experiments.  “Modeling” 
was an attempt to precisely characterize the essential components and interactions of a subject 
system – a representation of an object, system, or idea in some form other than that of the entity 
itself (Cook, 2001, p.8).  A model was a physical, mathematical, or logical representation of a 
system, entity, phenomenon, or process intended to promote understanding.  Models described 
how a simplified version of real world activity would perform, and could test hypotheses at a 
fraction of the cost of actually constructing the activities that the models simulated.  One primary 
benefit of a model was that researchers could use a simple approximation of a system/process 
and gradually refine the model as their understanding of the system/process improved thus 
enabling them to achieve good approximations of very complex problems quickly.  Models 
became increasingly accurate with additional refinements (Björlin, 2005, p.16). 
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Dynamic modeling (a.k.a. “Simulation”) was a software representation of the dynamic or 
time-based behavior of a system.  While a static model involved a single computation of an 
equation, dynamic modeling was iterative and constantly recomputed its equations as time 
changed.  Dynamic modeling could predict the outcomes of possible courses of action and 
account for the effects of variances or randomness (Björlin, 2005, p.16). 
Simulation was the process of designing a computerized model of a system (or process) 
and conducting experiments with the model for understanding the behavior of the system, 
evaluating various strategies for the operation of the system, and determining real-world 
interactions.  A simulation allowed a researcher to develop a logical abstraction (an object), and 
then examine how an object behaved under differing stimulus.  Changes to the subject could then 
be implemented, tested, and evaluated in the simulation, which was easier, cheaper, and faster 
than creating many different physical subjects, each with only slightly different attributes.  A 
simulation could be of benefit if it was impossible (or impractical) to construct an actual working 
subject to test changes.  Before a simulation could be of benefit, a model of the system had to be 
developed to allow the simulation developer to construct the simulation.  In a perfect world, the 
subject of a simulation would have precise rules for its attributes, operations, and interactions 
stated in natural language, or preferably in mathematical rules (Cook, 2001, p.8).  Network 
simulation provided a controlled and repeatable environment for modeling and testing computer 
networks (Taleb, 2005, p.1) and different components such as hosts, routers, hubs, proxy caches, 
links, protocols for computer communication, and applications using the network components 
(Xu, 2006, p.1).  Network simulation had long been the method of choice for testing various 
Internet protocols and applications.  Network performance research could be performed on a 
laboratory network testbed consisting of co-located hosts and routers (Taleb, p.1).  Large 
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network simulation models usually modeled network topology by assuming a number of end-
nodes and a number of routers, with each end-node connected to only one router to represent the 
last hop link from the network to the end host, and the routers were interconnected to represent 
the backbone network (Xu, p.12).  However, network simulation could be a very time-
consuming and expensive solution as researchers had to purchase a lot of hardware and configure 
the network.  Performing different types of experiments on the testbed needed much time since 
each experiment could require a reconfiguration of the network.  Moreover, the performance of a 
small network testbed could greatly differ from the performance of Internet-scale networks. 
(Taleb, p.1)  In some cases however, network simulation might not have been the appropriate 
tool for analyzing Internet-scale networks (Taleb, p.2). 
Network “emulation” was a … powerful networking research tool … that enabled the 
testing of real network protocols and applications under a controlled simulation environment 
(Taleb, 2005, p.2).  Emulation testbeds were used instead of simulators to conduct experiments 
with real hardware and software (Chertov, 2008, p.4).  A network emulator allowed real network 
traffic to interact with traffic generated from a simulation environment, and the simulated 
network could be easily reconfigured to reflect different network characteristics (Taleb, 2005, 
p.5).  The advantage of using a network emulator as opposed to a simulator was that an 
emulation environment afforded much higher fidelity since the emulation testbed used real 
devices with limited resources, real applications, and operating systems … to faithfully represent 
every host in an experiment - provided that it was correctly configured to avoid artifacts 
(Chertov, p.16).  Simulators and emulation testbeds though did not always faithfully represent 
router characteristics, and few testbeds had real routers because the number/type of routers and 
ports were limited thus imposing limitations on the experiment topology scale.  The routers had 
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to be emulated by computer workstations, hence sacrificing fidelity and potentially inducing 
artifacts (Chertov, p.4).  Chertov reported his trials demonstrated that a regular commodity 
workstation running Linux could outperform low to mid-range Cisco routers (Chertov, p.16). 
To collect network traffic data for his simulation experiment, Zhou used both passive 
data collection sensors (”sniffers”) installed at each node or at the main network gateway, and 
active data collection by sending packets out and measuring the responses to the packets (Zhou, 
2005, p.20).  The instruments used in simulations and emulations presented concerns regarding 
experimental verification and validation.  Björlin said if a model was going to be credible and a 
predictor of future behavior of a system/process, it had to pass a rigorous verification and 
validation process.  “Verification” meant the model was behaving exactly as intended by the 
researcher after rigorous reviews of code and/or mathematical/logical proofs, inputs, and outputs.  
“Validation” meant the model was replicating the behavior of the system that it was modeling 
(Björlin, 2005, p.16), referring also to “External Validity” - generalizability, reliability, and 
reproducibility of the findings of the study under specific conditions.  Chertov noted a key 
advantage of using such emulation testbeds was that the results were reproducible, allowing for 
detailed comparisons and careful sensitivity analysis. (Chertov, 2008, p.15).  Cook elaborated 
upon validation and verification for simulations. 
Validation of the model is required.  These steps are just as important in a 
simulation as they are in any system.  A system that is not validated has not been field-
tested against the real world and could produce invalid results.  Abstraction and 
validation are equally necessary to create a reliable model that correctly reflects the real 
world, and also contains all attributes necessary to make the model a useful tool for 
prediction.  This validation must take place at two different times.  The model must be 
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validated against the real world.  Then the model must be validated again after the 
simulation has been created.  The simulation outputs will help revalidate the model 
against the real world.  The second validation focuses on validating the simulation against 
the model, with little emphasis on revalidating the model against the real world (Cook, 
2001, p.8). 
First the model is created and validated.  Next the simulation is created, verified, 
and validated.  Only then can meaningful results be obtained and carefully examined 
against reality.  Tests must be performed to ensure that the model and simulation 
accurately represent the real world before the simulation can be used to predict behavior 
(Cook, 2001, p.10). 
Reviewing and validating the model prior to and also after the simulation is 
created is recommended.  A reevaluation of the validity of the model after coding is 
required.  The creation of a valid model requires experts who understand the workings of 
the physical system.  The experts must be available not only to help create the model, but 
also for all phases of verification and validation.  If expertise is absent during verification 
and validation, only verification will be performed.  This will result in a system that is 
consistent and internally correct, but also one that might not actually correspond to (and 
therefore cannot be used as a reliable predictor of) the real world (Cook, p.9). 
Xu pointed out that larger scale simulations would produce more meaningful validation, 
since conclusions from smaller scale simulations might not be valid when scaled.  Such large 
scale network research would demand the ability to simulate large networks (Xu, 2006, p.2).  A 
potential challenge was to reduce the simulation resource requirements that larger simulations 
could fit into a single workstation without sacrificing the accuracy of the results.  Certain 
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simulation details could be rationed to reduce resource requirements, but the validity of the 
simulation results could become questionable because of the loss of accuracy (Xu, p.3). 
 
Design 
The design of the study’s experiment involved several phases.  Samples of actual 
hypothetical local and last mile wireline telecommunications markets were modeled into 
diagrams and grouped into related types of scenarios.  Various factors including access 
restrictions, market control, and end user choices were then added to each of the scenarios’ 
conditions.  Scaled-down emulations of each scenario model were then designed requiring 
network equipment, personal computers, and software.  Additional computer workstations 
serving as emulated end users were to serve as the instrument.  The workstations were to 
generate trace file data for verification and validation purposes and store it for later export.  A set 
of non-technical observational questions pertaining to the scenario models and emulations 
regarding governance and business models, politics, network theory, etc., to be answered during 
the experiment was created to provide data for answering the research question. (Appendix B).  
Data generated by the experiment and the questionnaire was designed to be exportable in digital 
formats compatible for incorporation into this report. 
Since the study did not involve human subjects, the West Virginia University 
Institutional Review Board replied that their authorization for this particular non-human study to 
be conducted was not necessary. 
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Models 
Modeling a census of the actual and hypothetical local and last mile wireline 
telecommunication markets would ideally result in the most data results for optimum analysis.  
However for the practical feasibility of this study, only a number of select topology samples 
considered to be representative of contemporary local and last mile markets together with 
additional hypothetical constructs based upon the literature review, conversations with industry 
experts, and field observations were modeled into diagrams. 
The models were categorized into 16 scenarios.  In Part A of each scenario the first 
model featured a construct of an end-to-end network - the Internet being one example.  One or 
two downstream end users had connections to one or more providers in the local market.  In 
some scenarios those providers were interconnected to each other, in others they were not.  In 
most of the scenarios the local market providers had access to the upstream Tier I provider, 
although in a few cases a provider did not have that access available.  The Tier I ISP then 
connected to the Upstream End User’s router and workstation.  Part B of the scenarios replicated 
Part A, except an additional ISP was added to the local market to represent their entry and 
potentially increased market competition and address the research question’s open access and 
competition concerns.  Some scenarios included additional construct variants of the first Part B 
models featuring the competitive ISP’s optional access to the upstream Tier I provider, other 
local market providers, and the downstream end user(s).  Certain scenarios included a Part C 
where the additional ISP represented Google Fiber.  Not every possible model variant was 
included in the later scenarios since there was obvious duplicity that would have rendered 
identical results. 
The models were then described with the following constructs and conditions. 
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1. A local market served by only one private provider that provides its own system and carriage 
service between upstream providers to local market end users. 
2. A local market served by multiple providers that provide their own systems and carriage 
services between upstream providers to local market end users. 
3. A local market dominated by two duopolistic providers where all providers provide their own 
systems and carriage services between upstream providers to local market end users. 
4. A local market dominated by a monopolistic provider where all providers provide their own 
systems and carriage services between upstream providers to local market end users. 
5. A local market served by only a public MAN that provides its own system and carriage 
service between upstream providers to local market end users. 
6. A local market served by multiple providers including a public MAN that provide their own 
systems and carriage services between upstream providers to local market end users. 
7. A local market including a public MAN dominated by two duopolistic private providers 
where all providers provide their own systems and carriage services between upstream 
providers to local market end users. 
8. A local market including a public MAN dominated by a monopolistic private provider where 
all providers provide their own systems and carriage services between upstream providers to 
local market end users. 
9. A local market served by multiple providers including a public MAN where all providers 
provide their own systems and carriage services between upstream providers to local market 
end users, and where other private providers and the public MAN can optionally access and 
use each others’ last mile systems to provide service. 
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10. A local market served by multiple providers including a public MAN, where two private 
providers are the only last mile system and service providers.  Other private providers 
and the public MAN must access and use either or both of those private providers’ last 
mile systems to provide service. 
11. A local market served by multiple providers including a public MAN, where one private 
provider is the only last mile system and service provider.  Other private providers and 
the public MAN must access and use the sole private provider’s last mile system to 
provide service. 
12. A local market served by multiple providers including a public MAN, where the public 
MAN is the only last mile system and service provider.  Other private providers must 
access and use the MAN’s last mile system to provide service. 
13. A local market served by one private provider and a public MAN, where the public MAN 
is the sole last mile system provider but does not provide upstream carriage service. 
14. A local market served by multiple providers including a public MAN, where the public 
MAN is the sole last mile system provider but does not provide upstream carriage 
service. 
15. A local market served by multiple providers including a public MAN that is dominated 
by two duopolistic providers.  The public MAN is the sole last mile system provider but 
does not provide upstream carriage service. 
16. A local market served by multiple providers including a public MAN that is dominated 
by a monopolistic provider.  The public MAN is the sole last mile system provider but 
does not provide upstream carriage service. 
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Emulation 
The emulation of the models in this experiment used networking equipment, computers, 
and software configured to represent providers’ and end users’ systems within a “laboratory” 
facility.  Other appurtenances and accessories and technical assistance were required to support 
the emulation. 
 
Emulation Hardware 
The emulation test bed used a number of small office/home office routers and off-the-
shelf personal computers to emulate providers’ and end users’ systems and workstations.  The 
scenarios required each provider have one router and one computer used for controlling and 
monitoring the router.  The test with the most extensive buildout required a total of nine routers 
and computers, and the tests with the most number of connections between the routers required 
those routers have six ports each plus one for their controlling computers. 
Ten Netgear ProSafe FVS318G Firewall wireline-only routers with eight ports running at 
1Gb/sec were acquired for use as the emulated routers.  15 used Dell Optiplex GX150 Pentium 
III desktop computers each running at 930MHz with 256MB RAM, between 20-40MB hard 
drives, one onboard 1Gb/sec Ethernet port, and one or two 1Gb/sec Ethernet PCI NICs were 
acquired, nine of which were used for the router controlling and monitoring computers.  Three of 
the 15 computers were used for the one upstream and two downstream end user workstations, but 
those did not have access to the router’s control functions.  An Apple iBook running at 600MHz 
with 384MB RAM and a 14GB hard drive was acquired for extra assistance in constructing and 
spot checking the emulations. 
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The acquired routers were all refurbished by the manufacturer.  Based upon past 
experience, any equipment that required repairs could possibly malfunction again, thus there was 
some slight degree of risk to the reliability and functionality of the routers.  Conversely, other 
similar routers previously purchased new also failed for various reasons.  The particular model of 
Dell computers also had issues.  It was learned after the computers were acquired that a lawsuit 
filed in a U.S. federal district court accused Dell of using bad Nichicon Corp. capacitors in its 
Optiplex desktop series computers and covering up the problems.  Some leaking capacitors 
caused various problems that resulted in the computers malfunctioning, which Dell tried to 
blame on end user overuse of the processors (Vance, 2010).  The routers and computers were 
monitored throughout the experiment for their proper functionality.  The extra routers and 
computers were held in hot standby reserve in case of contingencies. 
 
Emulation Operating Systems 
The firmware used by the Netgear FVS318G routers was version 3.1.1-08.  The operating 
systems installed on the Dell Optiplex 150GX units used for controlling and monitoring the 
routers was Red Hat Enterprise Linux derivative Community ENTerprise Operating System, 
a.k.a. CentOS, version 5.8.  One Dell unit for testing and other purposes had Windows XP SP2 
installed, and the iMac laptop used for similar purposes had OS 10.4.11 installed. 
 
Emulation Software 
The experiment required a number of software applications to emulate providers’ and end 
users’ routers and workstations.  To access the routers’ internal web-based management software 
for control and monitoring, WWW browsers CentOS-based Mozilla Firefox ESR 10.0.12 and 
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Windows XP-based Microsoft Internet Explorer 6.0 were used on the Dell computers, and Apple 
OS X-based Safari 4.1.3 was used on the iBook. 
 
Appurtenances and Accessories 
Other items required and/or helpful to construct and conduct the experiment included 
monitors, mice, and keyboards for each computer, ANSI/TIA-568-B.2-1 Ethernet-based 
Category 6 cables with all segments kept shorter than the standard’s 100m maximum length, 
power cords, power strips, multiple power outlets, tables, and hand tools. 
 
Technical Assistance 
Construction, configuration, and operation of the emulation required the technical 
assistance of a network consultant since the researcher was not literate in networking beyond 
establishing basic one-router home networks. 
 
Instrumentation 
The instrument used in this experiment included most of the same hardware and 
operating systems used for the emulation, with additional software to produce and report data. 
 
Instrument Hardware 
The instrument used most of the same hardware as listed in the Emulation Hardware 
section.  A Sony HandyCam DCR-TRV480 digital video camera and a Sony DSC-W150 
Cybershot digital camera were available to record certain events during the experiment if 
necessary.  Memory sticks were used to transfer trace files and other data saved on those 
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computers functioning as instruments to an external workstation for further processing and 
incorporation into this report. 
 
Instrument Operating Systems 
The firmware used by the Netgear FVS318G routers was version 3.1.1-08.  The operating 
systems installed on the Dell Optiplex 150GX units used for the end user workstations was Red 
Hat Enterprise Linux derivative Community ENTerprise Operating System, a.k.a. CentOS, 
version 5.8.  One Dell unit for testing and other purposes had Windows XP SP2 installed, and the 
iMac laptop used for similar purposes had OS 10.4.11 installed. 
 
Instrument Software 
The instrument required a number of software applications to generate and record the 
data from the three end user workstations.  Windows XP-based software included Traceroute 
application Tracert 5.1 and Ping application Ping 5.1.  Apple OS X-based software included 
Network Utility 1.4.2 featuring Ping and Traceroute. 
 
Appurtenances and Accessories 
Other items required and/or helpful to construct and conduct the experiment included 
monitors, mice, and keyboards for each computer, Ethernet network cabling, power cords, power 
strips, multiple power outlets, tables, and hand tools. 
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Technical Assistance 
Construction, configuration, and operation of the instrument required the technical 
assistance of a network consultant since the researcher was not literate in networking beyond 
establishing basic one-router home networks. 
 
Procedure 
The following procedure was used to prepare for and conduct the experiment.  All of the 
necessary hardware, operating systems, software, appurtenances, and accessories for the 
emulation and instrument were acquired.  One monitor, keyboard, mouse, and power cord were 
connected to each Dell computer, and the power cords from the monitors and computers were 
connected to power strips that were plugged into wall sockets.  The computers were then booted 
up and checked for their basic functionality.  A couple workstations had problems, mostly due to 
dirt in the cooling fans causing noise, sticky liquids in the keyboards, and debris caking inside 
the mice.  The affected components were cleaned and returned to service. 
Due to the excessive cost of actual routers, an alternative using the free Vyatta routing 
software, multiple NICs, and managed switches was considered.  The option would have utilized 
the Dell computers as routers with some basic capabilities on par with dedicated higher end 
routers.  However the software was quite involved and required Linux literacy, and fortunately 
an affordable lot of ten refurbished Netgear routers became available and were acquired, thus the 
PCs were relegated as controls for the routers and as end user workstations. 
Operating system CentOS 6.2 was initially loaded on one computer, but the installation 
failed after a number of attempts.  Further research indicated the computers were not advanced 
enough to handle that version, so the older CentOS 5.8 was instead loaded on the unit, and was 
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successfully configured and deemed functional.  A number of the other computers were loaded 
and configured with the operating system, and then were connected to the Internet for upgrades 
to the operating system that were downloaded and installed.  One Dell computer was loaded with 
Windows XP SP2 and was deemed functional.  That unit was not connected to the Internet so as 
to avoid acquiring viruses and the like.  The iBook was acquired with its OS previously installed 
and upgraded to the highest version available for its processor and model type.  During the 
construction of the experiment, one Dell unit overheated due to its fan thought to have been 
previously cleaned seizing up and affecting the hard drive and RAM.  The unit was pulled from 
service and put on standby for parts.  The iBook’s Ethernet port would only work with a specific 
cable attached between it and the Upstream End User router. 
The routers were connected to power supplies and booted up to check their 
functionalities.  The Dell computers running CentOS were attached to a port on each of the 
routers to be used as configuration and monitoring terminals.  Time with the consultant was 
scheduled for consultation on configuring the routers and reviewing the construction and 
operation of the emulation and instrument for each model.  Data was generated from the research 
filling out the observation questions for all of the scenario models. 
The following sections detail the specific procedures for each scenario test. 
 
Scenario 1 
In Scenario 1, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served 
by only one incumbent provider between the upstream providers to the end users.  In Part B, 
competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt to enter the local 
and last mile markets. 
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Part A. 
The procedure for Part A, Test 1.1 is as follows. 
1. Secure and situate the following units. 
a. Five computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, ISP2, 
and Downstream End User. 
b. One switch for the Tier I ISP router. 
c. Two computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User and 
Downstream End User routers. 
2. Network the following units together per Model 1.1. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router. 
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router. 
c. Tier I ISP router-LEC router. 
d. LEC router-Downstream End User router. 
e. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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Figure 3.1. Model 1.1 Base Topology. 
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3. Power up the units. 
4. Configure the routers as needed. 
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes, 
and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 1.1. 
7. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Part B. 
8. The procedure for Part B, Test 1.2 is as follows. 
9. Disconnect the Upstream End User router and the LEC router from the Tier I ISP router. 
10. Network a switch to the Tier I ISP router. 
11. Network the Upstream End User router, LEC router, and ISP2 router to the Tier I router 
switch. 
12. Connect a cable to the ISP2 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream 
End User router. 
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Figure 3.2. Model 1.2 Test Topology. 
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13. Power up the units. 
14. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP and 
Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router. 
15. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2 
router as an additional route. 
16. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
17. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 1.2. 
18. When finished, power down the units. 
 
The procedure for Part B, Test 1.3 is as follows. 
19. Disconnect the downstream end of the LEC router-Downstream End User router 
connection. 
20. Network the ISP2 router-Downstream End User router together. 
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Figure 3.3. Model 1.3 Test Topology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Upstream 
End User 
WS 
 
 
LEC 
 
Upstream 
End User 
Router 
 
Dnstream 
End User 
Router 
 
Dnstream 
End User 
WS 
 
Tier I 
ISP 
 
 
ISP2 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 173 
21. Power up the units. 
22. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP and 
Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router. 
23. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2 
router as an additional route. 
24. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
25. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 1.3. 
26. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Scenario 2 
In Scenario 2, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served 
by multiple private providers between the upstream providers to the end users.  In Part B, 
competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt to enter the local 
and last mile markets. 
 
Part A. 
The procedure for Part A, Test 2.1 is as follows. 
1. Secure and situate the following units. 
a. Seven computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, 
ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User. 
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b. One switch for the Tier I ISP router. 
c. Two computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User and 
Downstream End User routers. 
2. Network the following units together. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router. 
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch. 
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router. 
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router. 
e. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router. 
f. LEC router-Downstream End User router. 
g. Connect a cable to the CC router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream 
End User router. 
h. Connect a cable to the ISP1 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream 
End User router. 
i. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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Figure 3.4. Model 2.1 Base Topology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Upstream 
End User 
WS 
 
Upstream 
End User 
Router 
 
Dnstream 
End User 
Router 
 
Dnstream 
End User 
WS 
 
Tier I 
ISP 
 
 
CC 
 
 
ISP1 
 
 
LEC 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 176 
3. Power up the units. 
4. Configure the routers as needed. 
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes, 
and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 2.1. 
7. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Part B. 
8. The procedure for Part B, Test 2.2 is as follows. 
9. Network the Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router together. 
10. Connect a cable to the ISP2 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream 
End User router. 
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Figure 3.5. Model 2.2 Test Topology. 
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11. Power up the units. 
12. Configure the routers as needed. 
13. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP and 
Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router. 
14. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2 
router as an additional route. 
15. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
16. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 2.2. 
17. When finished, power down the units. 
 
The procedure for Part B, Test 2.3 is as follows. 
18. Disconnect the downstream end of the LEC router-Downstream End User router 
connection. 
19. Network the CC router-Downstream End User router together. 
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Figure 3.6 Model 2.3 Test Topology. 
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20. Power up the units. 
21. Configure the routers as needed. 
22. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the CC 
router as an additional route. 
23. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
24. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 2.3. 
25. When finished, power down the units. 
 
The procedure for Part B, Test 2.4 is as follows. 
26. Disconnect the downstream end of the CC router-Downstream End User router 
connection. 
27. Network the ISP1 router-Downstream End User router together. 
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Figure 3.7. Model 2.4 Test Topology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Upstream 
End User 
WS 
 
Upstream 
End User 
Router 
 
Dnstream 
End User 
Router 
 
Dnstream 
End User 
WS 
 
Tier I 
ISP 
 
 
CC 
 
 
ISP1 
 
 
LEC 
 
 
ISP2 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 182 
28. Power up the units. 
29. Configure the routers as needed. 
30. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP1 
router as an additional route. 
31. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
32. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 2.4. 
33. When finished, power down the units. 
 
The procedure for Part B, Test 2.5 is as follows. 
34. Disconnect the downstream end of the ISP1 router-Downstream End User router 
connection. 
35. Network the ISP2 router-Downstream End User router together. 
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Figure 3.8. Model 2.5 Test Topology. 
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36. Power up the units. 
37. Configure the routers as needed. 
38. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2 
router as an additional route. 
39. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
40. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 2.5. 
41. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Scenario 3 
In Scenario 3, Part A will attempt to emulate a local market dominated by two private 
duopolistic providers between the upstream providers to the end users.  In Part B, competitor 
ISP2 will then attempt to enter the local market.  In Part C, competitor Google will then attempt 
to enter the local and last mile markets as ISP2.  Note – only a representative sample of all of the 
possible last mile connection combinations will tested. 
 
Part A. 
The procedure for Part A, Test 3.1 is as follows. 
1. Secure and situate the following units. 
a. Seven computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, 
ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User. 
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b. One switch for the Tier I ISP router. 
c. Three computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User, 
Downstream End User #1, and Downstream End User #2. 
2. Network the following units together. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router. 
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch. 
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router. 
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router. 
e. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router. 
f. LEC router-Downstream End User router. 
g. CC router-Downstream End User Workstation #2. 
h. Connect a cable to the ISP1 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream 
End User router. 
i. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation #1. 
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Figure 3.9. Model 3.1 Base Topology. 
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3. Power up the units. 
4. Configure the routers as needed. 
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes, 
and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
b. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User Workstation #2. 
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire. 
7. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Part B. 
The procedure for Part B, Test 3.2 is as follows. 
8. Network the Tier I ISP router switch-ISP2 router together. 
9. Connect a cable to the ISP2 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream End 
User Workstation #2. 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 188 
Figure 3.10. Model 3.2 Test Topology. 
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10. Power up the units. 
11. Configure the routers as needed. 
12. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the ISP2 router. 
13. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP router to utilize the ISP2 router as an additional route. 
14. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
b. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC 
router-Downstream End User Workstation #2. 
15. Complete Section B of the questionnaire. 
16. When finished, power down the units. 
 
The procedure for Part B, Test 3.3 is as follows. 
17. Disconnect the downstream end of the LEC router-Downstream End User router 
connection. 
18. Disconnect the downstream end of the CC router-Downstream End User Workstation #2 
connection. 
19. Network the ISP1 router-Downstream End User router together. 
20. Network the ISP2 router-Downstream End User Workstation #2 together. 
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Figure 3.11. Model 3.3 Test Topology. 
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21. Power up the units. 
22. Configure the routers as needed. 
23. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the ISP2 router. 
24. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP router to utilize the ISP2 router as an additional route. 
25. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
b. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 
router-Downstream End User workstation #2. 
26. Complete Section B of the questionnaire. 
27. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Part C. 
The procedure for Part C, Test 3.4 is as follows. 
28. Disconnect the downstream end of the ISP1 router-Downstream End User router 
connection. 
29. Disconnect the downstream end of the ISP2 router-Downstream End User Workstation 
#2 connection. 
30. Network the LEC router-Downstream End User router together. 
31. Network the CC router-Downstream End User Workstation #2 together. 
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32. Connect a cable to the Google router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream 
End User router. 
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Figure 3.12. Model 3.4 Test Topology. 
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33. Power up the units. 
34. Configure the routers as needed. 
35. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the Google router. 
36. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP router to utilize the Google router as an additional 
route. 
37. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
b. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC 
router-Downstream End User Workstation #2. 
38. Complete Section C of the questionnaire. 
39. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Scenario 4 
In Scenario 4, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market 
dominated by a monopolistic private provider between the upstream providers to the end users.  
In Part B, competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt to enter 
the local and last mile markets. 
 
Part A. 
The procedure for Part A, Test 4.1 is as follows. 
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1. Secure and situate the following units. 
a. Seven computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, 
ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User. 
b. One switch for the Tier I ISP router. 
c. Two computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User and 
Downstream End User routers. 
2. Network the following units together. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router. 
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch. 
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router. 
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router. 
e. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router. 
f. LEC router-Downstream End User router. 
g. Connect a cable to the CC router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream 
End User router. 
h. Connect a cable to the ISP1 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream 
End User router. 
i. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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Figure 3.13. Model 4.1 Base Topology. 
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3. Power up the units. 
4. Configure the routers as needed. 
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes, 
and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 4.1. 
7. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Part B. 
The procedure for Part B, Test 4.2 is as follows. 
8. Network the Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router together. 
9. Connect a cable to the ISP1 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream End 
User router. 
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Figure 3.14. Model 4.2 Test Topology. 
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10. Power up the units. 
11. Configure the routers as needed. 
12. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the ISP2 router. 
13. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2 
router as an additional route. 
14. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
15. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 4.2. 
16. When finished, power down the units. 
 
The procedure for Part B, Test 4.3 is as follows. 
17. Disconnect the downstream end of the LEC router-Downstream End User router 
connection. 
18. Network the CC router-Downstream End User router together. 
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Figure 3.15. Model 4.3 Test Topology. 
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19. Power up the units. 
20. Configure the routers as needed. 
21. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the CC router. 
22. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the CC 
router as an additional route. 
23. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
24. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 4.3. 
25. When finished, power down the units. 
 
The procedure for Part B, Test 4.4 is as follows. 
26. Disconnect the downstream end of the CC router-Downstream End User router 
connection. 
27. Network the ISP1 router-Downstream End User router together. 
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Figure 3.16. Model 4.4 Test Topology. 
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28. Power up the units. 
29. Configure the routers as needed. 
30. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the ISP1 router. 
31. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP1 
router as an additional route. 
32. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
33. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 4.4. 
34. When finished, power down the units. 
 
The procedure for Part B, Test 4.5 is as follows. 
35. Disconnect the downstream end of the ISP1 router-Downstream End User router 
connection. 
36. Network the ISP2 router-Downstream End User router together. 
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Figure 3.17. Model 4.5 Test Topology. 
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37. Power up the units. 
38. Configure the routers as needed. 
39. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the ISP2 router. 
40. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2 
router as an additional route. 
41. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
42. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 4.5. 
43. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Scenario 5 
In Scenario 5, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served 
by only a public MAN between the upstream providers to the end users.  In Part B, competitor 
ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt to enter the local and last 
mile markets. 
 
Part A. 
The procedure for Part A, Test 5.1 is as follows. 
1. Secure and situate the following units. 
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a. Five computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, Public MAN, 
ISP2, and Downstream End User. 
b. One switch for the Tier I ISP router. 
c. Two computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User and 
Downstream End User routers. 
2. Network the following units together. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router. 
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router. 
c. Tier I ISP router-Public MAN router. 
d. Public MAN router-Downstream End User router. 
e. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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Figure 3.18. Model 5.1 Base Topology. 
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3. Power up the units. 
4. Configure the routers as needed. 
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes, 
and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 5.1. 
7. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Part B. 
The procedure for Part B, Test 5.2 is as follows. 
8. Disconnect the Upstream End User router and the Public MAN router from the Tier I ISP 
router. 
9. Network a switch to the Tier I ISP router. 
10. Network the Upstream End User router, Public MAN router, and ISP2 router to the Tier I 
router switch. 
11. Connect a cable to the ISP2 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream 
End User router. 
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Figure 3.19. Model 5.2 Test Topology. 
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12. Power up the units. 
13. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP and 
Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router. 
14. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2 
router as an additional route. 
15. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
16. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 5.2. 
17. When finished, power down the units. 
 
The procedure for Part B, Test 5.3 is as follows. 
18. Disconnect the downstream end of the Public MAN router-Downstream End User router 
connection. 
19. Network the ISP2 router-Downstream End User router together. 
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Figure 3.20. Model 5.3 Test Topology. 
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20. Power up the units. 
21. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP and 
Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router. 
22. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2 
router as an additional route. 
23. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
24. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 5.3. 
25. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Scenario 6 
In Scenario 6, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served 
by multiple private providers including a Public MAN between the upstream providers to the end 
users.  In Part B, competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt 
to enter the local and last mile markets. 
 
Part A. 
The procedure for Part A, Test 6.1 is as follows. 
1. Secure and situate the following units. 
a. Eight computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, 
Public MAN, ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User. 
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b. One switch for the Tier I ISP router. 
c. Two computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User and 
Downstream End User routers. 
2. Network the following units together. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router. 
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch. 
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router. 
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router. 
e. Tier I ISP router switch-Public MAN router. 
f. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router. 
g. LEC router-Downstream End User router. 
h. Connect a cable to the CC router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream 
End User router. 
i. Connect a cable to the Public MAN router destined to but not connecting with the 
Downstream End User router. 
j. Connect a cable to the ISP1 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream 
End User router. 
k. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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Figure 3.21. Model 6.1 Base Topology. 
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3. Power up the units. 
4. Configure the routers as needed. 
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes, 
and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 6.1. 
7. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Part B. 
The procedure for Part B, Test 6.2 is as follows. 
8. Network the Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router together. 
9. Connect a cable to the ISP2 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream End 
User router. 
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Figure 3.22. Model 6.2 Test Topology. 
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10. Power up the units. 
11. Configure the routers as needed. 
12. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP and 
Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router. 
13. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2 
router as an additional route. 
14. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
15. Complete Section B of the questionnaire. 
16. When finished, power down the units. 
 
The procedure for Part B, Test 6.3 is as follows. 
17. Disconnect the downstream end of the LEC router-Downstream End User router 
connection. 
18. Network the CC router-Downstream End User router together. 
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Figure 3.23. Model 6.3 Test Topology. 
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19. Power up the units. 
20. Configure the routers as needed. 
21. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the CC 
router as an additional route. 
22. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
23. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 6.3. 
24. When finished, power down the units. 
 
The procedure for Part B, Test 6.4 is as follows. 
25. Disconnect the downstream end of the CC router-Downstream End User router 
connection. 
26. Network the Public MAN router-Downstream End User router together. 
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Figure 3.24. Model 6.4 Test Topology. 
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27. Power up the units. 
28. Configure the routers as needed. 
29. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the 
Public MAN router as an additional route. 
30. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
31. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 6.4. 
32. When finished, power down the units. 
 
The procedure for Part B, Test 6.5 is as follows. 
33. Disconnect the downstream end of the Public MAN router-Downstream End User router 
connection. 
34. Network the ISP1 router-Downstream End User router together. 
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Figure 3.25. Model 6.5 Test Topology. 
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35. Power up the units. 
36. Configure the routers as needed. 
37. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP1 
router as an additional route. 
38. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
39. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 6.5. 
40. When finished, power down the units. 
 
The procedure for Part B, Test 6.6 is as follows. 
41. Disconnect the downstream end of the ISP1 router-Downstream End User router 
connection. 
42. Network the ISP2 router-Downstream End User router together. 
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Figure 3.26. Model 6.6 Test Topology. 
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43. Power up the units. 
44. Configure the routers as needed. 
45. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2 
router as an additional route. 
46. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
47. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 6.6. 
48. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Scenario 7 
In Scenario 7, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market 
including a Public MAN dominated by two duopolistic private providers between the upstream 
providers to the end users.  In Part B, competitor ISP2 will then attempt to enter the local and last 
mile markets.  In Part C, competitor Google will then attempt to enter the local and last mile 
markets as ISP2.  Note – only a representative sample of all of the possible last mile connection 
combinations will be tested. 
 
Part A. 
The procedure for Part A, Test 7.1 is as follows. 
1. Secure and situate the following units. 
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a. Eight computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, 
Public MAN, ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User. 
b. One switch for the Tier I ISP router. 
c. Three computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User, 
Downstream End User #1, and Downstream End User #2. 
2. Network the following units together. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router. 
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch. 
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router. 
d. Tier I ISP router switch-Public MAN router. 
e. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router. 
f. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router. 
g. LEC router-Downstream End User router. 
h. CC router-Downstream End User Workstation #2. 
i. Connect a cable to the Public MAN router destined to but not connecting with the 
Downstream End User router. 
j. Connect a cable to the ISP1 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream 
End User Workstation #2. 
k. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation #1. 
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Figure 3.27. Model 7.1 Base Topology. 
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3. Power up the units. 
4. Configure the routers as needed. 
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes, 
and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
b. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User Workstation #2. 
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 7.1. 
7. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Part B. 
The procedure for Part B, Test 7.2 is as follows. 
8. Network the Tier I ISP router switch-ISP2 router together. 
9. Connect a cable to the ISP2 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream End 
User Workstation #2. 
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Figure 3.28. Model 7.2 Test Topology. 
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10. Power up the units. 
11. Configure the routers as needed. 
12. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the ISP2 router. 
13. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP router to utilize the ISP2 router as an additional route. 
14. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
b. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC 
router-Downstream End User workstation #2. 
15. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 7.2. 
16. When finished, power down the units. 
 
The procedure for Part B, Test 7.3 is as follows. 
17. Disconnect the downstream end of the LEC router-Downstream End User router 
connection. 
18. Disconnect the downstream end of the CC router-Downstream End User Workstation #2 
connection. 
19. Network the Public MAN router-Downstream End User router together. 
20. Network the ISP2 router-Downstream End User Workstation #2 together. 
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Figure 3.29. Model 7.3 Test Topology. 
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21. Power up the units. 
22. Configure the routers as needed. 
23. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the ISP2 router. 
24. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP router to utilize the ISP2 router as an additional route. 
25. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
b. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 
router-Downstream End User workstation #2. 
26. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 7.3. 
27. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Part C. 
The procedure for Part C, Test 7.4 is as follows. 
28. Disconnect the downstream end of the Public MAN router-Downstream End User router 
connection. 
29. Disconnect the downstream end of the ISP2 router-Downstream End User Workstation 
#2 connection. 
30. Network the LEC router-Downstream End User router together. 
31. Network the CC router-Downstream End User Workstation #2 together. 
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32. Connect a cable to the Google router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream 
End User router. 
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Figure 3.30. Model 7.4 Test Topology. 
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33. Power up the units. 
34. Configure the routers as needed. 
35. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the Google router. 
36. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP router to utilize the Google router as an additional 
route. 
37. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
b. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC 
router-Downstream End User workstation #2. 
38. Complete Section C of the questionnaire for Test 7.4. 
39. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Scenario 8 
In Scenario 8, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market 
including a public MAN dominated by a monopolistic private provider between the upstream 
providers to the end users.  In Part B, competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as 
Google) will then attempt to enter the local and last mile markets. 
 
Part A. 
The procedure for Test 8.1 is as follows. 
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1. Secure and situate the following units. 
a. Eight computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, 
Public MAN, ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User. 
b. One switch for the Tier I ISP router. 
c. Two computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User and 
Downstream End User routers. 
2. Network the following units together. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router. 
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch. 
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router. 
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router. 
e. Tier I ISP router switch-Public MAN router. 
f. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router. 
g. LEC router-Downstream End User router. 
h. Connect a cable to the CC router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream 
End User router. 
i. Connect a cable to the Public MAN router destined to but not connecting with the 
Downstream End User router. 
j. Connect a cable to the ISP1 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream 
End User router. 
k. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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Figure 3.31. Model 8.1 Base Topology. 
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3. Power up the units. 
4. Configure the routers as needed. 
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes, 
and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 8.1. 
7. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Part B. 
The procedure for Test 8.2 is as follows. 
8. Network the Tier I ISP router switch-ISP2 router together. 
9. Connect a cable to the ISP2 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream End 
User router. 
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Figure 3.32. Model 8.2 Test Topology. 
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10. Power up the units. 
11. Configure the routers as needed. 
12. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the ISP2 router. 
13. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2 
router as an additional route. 
14. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
15. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 8.2. 
16. When finished, power down the units. 
 
The procedure for Part B, Test 8.3 is as follows. 
17. Disconnect the downstream end of the LEC router-Downstream End User router 
connection. 
18. Network the CC router-Downstream End User router together. 
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Figure 3.33. Model 8.3 Test Topology. 
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19. Power up the units. 
20. Configure the routers as needed. 
21. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the CC router. 
22. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the CC 
router as an additional route. 
23. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
24. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 8.3. 
25. When finished, power down the units. 
 
The procedure for Part B, Test 8.4 is as follows. 
26. Disconnect the downstream end of the CC router-Downstream End User router 
connection. 
27. Network the Public MAN router-Downstream End User router together. 
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Figure 3.34. Model 8.4 Test Topology. 
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28. Power up the units. 
29. Configure the routers as needed. 
30. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the Public MAN router. 
31. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the 
Public MAN router as an additional route. 
32. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
33. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 8.4. 
34. When finished, power down the units. 
 
The procedure for Part B, Test 8.5 is as follows. 
35. Disconnect the downstream end of the Public MAN router-Downstream End User router 
connection. 
36. Network the ISP1 router-Downstream End User router together. 
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Figure 3.35. Model 8.5 Test Topology. 
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37. Power up the units. 
38. Configure the routers as needed. 
39. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the ISP1 router. 
40. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP1 
router as an additional route. 
41. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
42. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 8.5. 
43. When finished, power down the units. 
 
The procedure for Part B, Test 8.6 is as follows. 
44. Disconnect the downstream end of the ISP1 router-Downstream End User router 
connection. 
45. Network the ISP2 router-Downstream End User router together. 
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Figure 3.36. Model 8.6 Test Topology. 
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46. Power up the units. 
47. Configure the routers as needed. 
48. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the ISP2 router. 
49. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2 
router as an additional route. 
50. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
51. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 8.6. 
52. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Scenario 9 
In Scenario 9, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served 
by multiple private providers including a public MAN between the upstream providers to the end 
users, and where all providers can optionally access and use each other’s local market systems.  
In Part B, competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt to enter 
the local and last mile markets. 
 
Part A. 
The procedure for Part A, Test 9.1 is as follows. 
1. Secure and situate the following units. 
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a. Eight computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, 
Public MAN, ISP1, ISP2, and the Downstream End User. 
b. Six switches for the Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2. 
c. Two computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User and 
Downstream End User routers. 
2. Network the following units together. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router. 
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch. 
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router switch. 
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router switch. 
e. Tier I ISP router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
f. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
g. LEC router switch-CC router switch. 
h. LEC router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
i. LEC router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
j. CC router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
k. CC router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
l. Public MAN router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
m. LEC router switch-Downstream End User router switch. 
n. Connect a cable to the CC router switch destined to but not connecting with the 
Downstream End User router. 
o. Connect a cable to the Public MAN router switch destined to but not connecting with the 
Downstream End User router. 
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p. Connect a cable to the ISP1 router switch destined to but not connecting with the 
Downstream End User router. 
q. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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Figure 3.37. Model 9.1 Base Topology. 
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3. Power up the units. 
4. Configure the routers as needed. 
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes, 
and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 9.1. 
7. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Part B. 
8. The procedure for Part B, Test 9.2 is as follows. 
9. Network the following units together. 
a. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP2 router switch. 
b. ISP2 router switch-LEC router switch. 
c. ISP2 router switch-CC router switch. 
d. ISP2 router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
e. ISP2 router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
f. Connect a cable to the ISP2 router switch destined to but not connecting with the 
Downstream End User router. 
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Figure 3.38. Model 9.2 Test Topology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Upstream 
End User 
WS 
 
Upstream 
End User 
Router 
 
Dnstream 
End User 
Router 
 
Dnstream 
End User 
WS 
 
Tier I 
ISP 
 
Public 
MAN 
 
 
ISP1 
 
 
CC 
 
 
ISP2 
 
 
LEC 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 254 
10. Power up the units. 
11. Configure the routers as needed. 
12. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the ISP2 router. 
13. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2 
router as an additional route. 
14. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
15. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 9.2. 
16. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Scenario 10 
In Scenario 10, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served 
by multiple private providers including a public MAN but dominated by two duopolistic private 
providers, and where all providers can optionally access and use each other’s local market 
systems.  The two duopolistic private providers are the only last mile providers.  In Part B, 
competitor ISP2 will then attempt to enter the local market.  In Part C, competitor Google will 
then attempt to enter the local and last mile markets as ISP2. 
 
Part A. 
The procedure for Part A, Test 10.1 is as follows. 
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1. Secure and situate the following units. 
a. Eight computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, 
Public MAN, ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User. 
b. Seven switches for the Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, Public MAN, ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream 
End User routers. 
c. Three computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User, 
Downstream End User #1, and Downstream End User #2. 
2. Network the following units together. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router. 
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch. 
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router switch. 
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router switch. 
e. Tier I ISP router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
f. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
g. LEC router switch-CC router switch. 
h. LEC router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
i. LEC router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
j. CC router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
k. CC router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
l. Public MAN router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
m. LEC router switch-Downstream End User router switch. 
n. CC router switch-Downstream End User workstation #2. 
o. Downstream End User router switch-Downstream End User workstation #1. 
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Figure 3.39. Model 10.1 Base Topology. 
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3. Power up the units. 
4. Configure the routers as needed. 
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes, 
and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation 1. 
b. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User workstation 2. 
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 10.1. 
7. Power down the units. 
 
Part B. 
The procedure for Part B, Test 10.2 is as follows. 
8. Network the following units together. 
a. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP2 router switch. 
b. ISP2 router switch-LEC router switch. 
c. ISP2 router switch-CC router switch. 
d. ISP2 router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
e. ISP2 router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
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Figure 3.40. Model 10.2 Test Topology. 
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9. Power up the units. 
10. Configure the routers as needed. 
11. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the ISP2 router. 
12. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2 
router as an additional route. 
13. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation 1. 
b. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC 
router-Downstream End User workstation 2. 
14. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 10.2. 
15. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Part C. 
The procedure for Part C, Test 10.3 is as follows. 
16. Connect a cable to the Google router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream 
End User router. 
17. Connect a cable to the Google router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream 
End User workstation #2. 
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Figure 3.41. Model 10.3 Test Topology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Upstream 
End User 
WS 
 
Upstream 
End User 
Router 
 
Tier I 
ISP 
 
Public 
MAN 
 
 
ISP1 
 
 
CC 
 
 
Google 
 
 
LEC 
 
Dnstream 
End User 
Router 
 
Dnstream 
End User 
WS1 
 
Dnstream 
End User 
WS2 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 261 
18. Power up the units. 
19. Configure the routers as needed. 
20. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the Google router. 
21. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the 
Google router as an additional route. 
22. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation 1. 
b. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC 
router-Downstream End User workstation 2. 
23. Complete Section C of the questionnaire for Test 10.3. 
24. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Scenario 11 
In Scenario 11, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served 
by multiple private providers including a public MAN but dominated by a monopolistic private 
provider, and where all providers can optionally access and use each other’s local market 
systems.  The monopolistic private provider is the only last mile provider.  In Part B, competitor 
ISP2 will then attempt to enter the local market.  In Part C, competitor Google will then attempt 
to enter the local and last mile markets as ISP2. 
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Part A. 
The procedure for Part A, Test 11.1 is as follows. 
1. Secure and situate the following units. 
a. Eight computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, 
Public MAN, ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User. 
b. Six switches for the Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 routers. 
c. Two computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User and 
Downstream End User routers. 
2. Network the following units together. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router. 
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch. 
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router switch. 
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router switch. 
e. Tier I ISP router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
f. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
g. LEC router switch-CC router switch. 
h. LEC router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
i. LEC router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
j. CC router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
k. CC router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
l. Public MAN router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
m. LEC router switch-Downstream End User router. 
n. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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Figure 3.42. Model 11.1 Base Topology. 
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3. Power up the units. 
4. Configure the routers as needed. 
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes, 
and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 11.1. 
7. Power down the units. 
 
Part B. 
The procedure for Part B, Test 11.2 is as follows. 
8. Network the following units together. 
a. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP2 router switch. 
b. ISP2 router switch-LEC router switch. 
c. ISP2 router switch-CC router switch. 
d. ISP2 router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
e. ISP2 router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
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Figure 3.43. Model 11.2 Test Topology. 
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9. Power up the units. 
10. Configure the routers as needed. 
11. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the ISP2 router. 
12. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2 
router as an additional route. 
13. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
14. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 11.2. 
15. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Part C. 
The procedure for Part C, Test 11.3 is as follows. 
16. Connect a cable to the Google router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream 
End User router. 
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Figure 3.44. Model 11.3 Test Topology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Upstream 
End User 
WS 
 
Upstream 
End User 
Router 
 
Dnstream 
End User 
Router 
 
Dnstream 
End User 
WS 
 
Tier I 
ISP 
 
Public 
MAN 
 
 
ISP1 
 
 
CC 
 
 
Google 
 
 
LEC 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 268 
17. Power up the units. 
18. Configure the routers as needed. 
19. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the Google router. 
20. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the 
Google router as an additional route. 
21. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
22. Complete Section C of the questionnaire for Test 11.3. 
23. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Scenario 12 
In Scenario 12, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served 
by multiple private providers including a public MAN but dominated by the monopolistic public 
MAN, and where all providers can optionally access and use each other’s local market systems.  
The monopolistic public MAN is the only last mile provider.  In Part B, competitor ISP2 will 
then attempt to enter the local market.  In Part C, competitor Google will then attempt to enter 
the local and last mile markets as ISP2. 
 
Part A. 
The procedure for Part A, Test 12.1 is as follows. 
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1. Secure and situate the following units. 
a. Eight computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, 
Public MAN, ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User. 
b. Seven switches for the Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 routers. 
c. Two computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User and 
Downstream End User routers. 
2. Network the following units together. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router. 
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch. 
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router switch. 
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router switch. 
e. Tier I ISP router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
f. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
g. LEC router switch-CC router switch. 
h. LEC router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
i. LEC router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
j. CC router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
k. CC router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
l. Public MAN router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
m. Public MAN router switch-Downstream End User router. 
n. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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Figure 3.45. Model 12.1 Base Topology. 
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3. Power up the units. 
4. Configure the routers as needed. 
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes, 
and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 12.1. 
7. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Part B. 
The procedure for Part B, Test 12.2 is as follows. 
8. Network the following units together. 
a. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP2 router switch. 
b. ISP2 router switch-LEC router switch. 
c. ISP2 router switch-CC router switch. 
d. ISP2 router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
e. ISP2 router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
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Figure 3.46. Model 12.2 Test Topology. 
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9. Power up the units. 
10. Configure the routers as needed. 
11. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the ISP2 router. 
12. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2 
router as an additional route. 
13. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
14. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 12.2. 
15. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Part C. 
The procedure for Part C, Test 12.3 is as follows. 
16. Connect a cable to the Google router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream 
End User router. 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 274 
Figure 3.47. Model 12.3 Test Topology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Upstream 
End User 
WS 
 
Upstream 
End User 
Router 
 
Dnstream 
End User 
Router 
 
Dnstream 
End User 
WS 
 
Tier I 
ISP 
 
Public 
MAN 
 
 
ISP1 
 
 
CC 
 
 
Google 
 
 
LEC 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 275 
17. Power up the units. 
18. Configure the routers as needed. 
19. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the Google router. 
20. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the 
Google router as an additional route. 
21. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
22. Complete Section C of the questionnaire for Test 12.3. 
23. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Scenario 13 
In Scenario 13, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served 
by only a public MAN.  The public MAN is the sole last mile system provider but does not 
provide upstream carriage service.  In Part B, competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and 
as Google) will then attempt to enter the local and last mile markets. 
 
Part A. 
The procedure for Part A, Test 13.1 is as follows. 
1. Secure and situate the following units. 
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a. Five computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, Public MAN, 
ISP2, and Downstream End User. 
b. One switch for the ISP2 router. 
c. Two computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User and 
Downstream End User routers. 
2. Network the following units together. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router. 
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router. 
c. Public MAN router-Downstream End User router. 
d. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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Figure 3.48. Model 13.1 Base Topology. 
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3. Power up the units. 
4. Configure the routers as needed. 
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes, 
and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 13.1. 
7. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Part B. 
The procedure for Part B, Test 13.2 is as follows. 
8. Network the following units together. 
a. Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router switch. 
b. Public MAN router-ISP2 router switch. 
c. Connect a cable to the ISP2 router switch destined to but not connecting with the 
Downstream End User Router. 
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Figure 3.49. Model 13.2 Test Topology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Upstream 
End User 
WS 
 
Public 
MAN 
 
Upstream 
End User 
Router 
 
Dnstream 
End User 
Router 
 
Dnstream 
End User 
WS 
 
Tier I 
ISP 
 
 
ISP2 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 280 
9. Power up the units. 
10. Configure the routers as needed. 
11. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the ISP2 router. 
12. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2 
router as an additional route. 
13. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 
router-Public MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User 
workstation. 
14. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 13.2. 
15. When finished, power down the units. 
 
The procedure for Part B, Test 13.3 is as follows. 
16. Disconnect the downstream end of the Public MAN router-Downstream End User router 
connection. 
17. Network the ISP2 router switch-Downstream End User router together. 
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Figure 3.50. Model 13.3 Test Topology. 
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18. Power up the units. 
19. Configure the routers as needed. 
20. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the ISP2 router. 
21. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2 
router as an additional route. 
22. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
23. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 13.3. 
24. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Scenario 14 
In Scenario 14, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served 
by multiple private providers including a public MAN, where the Public MAN is the sole last 
mile system provider but does not provide upstream carriage service.  All providers can 
optionally access and use each other’s local market systems.  In Part B, competitor ISP2 will 
then attempt to enter the local market.  In Part C, competitor Google will then attempt to enter 
the local and last mile markets as ISP2. 
 
Part A. 
The procedure for Part A, Test 14.1 is as follows. 
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1. Secure and situate the following units. 
a. Eight computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, 
Public MAN, ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User. 
b. Six switches for the Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 routers. 
c. Two computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User and 
Downstream End User routers. 
2. Network the following units together. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router. 
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch. 
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router switch. 
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router switch. 
e. Tier I ISP router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
f. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
g. LEC router switch-CC router switch. 
h. LEC router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
i. LEC router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
j. CC router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
k. CC router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
l. Public MAN router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
m. Public MAN router switch-Downstream End User router. 
n. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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Figure 3.51. Model 14.1 Base Topology. 
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3. Power up the units. 
4. Configure the routers as needed. 
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes, 
and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Public MAN Router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 14.1. 
7. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Part B. 
The procedure for Part B, Test 14.2 is as follows. 
8. Network the following units together. 
a. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP2 router switch. 
b. ISP2 router switch-LEC router switch. 
c. ISP2 router switch-CC router switch. 
d. ISP2 router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
e. ISP2 router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
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Figure 3.52. Model 14.2 Test Topology. 
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9. Power up the units. 
10. Configure the routers as needed. 
11. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the ISP2 router. 
12. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2 
router as an additional route. 
13. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC 
router-Public MAN Router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User 
workstation. 
14. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 14.2. 
15. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Part C. 
The procedure for Part C, Test 14.3 is as follows. 
16. Connect a cable to the Google router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream 
End User router. 
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Figure 3.53. Model 14.3 Test Topology. 
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17. Power up the units. 
18. Configure the routers as needed. 
19. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the Google router. 
20. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the 
Google router as an additional route. 
21. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC 
router-Public MAN Router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User 
workstation. 
22. Complete Section C of the questionnaire for Test 14.3. 
23. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Scenario 15 
In Scenario 15, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served 
by multiple private providers including a public MAN that is dominated by two private 
duopolistic providers.  The Public MAN is the sole last mile system provider but does not 
provide upstream carriage service.  All providers can optionally access and use each other’s local 
market systems.  In Part B, competitor ISP2 will then attempt to enter the local market.  In Part 
C, competitor Google will then attempt to enter the local and last mile markets as ISP2. 
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Part A. 
The procedure for Part A, Test 15.1 is as follows. 
1. Secure and situate the following units. 
a. Eight computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, 
Public MAN, ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User. 
b. Six switches for the Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, Public MAN, andISP1, and ISP2 routers. 
c. Two computers to be used as workstations for the clients of the Upstream End User and 
Downstream End User routers. 
2. Network the following units together. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router. 
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch. 
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router switch. 
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router switch. 
e. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
f. LEC router switch-CC router switch. 
g. LEC router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
h. LEC router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
i. CC router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
j. CC router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
k. ISP1 router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
l. Public MAN router switch-Downstream End User router. 
m. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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Figure 3.54. Model 15.1 Base Topology. 
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3. Power up the units. 
4. Configure the routers as needed. 
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes, 
and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Public MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 15.1. 
7. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Part B. 
The procedure for Part B, Test 15.2 is as follows. 
8. Network the following units together. 
a. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP2 router switch. 
b. ISP2 router switch-LEC router switch. 
c. ISP2 router switch-CC router switch. 
d. ISP2 router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
e. ISP2 router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
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Figure 3.55. Model 15.2 Test Topology. 
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9. Power up the units. 
10. Configure the routers as needed. 
11. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the ISP2 router. 
12. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2 
router as an additional route. 
13. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC 
router-Public MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User 
workstation. 
14. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 15.2. 
15. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Part C. 
16. The procedure for Part C, Test 15.3 is as follows. 
17. Connect a cable to the Google router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream 
End User router. 
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Figure 3.56. Model 15.3 Test Topology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Upstream 
End User 
WS 
 
Upstream 
End User 
Router 
 
Dnstream 
End User 
Router 
 
Dnstream 
End User 
WS 
 
Tier I 
ISP 
 
Public 
MAN 
 
 
ISP1 
 
 
CC 
 
 
Google 
 
 
LEC 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 296 
18. Power up the units. 
19. Configure the routers as needed. 
20. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the Google router. 
21. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the 
Google router as an additional route. 
22. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC 
router-Public MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User 
workstation. 
23. Complete Section C of the questionnaire for Test 15.3. 
24. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Scenario 16 
In Scenario 16, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served 
by multiple private providers including a public MAN that is dominated by a private 
monopolistic provider.  The Public MAN is the sole last mile system provider but does not 
provide upstream carriage service.  All providers can optionally access and use each other’s local 
market systems.  In Part B, competitor ISP2 will then attempt to enter the local market.  In Part 
C, competitor Google will then attempt to enter the local and last mile markets as ISP2. 
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Part A. 
The procedure for Part A, Test 16.1 is as follows. 
1. Secure and situate the following units. 
a. Eight computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, 
Public MAN, ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User. 
b. Six switches for the Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, Public MAN, andISP1, and ISP2 routers. 
c. Two computers to be used as workstations for the clients of the Upstream End User and 
Downstream End User routers. 
2. Network the following units together. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router. 
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch. 
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router switch. 
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router switch. 
e. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
f. LEC router switch-CC router switch. 
g. LEC router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
h. LEC router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
i. CC router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
j. CC router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
k. ISP1 router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
l. Public MAN router switch-Downstream End User router. 
m. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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Figure 3.57. Model 16.1 Base Topology. 
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3. Power up the units. 
4. Configure the routers as needed. 
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes, 
and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Public MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 16.1. 
7. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Part B. 
The procedure for Part B, Test 16.2 is as follows. 
8. Network the following units together. 
a. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP2 router switch. 
b. ISP2 router switch-LEC router switch. 
c. ISP2 router switch-CC router switch. 
d. ISP2 router switch-Public MAN router switch. 
e. ISP2 router switch-ISP1 router switch. 
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Figure 3.58. Model 16.2 Test Topology. 
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9. Power up the units. 
10. Configure the routers as needed. 
11. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the ISP2 router. 
12. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2 
router as an additional route. 
13. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC 
router-Public MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User 
workstation. 
14. Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 16.2. 
15. When finished, power down the units. 
 
Part C. 
The procedure for Part C, Test 16.3 is as follows. 
16. Connect a cable to the Google router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream 
End User router. 
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Figure 3.59. Model 16.3 Test Topology. 
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17. Power up the units. 
18. Configure the routers as needed. 
19. Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router 
acknowledges the Google router. 
20. Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the 
Google router as an additional route. 
21. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s 
routes, and record the results. 
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC 
router-Public MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User 
workstation. 
22. Complete Section C of the questionnaire for Test 16.3. 
23. When finished, power down the units. 
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 
Trace file data generated by the end user workstations and certain observational data 
requested by the Ch. 3 Procedures and Scenario Questions (Appendix B - Scenario 
Questionnaire) were to be acquired (Appendix C - Data) for the analysis of each emulation’s 
validation and verification of its models. 
 
Experiment Validation and Verification Data 
Trace file data was requested by the Procedures for all of the models. 
 
• Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes, 
and record the results. 
 
Data Acquisition Issues 
The routers were thought to have been properly configured and wired correctly to reflect 
Model 1.1 and its projected routing table as follows. 
 
1. Upstream End User Workstation 192.168.7.20 
2. Upstream End User Router  192.168.7.1 
3. Tier I ISP Router   192.168.4.1 
4. LEC Router    192.168.6.1 
5. Downstream End User Router 192.168.12.1 
6. Downstream End User Workstation 192.168.7.20 
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The construct was documented visually in the following two photos (brightened 20% using 
Photoshop). 
 
Figure 4.1. Model 1.1 Test Topology. 
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Figure 4.2. Model 1.1 Test Topology Detail. 
 
 
As a test, the Traceroute command was issued by the Upstream End User Workstation to access 
the Tier I ISP router being the next hop.  However the request failed to recognize the Tier I ISP 
router as shown in an example of the output. 
 
4-29-2013 21:58:23 
Traceroute has started ... 
 
traceroute to 192.168.4.1 (192.168.4.1), 64 hops max, 40 byte 
packets 
 1  192.168.7.1 (192.168.7.1)  3.575 ms  17.337 ms  1.857 ms 
 2  192.168.7.1 (192.168.7.1)  3008.866 ms !H  3005.810 ms !H  
3006.944 ms !H 
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Numerous changes were made including reconfiguring the routers, swapping cables, swapping 
routers, using LAN port-WAN port and WAN port-LAN port router connections vs. LAN port-
LAN port connections, and trying Traceroute from the downstream routers to the upstream 
routers, but the network was unable to have two neighbor routers recognize each other as 
required by the scenarios. 
To confirm Traceroute itself and the workstation were not at fault, the Upstream End 
User Workstation was removed as a client of the Upstream End User router, connected to the 
researcher’s home Internet connection, had its IP changed from the static IP 192.168.7.20 to 
DHCP, and Traceroute was run with www.Google.com being the destination.  The following 
route was generated. 
 
4-29-2013 22:31:00 
Traceroute has started ... 
 
traceroute: Warning: www.google.com has multiple addresses; using 
74.125.228.19 
traceroute to www.google.com (74.125.228.19), 64 hops max, 40 byte 
packets 
 1  192.168.2.1 (192.168.2.1)  0.824 ms  1.682 ms  0.289 ms 
 2  10.15.44.1 (10.15.44.1)  1076.207 ms  62.182 ms  39.625 ms 
 3  64-5-173-29.rev.omnicity.net (64.5.173.29)  195.465 ms  65.690 
ms  110.043 ms 
 4  68-142-163-1.rev.omnicity.net (68.142.163.1)  54.772 ms  
63.983 ms  21.990 ms 
 5  rrcs-96-11-185-161.central.biz.rr.com (96.11.185.161)  39.543 
ms  980.867 ms  73.997 ms 
 6  be14.clevohek-ccr01.mwrtn.rr.com (65.189.100.62)  73.069 ms  
60.793 ms  78.481 ms 
 7  ae10-0.cr0.dca20.tbone.rr.com (107.14.19.14)  125.139 ms  
42.367 ms  84.075 ms 
 8  ae-2-0.c1.nyc90.tbone.rr.com (66.109.1.49)  194.713 ms 
107.14.19.135 (107.14.19.135)  227.399 ms  82.082 ms 
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 9  74.125.49.181 (74.125.49.181)  229.502 ms  1115.884 ms * 
10  209.85.252.46 (209.85.252.46)  301.081 ms  96.707 ms  80.704 
ms 
11  72.14.238.173 (72.14.238.173)  75.440 ms *  970.551 ms 
12  iad23s05-in-f19.1e100.net (74.125.228.19)  2417.000 ms  
865.785 ms  86.554 ms 
 
The network was constructed and configured with only very minimal assistance received 
from any consultants, as most of them requested to provide service for the experiment, even with 
substantial compensation offered, failed to participate and/or help.  The following was a 
rundown of the individuals and organizations that were contacted for consultation and the results 
(note - most of the actual names have been withheld). 
 
• Student – A very gifted high school student quite literate in networking was requested to 
assist with the experiment.  After his graduation from high school and enrolment into college 
a decade prior to the prospectus of this study being approved, he and his family left the area 
and were out of contact thereafter. 
• CTO #1 – A very knowledgeable chief technical officer of an area business indicated interest 
in the experiment, but later became more involved with his employer’s networks and was 
thereafter unavailable. 
• CTO #2 – A highly knowledgeable and experienced CTO of an actual ISP agreed to consult 
on the project, but a few years prior to the prospectus of this study being approved, he 
accepted a major business opportunity that understandably required an immense amount of 
his time.  He subsequently ceased returning calls and emails. 
• Consultant #1 – A local independent consultant to numerous small businesses was interested 
in the project and even diagrammed a few configurations, but after numerous calls, emails, 
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and in-person meetings that in some later encounters were reduced to begging, he kept 
delaying his services saying he was too busy.  Other friends of his said he had disappeared. 
• WVU OIT – West Virginia University’s Office of Information Technology that provided 
some technical assistance to students was contacted for their potential assistance or if any of 
their staff could assist outside of their normal work.  Their reply was as follows. 
 
From: "Daniel L" <dlve@wifi7.com> 
To: dlve@wifi7.com 
Subject: Fwd: Dissertation Consult: *ref#24-587093 
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2013 05:49:46 -0400 
----- Original Message ----- 
From: 
OITINCIDENT@mail.wvu.edu 
To: 
dlve@wifi7.com 
Cc: 
Sent: 
26 Feb 2013 09:36:36 -0500 
Subject: 
Dissertation Consult: *ref#24-587093 
Hello, 
I am sorry OIT does not offer anything like that. 
OIT Help Desk 
304-293-4444 
*****The progress of your Incident can be obtained at http://oit.wvu.edu/helpdesk/selfservice. If 
you are 
responding with a screen shot please do not embed them within your message, please add them as 
an 
attachment.***** 
ref#24-587093 
Email sent using webmail from Omnicity 
 
• Consultant #2 – A local firm that serves small and medium sized businesses (and known for 
their high prices) was visited in person to request their consultation.  Their representative 
said the Linux operating system was rarely used, and that two consultants on staff that might 
know Linux and would call back later.  The consultants never responded. 
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• Consultant #3 – A past acquaintance quite literate in Linux and networking was contacted via 
voice mail for his potential interest, but he never returned the call.  Further followup with a 
mutual friend revealed he had an “episode” after marriage and fathering a child. 
• Consultant #4 – The mutual friend then placed an advertisement on Facebook requesting 
consultation for the project, which was answered by a consultant having an extensive resume 
of projects and experience in operating systems and networking.  He was interested in the 
project, but after reading a prospectus he later emailed that he was too busy with other clients  
He did refer another independent consultant located in the area. 
• Consultant #5 – An online background search showed the referred consultant was involved in 
a number of area projects, but he never returned a voice mail requesting his services. 
• CTO #3 – A government official recommended a school system CTO as a possible 
consultant.  After a couple requests by the official, the CTO replied she was not interested. 
• Consultant #6 – The son of the aforementioned school system CTO was also identified as a 
consultant.  The government official reported he too was not interested in the project. 
• CTO #4 – A mutual friend who was once CTO of a medium-sized firm was contacted for his 
interest in the project.  He never returned an email. 
• Consultant #6 – Another local firm that served small and medium sized businesses (and 
known for advertising their services on local media outlets) was called and an initial meeting 
was scheduled for the next week due to their heavy workload.  Upon arriving for the meeting, 
the consultant announced the meeting had been cancelled shortly after the initial call, and no 
future meeting was scheduled due again to their workload. 
• CTO #5 – A government agency CTO was contacted by email and visited in person to 
explain the project and request their consultation.  The CTO was pleasant but could not fully 
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understand the experiment, offered incomprehensible advice, and never seemingly 
understood the request for his consultation outside of work so as not to take up much of his 
time during official business and risk getting him in trouble. 
• Consultant #7 – A Linux-literate consultant was interested in the project but also was very 
busy.  He could only offer bits and pieces of information at a time, and his response time to 
calls and emails took up to a week at a time.  He tried to reconfigure the scenarios to better 
reflect the actual end-to-end telecommunication industry including adding numerous market 
participants (Appendix D), but the network configurations were confusing, incomplete, and 
did not appear to make sense. 
 
Internet searches and YouTube tutorials were a little helpful, but many of them featured different 
types of routers, various network configurations, few cases of connecting more than two routers, 
and most were primarily concerned with connecting routers and their clients to the Internet.  The 
instructional quality of their presentations was also largely questionable. 
The observation questions requesting verification and validation data for each scenario 
included the following. 
 
• What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario? 
 
During the experiment’s design phase, samples of actual hypothetical local and last mile wireline 
telecommunications markets were modeled into diagrams and grouped into related types of 
scenarios.  Various factors including access restrictions, market control, and end user choices 
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were then added to each of the scenarios’ conditions.  Those factors and conditions for each of 
the 16 scenarios served as responses to the question. 
Other questions requesting verification and validation data for all Part A Base Models 
included the following. 
 
• Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
• Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and 
conditions. 
• Do the connected units recognize each other? 
• What is the potential routing table? 
• Additional observations. 
 
Data requested in all Part B Test Models included the following. 
 
• Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
• Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and 
conditions. 
• Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
• Do the connected units recognize each other? 
• What is the potential routing table? 
• Additional observations. 
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Data requested in all Part C Test Models where Google entered the market included the 
following. 
 
• Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
• Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and 
conditions. 
• Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router? 
• Do the connected units recognize each other? 
• What is the potential routing table? 
• Additional observations. 
 
The models’ routes from each procedure and the resulting trace file data were to accompany each 
of the Part A, B, and C observation question responses. 
 
• Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
For example, Scenario 1, Part A, Test 1.1’s model used the following route. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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The resulting trace file from the end user workstation should have shown the route previously 
listed, but as mentioned Traceroute never got past the first hop being the Upstream End User 
router.  Both were to have been combined with the observation question and response. 
 
• Do the connected units recognize each other? (was to be “Yes”, but due to the routing failure 
was listed as “No”.) 
 
Data acquired for the remaining observation questions was further described as follows. 
 
• Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
The question requested additional information regarding the particular model being emulated.  
Observations included how well served the local market was, the situation that occurred when 
ISP2 entered the market, what provider the end user(s) chose as their upstream provider, what 
providers end user(s) could not choose and why, local market interconnectivity among providers, 
etc. 
 
• Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and 
conditions. 
 
The question received responses regarding if the routers and end user workstations were 
successfully networked together and functioned per the model and the scenario.  Any unavailable 
routes were to be confirmed as disconnections required by the model’s construct and conditions. 
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• What is the potential routing table? 
 
The question requested all of the potential combinations of routings between the Upstream End 
User to the Downstream End User(s).  As the number of providers, the number of last mile 
networks, and local market interconnections among providers grew, so too did the routing table 
to account for all of the permutations. 
 
• Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
• Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router? 
 
The Part B and C related questions requested verification that those providers’ routers were 
acknowledged by the network’s other routers. 
 
Open Access and Competition Data 
Other observational data requested by the Scenario Questions (Appendix B) was however 
successfully acquired (Appendix C) pertaining to the open access and competition concerns of 
the research question.  The data acquired for each scenario model included the following. 
 
• What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario? 
 
During the design phase, samples of actual and hypothetical local and last mile wireline 
telecommunications markets were modeled into diagrams and grouped into related types of 
scenarios.  Various factors including access restrictions, market control, and end user choices 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 316 
were then added to each of the scenarios’ conditions.  Those factors and conditions for each of 
the 16 scenarios served as responses to the question. 
Other questions requesting open access and competition data for all Part A Base Models 
included the following. 
 
• Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
• Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and 
conditions. 
• Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
• Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
• Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
• Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile 
markets? 
• Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
• What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
• How do the providers access downstream end users? 
• Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each 
if necessary. 
• Additional observations. 
 
Data requested in all Part B Test Models included the following. 
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• Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
• Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and 
conditions. 
• Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
• Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
• Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
• Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile 
markets? 
• Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
• What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
• Does adding the ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 
affect the conditions governing each scenario? 
• Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
• How do the providers access downstream end users? 
• Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each 
if necessary. 
• Additional observations. 
 
Data requested in all Part C Test Models where Google entered the market included the 
following. 
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• Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
• Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and 
conditions. 
• Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
• Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
• Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
• Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile 
markets? 
• Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
• What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
• Does adding Google make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding Google 
affect the conditions governing each scenario? 
• Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router? 
• How do the providers access downstream end users? 
• Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each 
if necessary. 
• Additional observations. 
 
Data acquired for the observation questions was further described as follows. 
 
• Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
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The responses provided additional information regarding the particular model being emulated.  
Observations included how well served the local market was, the situation that occurred when 
ISP2 entered the market, what provider the end user(s) chose as their upstream provider, what 
providers end user(s) could not choose and why, local market interconnectivity among providers, 
etc. 
 
• Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and 
conditions. 
 
Responses were to regard if the routers and end user workstations had been successfully 
networked together and functioned per the model and the scenario.  Any unavailable routes were 
to be confirmed as disconnections required by the model’s construct and conditions.  However 
because the routers could not be configured to network with each other, the emulations could not 
conform to the constructs and conditions. 
 
• Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
Responses to the question identified the middle mile, local, and last mile market participants and 
the degree of competition in each market.  Additional observations noted the effects of limited 
competition such as restricted marketplace entry for potential competitors. 
 
• Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
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The responses identified the construct for each providers’ local and last mile networks. 
 
• Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
Public MANs present in some models were typically considered non-profit government 
enterprises, while the other providers were usually for-profit corporations. 
 
• Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile 
markets? 
 
For those models where a Public MAN was in the same market with for-profit providers, there 
was the potential for business-related conflicts. 
 
• Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
Local and/or last mile market control by one or more providers depended upon the construct of 
the model.  Providers highlighted in bold type in the model’s topology had control and were 
noted as such.  If providers did not extend their own last mile networks to the downstream end 
users (whether the end users subscribed to them or not), then the provider(s) with their own last 
mile networks were assumed to have potential control of that market.  If the local market 
providers were interconnected, the providers without last mile networks could technically access 
end users via third party providers’ last mile networks if they were afforded equal open access.  
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One or more incumbent providers having control of the markets, and possibly together with other 
providers not having significant control in the market, could jointly collude to restrict further 
market entry by other potential competitors.  The Public MAN could dominate markets given 
their government backing and potential control over public rights of way, poles, streets, etc. 
 
• What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
In a truly competitive market, provider market shares could fluctuate between 100% for one 
provider and 0% for other providers, and vice versa.  In lesser competitive markets, a monopoly 
provider will always have a majority of the market share over the other competitors, and duopoly 
providers will always have a combined majority of the market share over the other competitors.  
The market share split ranges also depended upon the number of competitors in each model. 
 
• How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
Providers accessed the downstream end users either via their own last mile networks or via 
access to third party providers’ networks. 
 
• Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each 
if necessary. 
 
If the local market providers had their own last mile networks there was no concern for equal 
access.  However if they did not and had to share local interconnections to other providers and 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 322 
use their last mile networks then there was a concern of issues including access, discrimination, 
pricing, etc. 
 
• Additional observations. 
 
Responses to the question included traffic sharing issues among local market providers, how a 
Public MAN without its own last mile network might not technically qualify as a public MAN, 
the potential for a Public MAN to solely provide openly accessible last mile service without 
engaging in competitive local market service, the potential for Downstream End User 1 to use its 
router to switch among providers it currently subscribed to, etc. 
 
Parts B and C had the following related questions. 
 
• Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
• Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router? 
 
Responses were to verify that those providers’ routers were acknowledged by the network’s 
other routers, and if so it confirmed that those routers emulated the providers entering and 
providing service in the local market. 
 
Data Categorization 
Qualitative data is somewhat more difficult to present than quantitative data.  
Categorization of the data into various groupings could however assist with comparisons and 
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further analyses.  Regarding topology groupings, Part A of the scenarios resulted in data from the 
Base models, Part B resulted in data featuring the entry of ISP2 and Google as ISP2 in some 
cases, and Part C resulted in data featuring the entry of only Google.  Models in both Parts B and 
C featured more complex topologies than the Part A base models thereby yielding more data 
than Part A.  Models with low numbers of providers kept those markets relatively “under-
served” and resulted in less data than models with higher numbers of providers in the markets 
that were increasingly better-served.  In some models the LEC and Public MAN were local 
market monopolies, and in other models both LEC and CC were a local market duopoly.  
Providers were highlighted in bold if they had excessive control of the local market, with one 
highlighted provider per market having a monopoly and two highlighted providers per market 
having a duopoly.  (Oligopolies while commonplace in telecommunications and other markets 
were not modeled for this study.)  Models without monopolies and duopolies in the local market 
were considered to be competitive.  Some models featuring only one or two providers were not 
designated as monopolies or duopolies.  The rationale was in those scenarios the providers were 
actually competitive, and due to various factors (capitalization, political power, etc.) they could 
not control the market or fend off future competition.  Those markets were considered to be more 
easily enterable by competitors. 
Each scenario featured an ISP2 or no ISP2 and Google or no Google in their models, 
while all of the later scenarios featured a Public MAN.  Those three providers had distinctive 
market influences – all added to the market competition, the Public MAN may have enjoyed 
certain advantages as a public sector provider, and Google could completely dominate even a 
previously monopolized market. 
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A local market provider without its own upstream and/or downstream networks and being 
required to use third party networks was subject to potential discrimination and control by the 
other providers.  Access from a local market provider to the Tier I market provider, and from a 
local market provider to the End Users, ranged among the following. 
 
• No access. 
• Access via a third party provider. 
• Access via multiple third party providers. 
• Access via its own lines. 
• Access via multiple third party providers and its own lines. 
 
Each model featured at least one and up to five last mile providers.  Last mile lines were 
monopolized or duopolized unless other providers also owned and administered their own last 
mile lines, whereupon the last mile market would be more competitive.  If a provider owned and 
operated its own lines to end users, they were considered to provide both infrastructure and 
service (the DubLink conduit-only infrastructure provider case discussed in the literature review 
was not included in the scenarios). 
 
Market Participants 
Data regarding the market participants could possibly be categorized.  Generally the 
scenarios examined local markets with providers ranging among the following. 
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• LEC only. 
• Public MAN only. 
• Various combinations of up to five providers. 
• LEC, CC, Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2. 
• LEC, CC, Public MAN, ISP1, and Google. 
 
Upstream Network Segment Providers 
All models featured an Upstream End User, Upstream End User Router, and Tier I ISP 
Router ordered in a linear configuration designed to standardize those upstream markets across 
all models and eliminate the need for additional variant data and analysis on those providers.  
The Tier I ISP was always connected to local providers except in Models 13.1 - 16.2 where it 
deliberately was not connected to the Public MAN. 
 
LEC and CC 
LEC and CC were modeled in numerous scenarios as typical incumbents.  In some 
models the LEC was in a competitive market even as the sole provider.  Usually though the LEC 
enjoyed a monopoly in the local and/or last mile market.  (The size and power of an LEC could 
be correlated to the range of competitiveness of the market, i.e., a larger LEC was usually able to 
monopolize a market and defend itself from competitors.)  Usually LEC and CC provided their 
own last mile system types.  This resulted in each potentially having monopolies over the 
particular wireline type.  Regardless, data could be transmitted over either type, so the wireline 
type differences were not modeled.  The LEC’s main competition was usually from CC, thus if 
both were participating in the same markets, they could have a “double monopoly” (over 
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wireline types), or essentially a duopoly (over provided data).  LEC and/or CC may or may not 
have interconnected with other providers in the local market.  Such interconnections could have 
been used on an equal basis for redundancy and emergency purposes; however either could have 
possibly tried to discriminate against other providers if they were forced by say governments to 
“open access” their local and last mile lines.  In some cases LEC and/or CC could also be the 
Tier I ISP, potentially vertically integrating the backbone provider, middle mile, local provider, 
and/or last mile market segments.  (Such integration should be recognized but an analysis of the 
structure and data was beyond the scope of this report.) 
 
ISP1 
ISP1 was modeled as a local market competitor to the LEC and/or CC incumbents, 
although in numerous scenarios it was also a local market incumbent.  A number of models 
featured ISP1 providing its own last mile network, however in reality independent ISPs typically 
refrained from constructing their own last mile networks and instead tried to use other providers’ 
networks to access end users.  As discussed, such access via third party providers to end users 
could have been discretionary and restrictive, particularly in markets dominated by one or more 
incumbent providers.  Such ISP1 providers were usually at a disadvantage to the incumbents in 
the local and last mile markets. 
 
ISP2 
ISP2 joined the local market as a competitive provider in each scenario’s Part B and in 
some other variants.  Once entering the local market, it was then concerned with upstream and 
downstream access and possibly local marker interconnectivity.  As discussed with ISP1’s, 
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upstream and downstream access via third party providers could be discretionary and restrictive, 
particularly in markets dominated by incumbent providers.  Consequently such ISP2 providers 
were also usually at a disadvantage in the local and last mile markets.  As discussed in the 
literature review, there was much advocacy for ISP2-like competitors to enter local markets.  The 
popular solution was for governments to mandate forced access upon other providers’ networks 
vs. the challenge of ISP2s constructing from scratch and administering their own upstream, local 
market interconnections, and/or last mile networks. 
 
Public MAN 
A Public MAN provider was introduced in Scenarios 5 - 16.  In some models the Public 
MAN was featured as a regular competitive ISP with both upstream and last mile connections; 
however in Models 13.1 – 16.3 it was without an upstream connection to Tier I ISP and therefore 
had to rely upon other providers for upstream connectivity if they were agreeable to local market 
interconnections.  The Public MAN was the sole last mile provider in some models while in 
others it was without a last mile connection to one or both end users and therefore had to rely 
upon other providers for last mile connectivity if they were agreeable to local market 
interconnections.  In theory if a Public MAN does not own and administer its own last mile 
network and must acquire access via a third party’s last mile network for service provision, it 
may risk being considered a true public MAN.  In some models the Public MAN was the sole 
local market provider but the market remained competitive; competed against monopolists, 
duopolists, and equal competition; and was a monopolistic ISP vs. other providers in the local 
and/or last mile markets.  In Models 13.2 – 16.3 the Public MAN had no upstream access of its 
own, was interconnected among the other local mile providers, and except for Part C cases was 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 328 
the sole downstream last mile provider.  The Public MAN could theoretically forgo being a local 
market ISP and instead act as an open access “bridge” so that other providers need not construct 
and administer their own last mile networks.  Google’s own last mile network would be 
duplicative and inefficient if it had equal open access to the Public MAN’s local network and if 
its last mile featured sufficient speeds and capacities for their service provision. 
 
Google 
Google could substitute for ISP2 in most of the scenarios.  However Google was be 
considered to be significantly different from standard ISPs entering the market as it most likely 
had the wherewithal to construct/extend its own middle mile network downstream, interconnect 
with other local market providers, and provide its own last mile network to most end users.  
Google could demonopolize any monopolized or duopolized last mile market by offering faster 
service at a fraction of the market price.  Usually when Google entered a market it acquired 
significant market shares from incumbents and other competitors, and therefore could become a 
monopolist itself in the local and/or last mile markets.  However Google had indicated it did not 
really want to be an ISP - it merely wanted faster and cheaper access and better service to end 
users in the markets, and it would provide ISP functions by itself to achieve those goals if 
necessary.  Google was not likely to enter “unserved” markets investing in cutting edge 
infrastructure and providing services until it had entered other markets with uncompetitive 
incumbents and populated with more end users.  Google was not only a major end user, but it 
had acquired its own backbone trunk lines and middle mile lines, and could somewhat be 
considered its own Tier I ISP as it created and extended its own WAN closer to the “edge”, i.e., 
downstream to the local market and end users.  The scenarios and models did not represent that 
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construct, but it should be taken into consideration as more high end end users would likely 
emulate Google’s buildout and possibly compete and/or provide their own custom services in the 
local and last mile markets.  Google recently purchased the Provo public MAN that was 
competing in a fairly well served market, though it would most likely not open access its local 
and last mile networks to those competitors. 
 
Downstream End Users 
Downstream End User 1 was assigned a router while Downstream End User 2 was not.  
DEU1 could therefore represent a business end user with a more powerful router and be able to 
connect with multiple providers potentially simultaneously and/or connect with multiple lines to 
a sole provider for increased throughput.  DEU2 likely represented an average residential user 
with a basic router/switch and little or no need (at the present) for multiple simultaneous 
providers and/or multiple lines from a sole provider.  Few actual constructs featured multiple 
providers serving end users with their own last mile networks, and typically end users were 
served by one type of wireline per provider.  While the providers may have been well 
interconnected in some local markets, end users were modeled not to enjoy such redundancy in 
the last mile to the providers.  (The topic is beyond the scope of this study, but it must be noted 
those models with sole last mile networks while more economically efficient as natural utilities 
were also more at risk technically particularly regarding downstream redundancy.) 
 
Model Filtering 
A question for qualitative studies was what to do with the data in the various groups.  
Perhaps a process of elimination by filtering out undesired models based upon the group types 
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(essentially simulating market restructuring) could help determine which model(s) were the most 
feasible, beneficial, and efficient per particular interest group.  (As a quick reference aide for this 
discussion, just the models were copied from the scenarios into their own document and saved as 
Appendix E.)  Such interest groups having their own goals and objectives could include the 
following. 
 
• Downstream End Users. 
• Upstream ASP End Users. 
• Providers. 
• Governments. 
• Investors. 
• Researchers. 
 
Downstream End Users could be subdivided into those more literate, moderately literate, 
and less literate regarding their desires for local and last mile constructs.  Literate end users 
might desire open access of the local market to maximize the number of potential providers; 
local market interconnectivity to ensure if their provider went down for some reason there was 
redundant access to others and to ensure their provider was able to route traffic upstream; a 
competitive local market for providers to offer their best services, speeds and least prices; and 
each provider owning their own last mile networks so in case of contingency the end user could 
switch quickly to an alternative provider.  Lesser literate end users might not appreciate the 
issues as much unless they actually experienced the potential benefits of the restructuring.  
Upstream Application Service Provider End Users could be divided into large end users (Google, 
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Facebook, Sony, etc.), medium, and small sizes.  ASPs would likely want many of the same 
models that more literate Downstream End Users desired. 
Providers could be divided among incumbents, competitors, for-profit/non-profit, and by 
sizes.  Reserving non-profits for the following Government group, most for-profit incumbent 
providers would want models without forced access.  They would want restrictions on 
competitors’ new last mile builds, but might consider using openly accessible neutral third party 
provider last mile networks.  Others might advocate their continued control of both markets to 
better ensure continued profits.  They might desire models with some local market 
interconnectivity in case of contingencies, or if they could control and discriminate the sharing.  
Incumbents would likely reject models increasing competition that would unnecessarily cause 
them to invest in increased speeds and services while lowering prices (and profit margins).  
Smaller for-profit and/or competitive providers would likely advocate for forced access.  They 
would want fewer restrictions on new competitive last mile builds, but might consider using 
openly accessible third party provider last mile networks more strongly than incumbents.  
Competitors would advocate less control of both markets.  They might desire models with local 
market interconnectivity if there was less control and discrimination by incumbents in the 
sharing.  Competitive providers would likely advocate models increasing competition that that 
could result in increased speeds and services while lowering prices and gaining some market 
shares. 
Governments would likely advocate increased local market competition, but not 
necessarily for a large number of local providers (an “un-breakupable” oligopoly might suffice).  
They might advocate local market interconnectivity to assist providers with contingencies, but 
not if sharing increased costs or created other burdens upon providers.  Depending upon their 
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political philosophical control at the time, governments could advocate forced access while 
sanctioning incumbent monopolies, or prohibit forced access respecting private property rights, 
and likewise still sanction incumbent monopolies.  Australian-like market restructuring was 
unlikely in the U.S. at the time.  Government enterprise Public MANs could enter markets as 
competitive providers even if the markets were fairly well served with no guarantee of acquiring 
necessary market shares to justify the enterprise.  Governments could advocate a Public MAN 
monopoly as a weapon vs. incumbent monopolies and duopolies thinking the markets would 
ultimately be demonopolized (or more likely oligopolized), but completely overlook an option of 
the Public MAN being restricted from competing in the local market and serving only as a 
sanctioned openly accessible last mile “bridge” provider.  Thus a government’s position on 
models could greatly vary. 
Likewise investors could be categorized into numerous groups per their interests 
including market control advocacy, long term vs. short term profits, stock and bond investing vs. 
mergers and acquisitions investing, investors in ASPs vs. providers, etc.  Obviously those 
investors seeking shorter term profits and pricing powers would likely advocate the incumbent 
provider models. 
Researchers including Yochai Benkler, Barbara van Schewick, Tim Wu, etc. as discussed 
had opinions on what models should be advocated per their personal methodologies of desired 
access and competition.  This study sought to answer the research question’s concerns of 
creating open access and competition in the local and last mile market segments.  Fundamental 
filtering examples would include seamless end-to-end connectivity; therefore Model 13.1 would 
be eliminated since its last mile market and Tier I market were disconnected.  Some level of local 
market competition beyond one sole provider was desirable in most markets; therefore Models 
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1.1 (LEC was the sole provider) and Models 5.1 and 13.1 (the Public MAN was the provider) 
would also be eliminated.  Filters directly addressing the open access and competition concerns 
would include the following. 
(Researcher’s Note - After the models were originally designed, Google then announced 
it intended entering the local and last mile markets.  Due to the importance of the development 
upon this study, Google was therefore retrofitted into the models.  Method One of doing so was 
by doubling Google and ISP2, meaning in some scenarios “ISP2” could either represent ISP2 or 
Google as they were equally interchangeable - see Model 2.5.  Method Two was by designing 
ISP2 and Google as separate models if the two were not equally interchangeable in a scenario, 
i.e., Model 3.3 vs. Model 3.4.  For the following filtering cases, the Method One models had to 
be converted to Method Two models by adding a “dummy” model to the model sets within each 
scenario.  Thus for instance in Scenario 9, Model 9.2 was converted to only ISP2, and Model 
9.2G was added to accommodate Google as ISP2.  In retrospect, all scenarios where Google 
could have entered the markets should have had separate ISP2 and Google models to avoid 
confusion.) 
 
Competitive Local Market 
Since competitive local markets were desired, models with monopolies and duopolies 
would be eliminated except those where Google entered the market.  Thus the following models 
would be eliminated. 
 
• 3.1, 3.2, 3.3. 
• 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 (except 4.5G where Google is ISP2). 
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• 7.1, 7.2, 7.3. 
• 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6 (except 8.6G where Google is ISP2). 
• 10.1, 10.2. 
• 11.2, 11.2. 
• 12.1, 12.2. 
• 15.1, 15.2. 
• 16.1, 16.2. 
 
Maximized Number of Local Market Providers 
End users would likely desire a choice among local market providers, with the more 
choices available the better.  End User access to four or more providers in the local market could 
possibly reduce monopolies, duopolies, and oligopolies.  Access between End Users and 
providers could be direct or indirect via local market interconnectivity among providers.  End 
User access restricted to three or fewer providers would eliminate those models.  Thus the 
following models would be eliminated. 
 
• 1.1, 1.2, 1.3. 
• 2.1. 
• 3.1, 3.2, 3.3. 
• 4.1. 
• 5.1, 5.2, 5.3. 
• 13.1, 13.2, 13.3. 
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Local Market Provider Interconnectivity 
Providers in the local market are desired to be interconnected and able to assist other 
providers trying to reach their upstream and downstream end users.  No discrimination would be 
permissible in the sharing.  Thus the following models would be eliminated for the lack of 
interconnectivity. 
 
• 1.1, 1.2, 1.3. 
• 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.5G. 
• 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4. 
• 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.5G 
• 5.1, 5.2, 5.3. 
• 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.6G. 
• 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4. 
• 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, 8.6G. 
• 13.1. 
 
Individual Provider-Owned Last Miles 
One method of achieving competition in the last mile would be to require all local market 
providers own and administer their own last mile networks to all Ends Users that desired access 
and service.  No provider could share their last mile lines with other providers.  Local market 
providers would have to access at least one End User downstream with their own network.  Thus 
the following models would be eliminated. 
 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 336 
• 10.1, 10.2, 10.3, 10.3G. 
• 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 11.3G. 
• 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.3G. 
• 14.1, 14.2, 14.3, 14.3G. 
• 15.1, 15.2, 15.3, 15.3G. 
• 16.1, 16.2, 16.3, 16.3G. 
 
Multiple Last Miles 
Instead of requiring every provider to own and administer their own last mile networks, 
more than one network could be provided in the market to at least one End User.  Last mile 
networks could be shared by multiple providers.  Thus the following models would be 
eliminated. 
 
• 1.1. 
• 5.1. 
• 10.1, 10.2. 
• 11.1, 11.2. 
• 12.1, 12.2. 
• 13.1. 
• 14.1, 14.2. 
• 15.1, 15.2. 
• 16.1, 16.2. 
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Consolidated Last Mile Networks 
Instead of multiple last mile networks in the market, one network could be provided to all 
End Users if the provider was a neutral asset-only (last mile-only) provider and its network was 
able to be equally accessible and shared by all local market providers.  The last mile-only 
provider would own and administer the sole last mile network in the market.  No monopoly or 
duopoly local market providers could be the sole last mile network provider.  Thus the following 
models would be eliminated. 
 
• 1.2, 1.3. 
• 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.5G. 
• 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4. 
• 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.5G. 
• 5.2, 5.3. 
• 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.6G. 
• 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4. 
• 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, 8.6G. 
• 9.1, 9.2, 9.2G. 
• 10.1, 10.2, 10.3. 
• 11.1, 11.2, 11.3. 
• 12.1, 12.2, 12.3. 
• 13.2, 13.3. 
• 14.3 
• 15.3. 
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• 16.3. 
 
Non-Profit Last Mile 
If a Public MAN was the sole last mile provider, it could administer the network as a 
non-profit government agency and not as a for-profit middleman.  No other provider could own 
and administer its own last mile network in the market.  The Public MAN could not be an ISP in 
the local market having or sharing in any market control (i.e., not a monopoly or duopoly).  Thus 
the following models would be eliminated. 
 
• 1.1, 1.2, 1.3. 
• 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.5G. 
• 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4. 
• 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.5G. 
• 5.2, 5.3. 
• 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.6G. 
• 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4. 
• 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, 8.6G. 
• 9.1, 9.2, 9.2G. 
• 10.1, 10.2, 10.3. 
• 11.1, 11.2, 11.3. 
• 12.1, 12.2, 12.3. 
• 13.2, 13.3. 
• 14.1, 14.2. 
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• 15.1, 15.2. 
• 16.1, 16.2. 
 
Model Filtering Tabulation 
The model filtering results from the previous section were tabulated in a spreadsheet 
(Appendix F, Model Filtering Results).  Eliminated models were represented with the number 
“1” in the correlating cells, and retained models had no data entered in the correlating cells. 
 
Model Filtering Scoring 
The most desirable unfiltered models in each filtering case could be added together, and 
the models with the lowest scores could be considered as better achieving open access and 
competition in the markets.  However because the four last mile market filtering cases are all 
desirable for different reasons, they cannot be added together for a total score.  Instead the first 
five filtering cases could all be added together for a subtotal, and then one of the four last mile 
filtering cases could be added to them one at a time to determine a grand total.  The resulting 
four sets of grand total scores could then be compared amongst each other more appropriately.  
Those four sets of scores were tabulated in another spreadsheet (Appendix F, Model Filtering 
Scoring Results).  Each of the four sets was entered into its own worksheet within the 
spreadsheet. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Discussion 
The experiment’s validation and verification trace file data were all expected to 
accurately correlate with the models, thereby verifying and validating the emulation, and would 
ensure to a high degree of confidence the experiment and data was replicable by other 
researchers.  Facing a deadline to complete the study and degree program, a decision was made 
by the researcher to cease spending numerous valuable hours “hacking” the experiment’s routers 
in hopes of making them function properly, and instead forego the emulation and report the 
subsequent failure.  In doing so, the experiment could not be verified or validated against errors 
and questions; thus the scenarios and models remained more conceptual vs. realistic. 
The most likely cause for failure was a router configuration setting or proper cabling 
among the ports.  Proper consultation would probably have detected the errors and enabled the 
routers to communicate properly with each other, which would have ruled out other issues.  
There was a very outside but highly probable chance that the units were faulty because they were 
remanufactured models, and could even have been counterfeit as they were purchased online 
from a California-based liquidator that was not primarily a computer equipment outlet.  Such 
cases of fake equipment are not unheard of in the industry, particularly in Asia.  On 4-30-2013, 
Pricewatch.com listed eight vendors selling the same routers for between $107 to $152 each 
including shipping.  The ten routers purchased as a lot on 4-23-2013 cost $188 minus shipping.  
Also, all of the serial numbers were blackened out on the bottoms of the units but could still be 
read from an angle.  Determining internal router errors or counterfeit units would require expert 
analysis or returning a sample to Netgear for their examination and determination. 
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The observation questionnaire requested a routing table of all of the possible routes 
available for each model.  To ensure verification and validation, trace files of all the 
permutations could be run, but due to time constraints on the study only the routes requested in 
the procedure for each model topology (that also appeared in the routing table) were to be run 
and generated.  Most of the routing table permutations per model were unnecessary to actually 
trace, as routers are programmed to automatically seek and take available routes with the fewest 
hops among other routers.  Routes containing more hops (such as in the models with local 
market interconnections) would be more inefficient and increase traffic delays.  Some longer 
routes might be necessary so as to aggregate small providers’ traffic before interconnecting with 
larger providers’ networks in the local and/or upstream markets due to potentially imbalanced 
peering agreements (traffic interchange policies). 
The model filtering scoring data results from Appendix F for the Individual Provider-
Owned Last Mile Networks showed the following models had total scores of 0 (0 being the best 
score possible). 
 
• 9.1, 9.2, 9.2G. 
 
The model filtering scoring data results for the Multiple Last Mile Networks showed the 
following models had total scores of 0. 
 
• 9.1, 9.2, and 9.2G, 10.3, 11.3, 12.3, 14.3, 15.3, 16.3. 
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The model filtering scoring data results for the Consolidated Last Mile Networks showed the 
following models had total scores of 0. 
 
• 14.1, 14.2. 
 
The model filtering scoring data results for the Non-Profit Last Mile Networks showed the 
following models had total scores of 0. 
 
• 14.1, 14.2. 
 
Conclusions 
The models that could be the most feasible, beneficial, and efficient regarding the 
Research Question’s concern for open access and competition in the local and last mile markets 
included the following.  For markets where Individual Provider-Owned Last Mile Networks are 
desired, Scenario 9 (A local market served by multiple providers including a public MAN where 
all providers provide their own systems and carriage services between upstream providers to 
local market end users, and where other private providers and the public MAN can optionally 
access and use each others’ last mile systems to provide service), Models 9.1, 9.2, and/or 9.2G 
were recommended. 
For markets where Multiple Last Mile Networks were desired, Scenarios 9 (A local 
market served by multiple providers including a public MAN where all providers provide their 
own systems and carriage services between upstream providers to local market end users, and 
where other private providers and the public MAN can optionally access and use each others’ 
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last mile systems to provide service), Models 9.1, 9.2, and 9.2G; 10 (A local market served by 
multiple providers including a public MAN, where two private providers are the only last mile 
system and service providers.  Other private providers and the public MAN must access and use 
either or both of those private providers’ last mile systems to provide service), Model 10.3; 11 (A 
local market served by multiple providers including a public MAN, where one private provider is 
the only last mile system and service provider.  Other private providers and the public MAN 
must access and use the sole private provider’s last mile system to provide service), Model 11.3; 
12 (A local market served by multiple providers including a public MAN, where the public 
MAN is the only last mile system and service provider.  Other private providers must access and 
use the MAN’s last mile system to provide service), Model 12.3; 14 (A local market served by 
multiple providers including a public MAN, where the public MAN is the sole last mile system 
provider but does not provide upstream carriage service), Model 14.3; 15 (A local market served 
by multiple providers including a public MAN that is dominated by two duopolistic providers.  
The public MAN is the sole last mile system provider but does not provide upstream carriage 
service), Model 15.3, and 16 (A local market served by multiple providers including a public 
MAN that is dominated by a monopolistic provider.  The public MAN is the sole last mile 
system provider but does not provide upstream carriage service), Model 16.3 were 
recommended.  For markets where Consolidated Last Mile Networks and Non-Profit Last Mile 
Networks were desired, Scenario 14 (A local market served by multiple providers including a 
public MAN, where the public MAN is the sole last mile system provider but does not provide 
upstream carriage service), Models 14.1 and/or 14.2 were recommended. 
The “best solution” referring back to Wyckoff‘s rail proposal could possibly be a mixed 
market approach where providers of various types (for-profits, non-profits, coops, etc.) compete 
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in the local market, interconnect in the local market at least for contingency purposes, and access 
the last mile via an extensive multi-route last mile network provided by a non-profit Public MAN 
to further reduce end user costs and ensure open access to the End Users.  Such market 
restructuring should enable more local market competition vs. relying solely upon market entry 
by competitors, forced access mandates, and likely subsidies that further skew the market. 
 
Recommendations for Further Research 
Other researchers should be able to conduct similar local and last mile market emulations, 
add more filtering items (properly standardized if not also weighted), and possibly verify the 
study conclusions using formulas with costs, speeds, and other factors for quantitative results and 
analyses.  The Monte Carlo method could be utilized to simulate market shares for the models 
and to determine further optimizations and efficiencies.  Perhaps the scaled models and 
emulations would be considered more representative of actual markets and networks if the 
experiment was better financed and conducted within a mode modern, well-equipped laboratory 
(i.e., GENI), and provided with a full research team (i.e., Benkler’s Berkman Center for Internet 
and Society at Harvard University).  Note though that many initial telecommunication systems 
(most likely) evolved from experimental equipment and networking technology experiments 
within early laboratory and research settings, and the successful products were eventually were 
scaled up and rolled out into the field and markets. 
The last mile market question remained open to debate regarding which of the four 
desired models were ideal.  The apparent issues involved are technological robustness of the 
network vs. system buildout and administration economics vs. information (being transmitted 
over the networks) valuation economics. 
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The study's results could further benefit the previously listed parties including providers, 
end users, governments, equipment providers, and investors requiring increased access to 
advanced and competitive telecommunications services.  Educational providers could better 
implement previously discussed telepresence technologies and private WANs connecting 
providers, and expedite access to upstream high end academic and research networks given 
additional market competition and potentially reduced prices and increased available throughput.  
The study’s experiment could possibly be implemented as a real world proof of concept by 
governments to create new or possibly restructure their Public MANs per the recommended local 
and last mile market structures. 
Throughout the study researcher was required to be aware of current events such as 
Australia’s telecommunication market restructuring, and its case research was fortunately able to 
be incorporated into the study.  However Google was not anticipated entering the markets so 
quickly despite warnings of technological and market disruptions elsewhere.  Omitting Google’s 
venture would have quickly dated the study’s research and limited the potential results.  Google 
entering all U.S. markets would reportedly cost $140B (Yarow, 2012).  Competitors would 
therefore have to expend additional amounts to stay competitive with Google.  Are the 
competitors capitalized enough to catch up to and stay equal with Google, or might they consider 
ceasing business in the market?  Wireline providers AT&T and Verizon were selling local 
exchanges to concentrate on wireless services, so the market outlook is in flux. 
Some lessons learned during the course of the study included the necessity to confirm the 
abilities and reliability of outside consultants, particularly computer and network consultants.  A 
few may mean well in trying to use their experiences and training to make recommendations for 
the researcher that could in fact change the intended construct of the experiment from that of the 
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researcher to their own solution.  Their rationales may be oriented more towards standard 
networking practices and not adaptable to more experimental constructs and explorations of the 
capabilities of the equipment.  Consultants may also accept too much new work and then get in 
trouble by not allotting adequate time to all of the clients and their projects. 
Other student researchers may want to attempt trials of their experiments prior to waiting 
for official permission to start the experiment so as to avoid any potential setbacks such as those 
previously discussed.  Confirming the equipment works and can be configured as intended prior 
to the experiment is highly recommended so that any problems can be addressed before time 
limits are reached. 
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Appendix A 
 
Network Data Reference Charts 
 
 
Ethernet 
10bT: 10Mb/sec 
100bT: 100Mb/sec 
1000bT: 1Gb/sec 
10GigE: 10Gb/sec 
1TbE: 1Tb/sec 
10TbE: 10Tb/sec 
 
 
TDM Circuits 
DS0/T0: 64Kb/sec   1 Circuit 
DS1/T1: 1.54Mb/sec  24 Circuits 
DS2/T2: 6.3Mb/sec   96 Circuits 
DS3/T3: 44.7Mb/sec  672 Circuits 
DS4/T4: 274.17Mb/sec  4032 Circuits 
DS5/T5: 400.352Mb/sec  5760 Circuits 
 
 
SONET Optical Carrier 
OC1:  51.5Mb/sec 
OC3:  155.5Mb/sec 
OC12: 622Mb/sec 
OC48: 2.48Gb/sec 
OC192: 9.95Gb/sec 
OC768: 38.81Gb/sec 
OC3072: 160Gb/sec 
 
 
International System of Units Nomenclature 
Multiplication  Prefix Prefix 
Factor   Name  Symbol 
10^3    kilo  k 
10^6    mega  M 
10^9    giga  G 
10^12   tera  T 
10^15   peta  P 
10^18   exa  E 
10^21   zetta Z 
10^24   yotta Y 
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Appendix B 
 
Observation Questionnaire 
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Scenario Questions 
 
Scenario # 
 
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario? 
 
 
Part A. 
 
Test .1 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
Additional observations. 
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Part B. 
 
Test . 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
Does adding the ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 
affect the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
Additional observations. 
 
 
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models. 
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Part C. 
 
Repeat Part B substituting Google Fiber for ISP2. 
 
Test . 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
Does adding Google make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding Google 
affect the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router? 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
Additional observations. 
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Appendix C 
 
Questionnaire Responses 
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Scenario Questions 
 
Scenario #1 
 
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario? 
 
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by only one 
incumbent provider between the upstream providers to the end users.  In Part B, competitor ISP2 
(as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt to enter the local and last mile 
markets. 
 
 
Part A. 
 
Test 1.1 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 1.1 is attempting to emulate a local market “under-served” by the only incumbent 
LEC that provides its own system and carriage service between the upstream provider and the 
DEU.  The DEU has selected LEC as its upstream provider, although it is the only provider 
available to choose from participating in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users: 
 
The middle mile market is virtually monopolized, as only ISP2 has its own connection 
from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the middle 
market too or currently refuses to participate there.  However the construct indicates LEC does 
not have an actual monopoly, and other providers are therefore able to enter the middle mile 
market. 
 
The local market is virtually monopolized, as LEC is the only provider.  However the 
construct indicates LEC does have an actual monopoly, and other providers are therefore able to 
enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is virtually monopolized, as only LEC has its own connection from 
the local market to the DEU.  However the construct indicates the last mile market is 
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theoretically competitive as LEC is not a sanctioned natural utility, and other providers are 
therefore able to enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC provides both infrastructure and service to the DEU. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
LEC is typically a for-profit corporation. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Not applicable, as LEC is the only local and last mile market provider. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC does not have an actual monopoly, but it could potentially 
control the local and last mile markets since it is the only current provider in both markets 
thereby giving it de facto control over them.  LEC cannot discriminate against other providers 
until there actually are other providers in the two markets.  However LEC could announce 
discriminatory policies as a barrier towards potential competitors including network access 
restrictions, monopoly service under-pricing in the particular local market, etc. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
LEC has a 100% share of both the local and last mile market. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
No. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as LEC uses its own last mile system to the DEU for 
service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s system for provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
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Part B. 
 
Test 1.2 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 1.2 is attempting to emulate a local market “under-served” by the only incumbent 
LEC that provides its own system and carriage service between the upstream provider to the 
DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice between the two providers and has chosen to retain LEC as 
its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cable being disconnected 
between the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the route represented 
the end user having access to ISP2 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users: 
 
The middle mile market is virtually duopolized, as only LEC and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the 
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  However the construct indicates 
neither LEC nor ISP2 have an actual duopoly, and other providers are therefore able to enter the 
middle mile market. 
 
The local market is virtually duopolized, as LEC and ISP2 are the only providers.  
However the construct indicates neither LEC nor ISP2 have an actual duopoly, and other 
providers are therefore able to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is virtually duopolized, as only LEC and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the local market to the DEU.  However the construct indicates the last mile 
market is theoretically competitive as neither LEC nor ISP2 are sanctioned natural utilities, and 
other providers are therefore able to enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
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LEC and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
LEC is typically a for-profit corporation.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but 
could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Since both providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any 
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates neither LEC nor ISP2 currently have actual monopolies or a 
duopoly in the local and last mile markets.  One of the providers could possibly try to control the 
local market, or both providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for 
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other 
provider or potential competitive providers respectively. 
 
Since both LEC and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, neither provider could use 
access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the other from accessing end users.  Both 
could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market entry unless 
competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC ISP2 
100% 0% 
0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
 
LEC ISP2 
100% 0% 
0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 378 
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 
100% making those markets more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low 
number of total providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by LEC to establish a monopoly in them 
more difficult.  Likewise LEC makes any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets 
more difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The ISP2 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only 
because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
Both LEC and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as both LEC and ISP2 use their own last mile systems to 
the DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
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The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch between LEC and ISP2 or use both 
simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers. 
 
 
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models. 
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Test 1.3 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 1.3 is attempting to emulate a local market “under-served” by the incumbent LEC 
that provides its own system and carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice between the two providers and has switched to the ISP2 as 
its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cable being disconnected 
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the route represented 
the end user having access to LEC but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is virtually duopolized, as only LEC and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the 
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  However the construct indicates 
neither LEC nor ISP2 have an actual duopoly, and other providers are therefore able to enter the 
middle mile market. 
 
The local market is virtually duopolized, as LEC and ISP2 are the only providers.  
However the construct indicates neither LEC nor ISP2 have an actual duopoly, and other 
providers are therefore able to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is virtually duopolized, as only LEC and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the local market to the DEU.  However the construct indicates the last mile 
market is theoretically competitive as neither LEC nor ISP2 are sanctioned natural utilities, and 
other providers are therefore able to enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU. 
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Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
LEC is typically a for-profit corporation.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but 
could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Since both providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any 
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates neither LEC nor ISP2 currently have actual monopolies or a 
duopoly in the local and last mile markets.  One of the providers could possibly try to control the 
local market, or both providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for 
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other 
provider or potential competitive providers respectively. 
 
Since both LEC and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, neither provider could use 
access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the other from accessing end users.  Both 
could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market entry unless 
competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC ISP2 
100% 0% 
0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
 
LEC ISP2 
100% 0% 
0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
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ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 
100% making those markets more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low 
number of total providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by LEC to establish a monopoly in them 
more difficult.  Likewise LEC makes any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets 
more difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The LEC and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only 
because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
Both LEC and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as both LEC and ISP2 use their own last mile systems to 
the DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU. 
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Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch between LEC and ISP2 or use both 
simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers. 
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Scenario Questions 
 
Scenario #2 
 
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario? 
 
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by multiple 
private providers between the upstream providers to the end users.  In Part B, competitor ISP2 
(as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt to enter the local and last mile 
markets. 
 
 
Part A. 
 
Test 2.1 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 2.1 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers 
that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to the DEU.  
The DEU has an equal choice among the three providers and has chosen LEC as its upstream 
provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the CC and Downstream End User routers and ISP1 and Downstream End User routers 
thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to CC and ISP1 but not 
subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and ISP1 have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the 
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and ISP1 are all providers.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and ISP1 have their own connections 
from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to enter the market. 
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Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any 
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a 
duopoly in the local and last mile markets.  One of the providers could possibly try to control the 
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for 
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other 
providers or potential competitive providers respectively. 
 
Since LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own last mile systems, none of those providers 
could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing end users.  
Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market entry unless 
competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC ISP1 
100% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
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LEC CC ISP1 
100% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The CC and Downstream End User routers and the ISP1 and Downstream End User 
routers do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole 
emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, CC, and ISP1 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, and ISP1, or use 
two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them. 
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Part B. 
 
Test 2.2 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 2.2 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers 
that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice among the four providers and has chosen to retain LEC as 
its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the CC and Downstream End User routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, 
and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the 
end user having access to CC, ISP1, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the 
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 are all providers.  Other 
providers are likewise able to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to enter the 
market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU. 
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Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit 
corporation, but could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any 
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a 
duopoly in the local and last mile markets.  One of the providers could possibly try to control the 
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for 
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other 
providers or potential competitive providers respectively. 
 
Since LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, none of those 
providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing 
end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market 
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
 
LEC CC ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 
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Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 
33.33% making those markets more competitive and relatively well served due to the moderate 
number of total providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the incumbent providers to establish a 
monopoly or duopoly in them more difficult.  Likewise the incumbent providers make any effort 
by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The CC and Downstream End User routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, 
and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only because of 
the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
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According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2, 
or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them. 
 
 
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models. 
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Test 2.3 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 2.3 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers 
that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice among the four providers and has chosen CC as its 
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User 
routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the routes 
represented the end user having access to LEC, ISP1, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the 
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 are all providers.  Other 
providers are likewise able to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to enter the 
market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
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LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit 
corporation, but could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any 
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a 
duopoly in the local and last mile markets.  One of the providers could possibly try to control the 
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for 
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other 
providers or potential competitive providers respectively. 
 
Since LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, none of those 
providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing 
end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market 
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
 
LEC CC ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
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ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 
33.33% making those markets more competitive and relatively well served due to the moderate 
number of total providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the incumbent providers to establish a 
monopoly or duopoly in them more difficult.  Likewise the incumbent providers make any effort 
by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User 
routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only 
because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the 
DEU for service provision. 
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If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2, 
or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them. 
 
 
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models. 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 395 
Test 2.4 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 2.4 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers 
that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice among the four providers and has chosen ISP1 as its 
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers, 
and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the 
end user having access to LEC, CC, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the 
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 are all providers.  Other 
providers are likewise able to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to enter the 
market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
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LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit 
corporation, but could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any 
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a 
duopoly in the local and last mile markets.  One of the providers could possibly try to control the 
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for 
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other 
providers or potential competitive providers respectively. 
 
Since LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, none of those 
providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing 
end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market 
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
 
LEC CC ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 397 
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 
33.33% making those markets more competitive and relatively well served due to the moderate 
number of total providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the incumbent providers to establish a 
monopoly or duopoly in them more difficult.  Likewise the incumbent providers make any effort 
by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers, 
and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only because of 
the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the 
DEU for service provision. 
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If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2, 
or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them. 
 
 
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models. 
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Test 2.5 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 2.5 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers 
that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice among the four providers and has chosen ISP2 as its 
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers, 
and the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the 
end user having access to LEC, CC, and ISP1 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the 
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 are all providers.  Other 
providers are likewise able to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to enter the 
market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
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LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit 
corporation, but could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any 
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a 
duopoly in the local and last mile markets.  One of the providers could possibly try to control the 
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for 
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other 
providers or potential competitive providers respectively. 
 
Since LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, none of those 
providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing 
end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market 
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
 
LEC CC ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
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ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 
33.33% making those markets more competitive and relatively well served due to the moderate 
number of total providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the incumbent providers to establish a 
monopoly or duopoly in them more difficult.  Likewise the incumbent providers make any effort 
by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers, 
and the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only because of 
the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the 
DEU for service provision. 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 402 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2, 
or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them. 
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Scenario Questions 
 
Scenario #3 
 
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario? 
 
Part A will attempt to emulate a local market dominated by two private duopolistic 
providers between the upstream providers to the end users.  In Part B, competitor ISP2 will then 
attempt to enter the local market.  In Part C, competitor Google will then attempt to enter the 
local and last mile markets as ISP2.  Note – only a representative sample of all of the possible 
last mile connection combinations will tested. 
 
 
Part A. 
 
Test 3.1 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 3.1 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers, 
all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to 
the DEUs.  LEC’s and ISP1’s systems access DEU1, while CC’s system accesses DEU2. 
 
DEU1 has an equal choice between LEC and ISP1 and has chosen LEC as its upstream 
provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose CC since there is no last mile 
access to it.  DEU2 has chosen CC as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but 
cannot choose LEC or ISP1 since there is no last mile access to either of them. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cable being disconnected 
between the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the route represented 
End User 1 having access to ISP1 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and ISP1 have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the 
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the middle mile market. 
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The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and ISP1 are all providers.  However the 
construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly, whereby limiting other providers’ abilities to 
enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market to DEU1 is virtually duopolized, as only LEC and ISP1 have their 
own connections from the local market to DEU1.  The last mile market to DEU2 is virtually 
monopolized, as only CC has its own connection from the local market to DEU2.  However the 
construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically competitive as none of the providers are 
sanctioned natural utilities, and other providers are therefore able to enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC and ISP1 provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU1, and CC provides 
its own infrastructure and service to DEU2. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any 
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market.  The two 
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly 
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other provider or potential 
competitive providers. 
 
Since LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own last mile systems, none of those providers 
could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing end users.  
Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market entry unless 
competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
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LEC CC ISP1 
50% 50% 0% 
> 1/3rd% > 1/3rd% < 1/3rd% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the duopoly providers’ market shares. 
 
The potential last mile market share range to DEU1 is: 
 
LEC ISP1 
100% 0% 
> 50% < 50% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share. 
 
CC has a 100% share of last mile market to DEU2. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The ISP1 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only 
because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User Workstation #2. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC and ISP1 access DEU1 directly via their own last mile systems, and CC accesses 
DEU2 directly via its own last mile system. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
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According to the construct somewhat.  Both LEC and ISP1 use their own last mile 
systems to DEU1 for service provision, while CC uses its own last mile system to DEU2 for 
service provision. 
 
If LEC and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to DEU2, they would either have to establish 
their own systems to DEU2 or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s system 
for provision to DEU2.  If CC chose to provide service to DEU1, it would either have to 
establish its own system to DEU1 or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s 
and/or ISP1’s system for provision to DEU1. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEUs, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEUs, or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to DEU1, or interconnect with and 
be granted adequate access to CC’s system for provision to DEU2. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch between LEC and ISP1 or use both 
simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers. 
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Part B. 
 
Test 3.2 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 3.2 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers, 
all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to 
the DEUs.  LEC’s and ISP1’s systems access DEU1, while CC’s system accesses DEU2. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2. 
 
DEU1 has an equal choice between LEC and ISP1 and has chosen LEC as its upstream 
provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose CC or ISP2 since there is no last 
mile access to either of them.  DEU2 has chosen CC as its upstream provider in the local and last 
mile markets, but cannot choose LEC or ISP1 since there is no last mile access to either of them. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers and the ISP2 router and End User 2 
workstation thereby interrupting the routes represented End User 1 having access to ISP1 and 
End User 2 having access to ISP2 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the 
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 are all providers.  However 
the construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly, whereby limiting other providers’ abilities 
to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market to DEU1 is virtually duopolized, as only LEC and ISP1 have their 
own connections from the local market to DEU1.  The last mile market to DEU2 is also virtually 
duopolized, as only CC and ISP2 have their own connections from the local market to DEU2.  
However the construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically competitive as none of the 
providers are sanctioned natural utilities, and other providers are therefore able to enter the 
market. 
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Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC and ISP1 provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU1, and CC and ISP2 
provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU2. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit 
corporation, but could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any 
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market.  The two 
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly 
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential 
competitive providers. 
 
Since LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, none of those 
providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing 
end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market 
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC ISP1 ISP2 
50% 50% 0% 0% 
> 25% > 25% < 25% < 25% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the duopoly providers’ market shares. 
 
The potential last mile market share range to DEU1 is: 
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LEC ISP1 
100% 0% 
> 50% < 50% 
 
The potential last mile market share range to DEU2 is: 
 
CC ISP2 
100% 0% 
> 50% < 50% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share. 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 33.33% making the 
market more competitive and relatively well served due to the moderate number of total 
providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s and CC’s duopoly a little more 
difficult to maintain, and could further cut into ISP1’s already minor market share.  Likewise 
duopolists LEC and CC and incumbent provider ISP1 could make any effort by ISP2 to establish 
a monopoly in the market quite difficult. 
 
ISP2 does not enter the last mile market to DEU1, leaving the number of those providers 
at two.  That market’s competitiveness remains unaffected and still relatively underserved due to 
the low number of total providers. 
 
ISP2’s entry in the last mile market to DEU2 increases the number of providers by 100% 
making that market more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low number of 
total providers. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The ISP1 and Downstream End User routers and the ISP2 router and Downstream End 
User 2 workstation do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the 
whole emulation malfunctioned. 
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What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User Workstation #2. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User workstation #2. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC and ISP1 access DEU1 directly via their own last mile systems, and CC and ISP2 
access DEU2 directly via their own last mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct somewhat.  Both LEC and ISP1 use their own last mile 
systems to DEU1 for service provision, while CC and ISP2 use their own last mile systems to 
DEU2 for service provision. 
 
If LEC and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to DEU2, they would either have to establish 
their own systems to DEU2 or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s and/or 
ISP2’s systems for provision to DEU2.  If CC and/or ISP2 chose to provide service to DEU1, 
they would either have to establish their own systems to DEU1 or interconnect with and be 
granted adequate access to LEC’s and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to DEU1. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEUs, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEUs, or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to DEU1, or interconnect with and 
be granted adequate access to CC’s and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to DEU2. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch between LEC and ISP1 or use both 
simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers. 
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Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models. 
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Test 3.3 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 3.3 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers, 
all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to 
the DEUs.  LEC’s and ISP1’s systems access DEU1, while CC’s system accesses DEU2. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2. 
 
DEU1 has an equal choice between LEC and ISP1 and has chosen ISP1 as its upstream 
provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose CC or ISP2 since there is no last 
mile access to either of them.  DEU2 has chosen ISP2 as its upstream provider in the local and 
last mile markets, but cannot choose LEC or ISP1 since there is no last mile access to either of 
them. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers and the CC router and End User 2 
workstation thereby interrupting the routes represented End User 1 having access to LEC and 
End User 2 having access to CC but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the 
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 are all providers.  However 
the construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly, whereby limiting other providers’ abilities 
to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market to DEU1 is virtually duopolized, as only LEC and ISP1 have their 
own connections from the local market to DEU1.  The last mile market to DEU2 is also virtually 
duopolized, as only CC and ISP2 have their own connections from the local market to DEU2.  
However the construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically competitive as none of the 
providers are sanctioned natural utilities, and other providers are therefore able to enter the 
market. 
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Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC and ISP1 provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU1, and CC and ISP2 
provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU2. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit 
corporation, but could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any 
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market.  The two 
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly 
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential 
competitive providers. 
 
Since LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, none of those 
providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing 
end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market 
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC ISP1 ISP2 
50% 50% 0% 0% 
> 25% > 25% < 25% < 25% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the duopoly providers’ market shares. 
 
The potential last mile market share range to DEU1 is: 
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LEC ISP1 
100% 0% 
> 50% < 50% 
 
The potential last mile market share range to DEU2 is: 
 
CC ISP2 
100% 0% 
> 50% < 50% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share. 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 33.33% making the 
market more competitive and relatively well served due to the moderate number of total 
providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s and CC’s duopoly a little more 
difficult to maintain, and could further cut into ISP1’s already minor market share.  Likewise 
duopolists LEC and CC and incumbent provider ISP1 could make any effort by ISP2 to establish 
a monopoly in the market quite difficult. 
 
ISP2 does not enter the last mile market to DEU1, leaving the number of those providers 
at two.  That market’s competitiveness remains unaffected and still relatively underserved due to 
the low number of total providers. 
 
ISP2’s entry in the last mile market to DEU2 increases the number of providers by 100% 
making that market more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low number of 
total providers. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The LEC and Downstream End User routers and the CC router and Downstream End 
User 2 workstation do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the 
whole emulation malfunctioned. 
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What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User Workstation #2. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User workstation #2. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC and ISP1 access DEU1 directly via their own last mile systems, and CC and ISP2 
access DEU2 directly via their own last mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct somewhat.  Both LEC and ISP1 use their own last mile 
systems to DEU1 for service provision, while CC and ISP2 use their own last mile systems to 
DEU2 for service provision. 
 
If LEC and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to DEU2, they would either have to establish 
their own systems to DEU2 or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s and/or 
ISP2’s systems for provision to DEU2.  If CC and/or ISP2 chose to provide service to DEU1, 
they would either have to establish their own systems to DEU1 or interconnect with and be 
granted adequate access to LEC’s and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to DEU1. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEUs, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEUs, or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to DEU1, or interconnect with and 
be granted adequate access to CC’s and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to DEU2. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch between LEC and ISP1 or use both 
simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers. 
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DEU1 and DEU2 have selected ISP1 and ISP2 respectively as their providers even 
though LEC’s and CC’s monopolies likely make their provision more advantageous to end users. 
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Part C. 
 
Repeat Part B substituting Google Fiber for ISP2. 
 
Test 3.4 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 3.4 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers, 
all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to 
the DEUs.  LEC’s and ISP1’s systems access DEU1, while CC’s system accesses DEU2. 
 
Google then enters the local market as competitive ISP2, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to both DEUs. 
 
DEU1 has an equal choice among LEC, ISP1, and Google, and has chosen LEC as its 
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose CC since there is no last 
mile access to it.  DEU2 has an equal choice between CC and Google, and has chosen CC as its 
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose LEC or ISP1 since there 
is no last mile access to either of them. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, the Google and Downstream End User 
routers, and the Google router and End User 2 workstation thereby interrupting the routes 
represented End User 1 having access to ISP1 and Google and End User 2 having access to 
Google but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and Google have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the 
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and Google are all providers.  The 
construct indicates LEC and CC had a duopoly, whereby limiting other providers’ abilities to 
enter the local market.  However Google’s entry into the local market eliminates LEC’s and 
CC’s duopoly. 
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The last mile market to DEU1 was virtually duopolized, as only LEC and ISP1 had their 
own connections from the local market to DEU1.  However Google’s entry into the last market 
eliminates LEC’s and CC’s duopoly to DEU1.  The last mile market to DEU2 is also virtually 
duopolized, as only CC and Google have their own connections from the local market to DEU2.  
However the construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically competitive as none of the 
providers are sanctioned natural utilities, and other providers are therefore able to enter the 
market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC and ISP1 provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU1, and CC and 
Google provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU2. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit 
corporation, but could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any 
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market.  The two 
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly 
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential 
competitive providers.  However Google’s entry into the local market eliminates LEC’s and 
CC’s duopoly.  Given Google’s corporate size and powers it could become a monopoly in the 
market if it so desired. 
 
Since LEC, CC, ISP1, and Google provide their own last mile systems, none of those 
providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing 
end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market 
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
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The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC ISP1 Google 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range to DEU1 is: 
 
LEC CC Google 
100% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range to DEU2 is: 
 
CC Google 
100% 0% 
0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding Google make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding Google 
affect the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
Google’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 33.33% making 
the market more competitive and relatively well served due to the moderate number of total 
providers. 
 
Google’s presence in the local market eliminates LEC’s and CC’s duopoly, and could 
further cut into ISP1’s already minor market share.  Efforts by former duopolists LEC and CC 
and incumbent provider ISP1 to prevent Google from establishing a monopoly in the market if it 
so desired would be quite difficult for them. 
 
Google’s entry in the last mile market to DEU1 increases the number of providers by 
50% making that market more competitive. 
 
Google’s entry in the last mile market to DEU2 increases the number of providers by 
100% making that market more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low 
number of total providers. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router? 
 
No. 
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Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, the ISP1 router and Downstream End User 
2 workstation, and the Google router and Downstream End User 2 workstation do not recognize 
each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User Workstation #2. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Google 
router-Downstream End User workstation #2. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Google 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, ISP1, and Google access DEU1 directly via their own last mile systems, and CC 
and Google access DEU2 directly via their own last mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct somewhat.  LEC, ISP1, and Google use their own last mile 
systems to DEU1 for service provision, while CC and Google use their own last mile systems to 
DEU2 for service provision. 
 
If LEC and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to DEU2, they would either have to establish 
their own systems to DEU2 or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s and/or 
Google’s systems for provision to DEU2.  If CC chose to provide service to DEU1, it would 
either have to establish its own system to DEU1 or interconnect with and be granted adequate 
access to LEC’s, ISP1’s and/or Google’s systems for provision to DEU1. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEUs, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEUs, or interconnect with and be granted 
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adequate access to LEC’s, ISP1’s, and/or Google’s systems for provision to DEU1, or 
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s and/or Google’s systems for provision 
to DEU2. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, ISP1, and Google, or use 
two or all simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to multiple providers. 
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Scenario Questions 
 
Scenario #4 
 
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario? 
 
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market dominated by a 
monopolistic private provider between the upstream providers to the end users.  In Part B, 
competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt to enter the local 
and last mile markets. 
 
 
Part A. 
 
Test 4.1. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 4.1 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers, 
all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to 
the DEUs.  The DEU has an equal choice among the three providers and has chosen LEC as its 
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the CC and Downstream End User routers and the ISP1 and Downstream End User 
routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the End User having access to CC and ISP1 
but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and ISP1 have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the 
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and ISP1 are all providers.  However the 
construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other providers’ abilities to enter the 
local market. 
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The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and ISP1 have their own connections 
from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any 
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market.  The provider could 
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to 
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers. 
 
Since LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own last mile systems, none of those providers 
could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing end users.  
Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market entry unless 
competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC ISP1 
100% 0% 0% 
> 1/3rd% < 1/3rd% < 1/3rd% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares. 
 
The potential last market share range is: 
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LEC CC ISP1 
100% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The CC and Downstream End User routers and the ISP1 and Downstream End User 
routers do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole 
emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, CC, and ISP1 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, and ISP1, or use 
two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them. 
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Part B. 
 
Test 4.2. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 4.2 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers 
that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice among the four providers and has chosen to retain LEC as 
its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the CC and Downstream End User routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, 
and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the 
End User having access to CC, ISP1, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the 
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 are all providers.  However 
the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other providers’ abilities to enter 
the local market. 
 
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to enter the 
market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU. 
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Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit 
corporation, but could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any 
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market.  The provider could 
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to 
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers. 
 
Since LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, none of those 
providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing 
end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market 
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
> 25% < 25% < 25% < 25% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share. 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
 
LEC CC ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
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ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 
33.33% making those markets more competitive and relatively well served due to the moderate 
number of total providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s monopoly a little more difficult to 
maintain, and could further cut into CC’s and ISP1’s already minor market shares.  Likewise 
monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC and ISP1 could make any effort by ISP2 to 
establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The CC and Downstream End User routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, 
and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only because of 
the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
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According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2, 
or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them. 
 
 
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models. 
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Test 4.3. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 4.3 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers 
that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice among the four providers and has chosen CC as its 
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User 
routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the routes 
represented the End User having access to LEC, ISP1, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the 
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 are all providers.  However 
the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other providers’ abilities to enter 
the local market. 
 
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to enter the 
market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services. 
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Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit 
corporation, but could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any 
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market.  The provider could 
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to 
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers. 
 
Since LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, none of those 
providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing 
end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market 
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
> 25% < 25% < 25% < 25% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share. 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
 
LEC CC ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 431 
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 
33.33% making those markets more competitive and relatively well served due to the moderate 
number of total providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s monopoly a little more difficult to 
maintain, and could further cut into CC’s and ISP1’s already minor market shares.  Likewise 
monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC and ISP1 could make any effort by ISP2 to 
establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User 
routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only 
because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
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According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2, 
or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them. 
 
 
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models. 
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Test 4.4. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 4.4 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers 
that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice among the four providers and has chosen ISP1 as its 
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers, 
and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the 
End User having access to LEC, CC, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the 
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 are all providers.  However 
the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other providers’ abilities to enter 
the local market. 
 
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to enter the 
market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU. 
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Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit 
corporation, but could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any 
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market.  The provider could 
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to 
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers. 
 
Since LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, none of those 
providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing 
end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market 
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
> 25% < 25% < 25% < 25% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share. 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
 
LEC CC ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
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ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 
33.33% making those markets more competitive and relatively well served due to the moderate 
number of total providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s monopoly a little more difficult to 
maintain, and could further cut into CC’s and ISP1’s already minor market shares.  Likewise 
monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC and ISP1 could make any effort by ISP2 to 
establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers, 
and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only because of 
the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
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According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2, 
or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them. 
 
 
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models. 
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Test 4.5. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 4.5 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers 
that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice among the four providers and has chosen ISP2 as its 
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers, 
and the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the 
End User having access to LEC, CC, and ISP1 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the 
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 are all providers.  However 
the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other providers’ abilities to enter 
the local market. 
 
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to enter the 
market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU. 
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Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit 
corporation, but could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any 
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market.  The provider could 
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to 
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers. 
 
Since LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, none of those 
providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing 
end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market 
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
> 25% < 25% < 25% < 25% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share. 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
 
LEC CC ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
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ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 
33.33% making those markets more competitive and relatively well served due to the moderate 
number of total providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s monopoly a little more difficult to 
maintain, and could further cut into CC’s and ISP1’s already minor market shares.  Likewise 
monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC and ISP1 could make any effort by ISP2 to 
establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers, 
and the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only because of 
the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
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According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2, 
or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them. 
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Scenario Questions 
 
Scenario #5 
 
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario? 
 
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by only a public 
MAN between the upstream providers to the end users.  In Part B, competitor ISP2 (as both an 
independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt to enter the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Part A. 
 
Test 5.1. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 5.1 is attempting to emulate a local market “under-served” by the only incumbent 
Public MAN that provides its own system and carriage service between the upstream provider 
and the DEU.  The DEU has selected the Public MAN as its upstream provider, although it is the 
only provider available to choose from participating in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN has its own 
connection from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the 
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  However the construct indicates the 
Public MAN does not have an actual monopoly, and other providers are therefore able to enter 
the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is virtually monopolized, as the Public MAN is the only provider.  
However the construct indicates the Public MAN does not have an actual monopoly, and other 
providers are therefore able to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN has its own 
connection from the local market to the DEU.  However the construct indicates the last mile 
market is theoretically competitive as the Public MAN is not a sanctioned natural utility, and 
other providers are therefore able to enter the market. 
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Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
The Public MAN provides both infrastructure and I service to the DEU. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Not applicable, as the Public MAN is the only local and last mile market provider. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates the Public MAN does not have an actual monopoly, but the 
Public MAN could potentially control the local and last mile markets since it is the only current 
provider in both markets thereby giving it de facto control over them.  The Public MAN cannot 
discriminate against other providers until there actually are other providers in the two markets.  
However the Public MAN could announce discriminatory policies as a barrier towards potential 
competitors including network access restrictions, monopoly service under-pricing in the 
particular local market, certain governmental enterprise advantages, etc. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The Public MAN has a 100% share of both the local and last mile market. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
No. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
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The Public MAN accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as the Public MAN uses its own last mile system to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
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Part B. 
 
Test 5.2. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 5.2 is attempting to emulate a local market “under-served” by the only incumbent 
Public MAN that provides its own system and carriage service between the upstream provider to 
the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice between the two providers and has chosen to retain the 
Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the route represented 
the End User having access to ISP2 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users: 
 
The middle mile market is virtually duopolized, as only the Public MAN and ISP2 have 
their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  However the 
construct indicates neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 have an actual duopoly, and other providers 
are therefore able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is virtually duopolized, as the Public MAN and ISP2 are the only 
providers.  However the construct indicates neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 have an actual 
duopoly, and other providers are therefore able to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is virtually duopolized, as only the Public MAN and ISP2 have their 
own connections from the local market to the DEU.  However the construct indicates the last 
mile market is theoretically competitive as neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 are sanctioned 
natural utilities, and other providers are therefore able to enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
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The Public MAN and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  ISP2 is typically a for-
profit corporation, but could be a non-profit corporation.  ISP2 is likely not another government 
enterprise to avoid unnecessary public sector duplication and competition. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and ISP2 is 
typically a for-profit corporation, the Public MAN could have certain unfair advantages in both 
markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 currently have actual 
monopolies nor a duopoly in the local and last mile markets.  One of the providers could possibly 
try to control the local market, or both providers could possibly try to jointly control the local 
market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users 
than the other provider or potential competitive providers respectively.  The Public MAN could 
use certain governmental enterprise advantages against ISP2 and other potential providers in the 
local market too. 
 
Since both the Public MAN and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, neither 
provider could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the other from accessing 
end users.  Both could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market 
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
MAN ISP2 
100% 0% 
0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
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MAN ISP2 
100% 0% 
0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 
100% making those markets more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low 
number of total providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the Public MAN to establish a 
monopoly in them more difficult.  Likewise the Public MAN makes any effort by ISP2 to 
establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The ISP2 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only 
because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
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What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
Both the Public MAN and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as both the Public MAN and ISP2 use their own last mile 
systems to the DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch between the Public MAN and ISP2 
or use both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers. 
 
 
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models. 
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Test 5.3. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 5.3 is attempting to emulate a local market “under-served” by the only incumbent 
Public MAN that provides its own system and carriage service between the upstream provider to 
the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice between the two providers and has switched to the ISP2 as 
its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the route 
represented the End User having access to the Public MAN but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is virtually duopolized, as only the Public MAN and ISP2 have 
their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  However the 
construct indicates neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 have an actual duopoly, and other providers 
are therefore able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is virtually duopolized, as the Public MAN and ISP2 are the only 
providers.  However the construct indicates neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 have an actual 
duopoly, and other providers are therefore able to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is virtually duopolized, as only the Public MAN and ISP2 have their 
own connections from the local market to the DEU.  However the construct indicates the last 
mile market is theoretically competitive as neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 are sanctioned 
natural utilities, and other providers are therefore able to enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
The Public MAN and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services o the DEU. 
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Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  ISP2 is typically a for-
profit corporation, but could be a non-profit corporation.  ISP2 is likely not another government 
enterprise to avoid unnecessary public sector duplication and competition. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and ISP2 is 
typically a for-profit corporation, the Public MAN could have certain unfair advantages in both 
markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 currently have actual 
monopolies nor a duopoly in the local and last mile markets.  One of the providers could possibly 
try to control the local market, or both providers could possibly try to jointly control the local 
market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users 
than the other provider or potential competitive providers respectively.  The Public MAN could 
use certain governmental enterprise advantages against ISP2 and other potential providers in the 
local market too. 
 
Since both the Public MAN and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, neither 
provider could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the other from accessing 
end users.  Both could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market 
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
MAN ISP2 
100% 0% 
0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
 
MAN ISP2 
100% 0% 
0% 100% 
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Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 
100% making those markets more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low 
number of total providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the Public MAN to establish a 
monopoly in them more difficult.  Likewise the Public MAN makes any effort by ISP2 to 
establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The Public MAN and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only 
because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
Both the Public MAN and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as both the Public MAN and ISP2 use their own last mile 
systems to the DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU. 
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Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch between the Public MAN and ISP2 
or use both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers. 
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Scenario Questions 
 
Scenario #6 
 
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario? 
 
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by multiple 
private providers including a Public MAN between the upstream providers to the end users.  In 
Part B, competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt to enter 
the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Part A. 
 
Test 6.1. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 6.1 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to 
the DEU.  The DEU has an equal choice among the four providers and has chosen LEC as its 
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User 
routers, and the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the routes 
represented the end user having access to CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 but not subscribing to 
them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market between the Tier I ISP and the local market is competitive, as the 
construct indicates LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 have their own connections from the 
Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the local market too or 
currently refuses to participate there.  The construct indicates the local market is competitive.  
The last mile market between the local market and the DEU is competitive since LEC, CC, the 
Public MAN, and ISP1 have their own connections to the DEU, and other providers are also able 
to enter the market. 
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The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 have 
their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 are all 
providers.  Other providers are likewise able to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 have their 
own connections from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to enter 
the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC, CC, Public MAN, and ISP1 provide their own infrastructures and services to the 
DEU. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1 
are typically for-profit corporations. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC, 
and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair 
advantages over them in both markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a 
duopoly in the local and last mile markets.  One of the providers could possibly try to control the 
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for 
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other 
providers or potential competitive providers respectively.  The Public MAN could use certain 
governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and other potential providers in the 
local market too. 
 
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 provide their own last mile systems, none of 
those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from 
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accessing end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to 
market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User 
routers, and the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only 
because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
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LEC, CC, Public MAN, and ISP1 access the DEU directly via their own last mile 
systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to the 
DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN, 
and ISP1, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them. 
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Part B. 
 
Test 6.2. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 6.2 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream 
provider to the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice among the five providers and has chosen to retain LEC as 
its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User 
routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User 
routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to CC, the Public 
MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 are all 
providers.  Other providers are likewise able to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 have 
their own connections from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
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LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services 
to the DEU. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 are 
typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a non-
profit corporation.  ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public 
sector duplication and competition. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC, 
ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair 
advantages over them in both markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a 
duopoly in the local and last mile markets.  One of the providers could possibly try to control the 
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for 
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other 
providers or potential competitive providers respectively.  The Public MAN could use certain 
governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and other potential providers in the 
local market too. 
 
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, 
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others 
from accessing end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a 
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile 
systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
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LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 25% 
making those markets even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total 
providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the incumbent providers to establish a 
monopoly or duopoly in them more difficult.  Likewise the incumbent providers make any effort 
by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User 
routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User 
routers do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole 
emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last 
mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision 
to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN, 
ISP1, and ISP2, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to 
them. 
 
 
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models. 
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Test 6.3. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 6.3 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream 
provider to the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice among the five providers and has chosen CC as its 
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End 
User routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End 
User routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to LEC, the 
Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 are all 
providers.  Other providers are likewise able to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 have 
their own connections from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services 
to the DEU. 
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Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 are 
typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a non-
profit corporation.  ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public 
sector duplication and competition. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC, 
ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair 
advantages over them in both markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a 
duopoly in the local and last mile markets.  One of the providers could possibly try to control the 
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for 
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other 
providers or potential competitive providers respectively.  The Public MAN could use certain 
governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and other potential providers in the 
local market too. 
 
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, 
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others 
from accessing end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a 
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile 
systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
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LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 25% 
making those markets even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total 
providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the incumbent providers to establish a 
monopoly or duopoly in them more difficult.  Likewise the incumbent providers make any effort 
by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User 
routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User 
routers do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole 
emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last 
mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision 
to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN, 
ISP1, and ISP2, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to 
them. 
 
 
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models. 
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Test 6.4. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 6.4 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream 
provider to the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice among the five providers and has chosen the Public MAN 
as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers, 
the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers 
thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to LEC, CC, ISP1, and 
ISP2 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 are all 
providers.  Other providers are likewise able to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 have 
their own connections from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services 
to the DEU. 
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Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 are 
typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a non-
profit corporation.  ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public 
sector duplication and competition. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC, 
ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair 
advantages over them in both markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a 
duopoly in the local and last mile markets.  One of the providers could possibly try to control the 
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for 
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other 
providers or potential competitive providers respectively.  The Public MAN could use certain 
governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and other potential providers in the 
local market too. 
 
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, 
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others 
from accessing end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a 
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile 
systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
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LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 25% 
making those markets even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total 
providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the incumbent providers to establish a 
monopoly or duopoly in them more difficult.  Likewise the incumbent providers make any effort 
by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers, 
the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers do 
not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole emulation 
malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last 
mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision 
to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN, 
ISP1, and ISP2, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to 
them. 
 
 
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models. 
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Test 6.5. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 6.5 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream 
provider to the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice among the five providers and has chosen ISP1 as its 
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers, 
the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User 
routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to LEC, CC, the 
Public MAN, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 are all 
providers.  Other providers are likewise able to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 have 
their own connections from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services 
to the DEU. 
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Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 are 
typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a non-
profit corporation.  ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public 
sector duplication and competition. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC, 
ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair 
advantages over them in both markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a 
duopoly in the local and last mile markets.  One of the providers could possibly try to control the 
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for 
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other 
providers or potential competitive providers respectively.  The Public MAN could use certain 
governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and other potential providers in the 
local market too. 
 
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, 
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others 
from accessing end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a 
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile 
systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
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LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 25% 
making those markets even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total 
providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the incumbent providers to establish a 
monopoly or duopoly in them more difficult.  Likewise the incumbent providers make any effort 
by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers, 
the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User 
routers do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole 
emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last 
mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision 
to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN, 
ISP1, and ISP2, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to 
them. 
 
 
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models. 
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Test 6.6. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 6.6 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream 
provider to the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice among the five providers and has chosen ISP2 as its 
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers, 
the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP1 and Downstream End User 
routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to LEC, CC, the 
Public MAN, and ISP1 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 are all 
providers.  Other providers are likewise able to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 have 
their own connections from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services 
to the DEU. 
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Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 are 
typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a non-
profit corporation.  ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public 
sector duplication and competition. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC, 
ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair 
advantages over them in both markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a 
duopoly in the local and last mile markets.  One of the providers could possibly try to control the 
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for 
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other 
providers or potential competitive providers respectively.  The Public MAN could use certain 
governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and other potential providers in the 
local market too. 
 
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, 
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others 
from accessing end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a 
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile 
systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 474 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 25% 
making those markets even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total 
providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the incumbent providers to establish a 
monopoly or duopoly in them more difficult.  Likewise the incumbent providers make any effort 
by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers, 
the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP1 and Downstream End User 
routers do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole 
emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 475 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last 
mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision 
to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN, 
ISP1, and ISP2, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to 
them. 
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Scenario Questions 
 
Scenario #7 
 
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario? 
 
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market including a Public 
MAN dominated by two duopolistic private providers between the upstream providers to the end 
users.  In Part B, competitor ISP2 will then attempt to enter the local and last mile markets.  In 
Part C, competitor Google will then attempt to enter the local and last mile markets as ISP2.  
Note – only a representative sample of all of the possible last mile connection combinations will 
tested. 
 
 
Part A. 
 
Test 7.1. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 7.1 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream 
provider to the DEUs.  LEC’s and the Public MAN’s systems access DEU1, while CC’s and 
ISP1’s systems access DEU2. 
 
DEU1 has an equal choice between LEC and the Public MAN and has chosen LEC as its 
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose CC or ISP1 since there is 
no last mile access to either of them.  DEU2 has chosen CC as its upstream provider in the local 
and last mile markets, but cannot choose LEC or the Public MAN since there is no last mile 
access to either of them. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers and the ISP1 router and End User 2 
workstation thereby interrupting the routes represented End User 1 having access to the Public 
MAN and End User 2 having access to ISP1 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 have 
their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
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participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 are all 
providers.  However the construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly, whereby limiting other 
providers’ abilities to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market to DEU1 is virtually duopolized, as only LEC and the Public MAN 
have their own connections from the local market to DEU1.  The last mile market to DEU2 is 
virtually duopolized, as only CC and ISP1 have their own connections from the local market to 
DEU2.  However the construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically competitive as none 
of the providers are sanctioned natural utilities, and other providers are therefore able to enter the 
market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC and the Public MAN provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU1, and 
CC and ISP1 provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU2. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1 
are typically for-profit corporations. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government 
enterprise and LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could 
have certain unfair advantages over them. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU1 yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit 
government enterprise and LEC is typically a for-profit corporation, the Public MAN could have 
certain unfair advantages. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU2 no, since both CC and ISP1 are typically for-profit 
corporations there are likely few if any significant conflicts regarding differing business types. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
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The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market.  The two 
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly 
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential 
competitive providers.  The Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages 
against the incumbent and other potential providers in the local market too. 
 
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 provide their own last mile systems, none of 
those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from 
accessing end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to 
market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 
50% 50% 0% 0% 
> 25% > 25% < 25% < 25% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the duopoly providers’ market shares. 
 
The potential last mile market share range to DEU1 is: 
 
LEC MAN 
100% 0% 
> 50% < 50% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share. 
 
The potential last mile market share range to DEU2 is: 
 
CC ISP1 
100% 0% 
> 50% < 50% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The Public MAN and Downstream End User routers and the ISP1 router and 
Downstream End User 2 workstation do not recognize each other not only because of the 
disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
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What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User Workstation #2. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User Workstation #2. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC and the Public MAN access DEU1 directly via their own last mile systems, and CC 
and ISP1 access DEU2 directly via their own last mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct somewhat.  Both LEC and the Public MAN use their own last 
mile systems to DEU1 for service provision, while CC and ISP1 use their own last mile systems 
to DEU2 for service provision. 
 
If LEC and/or the Public MAN chose to provide service to DEU2, they would either have 
to establish their own systems to DEU2 or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to 
CC’s and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to DEU2.  If CC and/or ISP1 chose to provide service 
to DEU1, they would either have to establish their own systems to DEU1 or interconnect with 
and be granted adequate access to LEC’s and/or the Public MAN’s systems for provision to 
DEU1. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEUs, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEUs, or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s and/or the Public MAN’s systems for provision to DEU1, or 
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to 
DEU2. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch between LEC and the Public MAN or 
use both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers. 
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Part B. 
 
Test 7.2. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 7.2 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream 
provider to DEU2.  LEC’s and the Public MAN’s systems access DEU1, while CC’s and ISP1’s 
systems access DEU2. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2. 
 
DEU1 has an equal choice between LEC and the Public MAN and has chosen LEC as its 
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose CC, ISP1, or ISP2 since 
there is no last mile access to either of them.  DEU2 has chosen CC as its upstream provider in 
the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose LEC or the Public MAN since there is no last 
mile access to either of them. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, the ISP1 router and End User 2 
workstation, and the ISP2 router and End User 2 workstation thereby interrupting the routes 
represented End User 1 having access to the Public MAN and End User 2 having access to ISP1 
and ISP2 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all 
providers.  However the construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly, whereby limiting other 
providers’ abilities to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market to DEU1 is virtually duopolized, as only LEC and the Public MAN 
have their own connections from the local market to DEU1.  The last mile market to DEU2 is 
competitive, as CC, ISP1, and ISP2 have their own connections from the local market to DEU2.  
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However the construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically competitive as none of the 
providers are sanctioned natural utilities, and other providers are therefore able to enter the 
market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC and the Public MAN provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU1, and 
ISP1, and CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU2. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1 
are typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a 
non-profit corporation.  ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary 
public sector duplication and competition. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government 
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN 
could have certain unfair advantages over them. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU1 yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit 
government enterprise and LEC is typically a for-profit corporation, the Public MAN could have 
certain unfair advantages. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU2 no, since CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit 
corporations there are likely few if any significant conflicts regarding differing business types. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market.  The two 
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly 
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential 
competitive providers.  The Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages 
against the incumbent and other potential providers in the local market too. 
 
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, 
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others 
from accessing end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a 
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barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile 
systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
50% 50% 0% 0% 0% 
> 20% > 20% < 20% < 20% < 20% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the duopoly providers’ market shares. 
 
The potential last mile market share range to DEU1 is: 
 
LEC MAN 
100% 0% 
> 50% < 50% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share. 
 
The potential last mile market share range to DEU2 is: 
 
CC ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 
> 1/3rd% < 1/3rd% < 1/3rd% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share. 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the 
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s and CC’s duopoly a little more 
difficult to maintain, and could further cut into the Public MAN’s and ISP1’s already minor 
market shares.  Likewise duopolists LEC and CC and incumbent providers Public MAN and 
ISP1 could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult. 
 
ISP2 does not enter the last mile market to DEU1, leaving the number of those providers 
at two.  That market’s competitiveness remains unaffected and still relatively underserved due to 
the low number of total providers. 
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ISP2’s entry in the last mile market to DEU2 increases the number of providers by 50% 
making that market more competitive. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, the ISP1 router and Downstream 
End User 2 workstation, and the ISP2 router and Downstream End User 2 workstation do not 
recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole emulation 
malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User workstation #2. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User Workstation #2. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User workstation #2. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC and the Public MAN access DEU1 directly via their own last mile systems, and CC, 
ISP1, and ISP2 access DEU2 directly via their own last mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
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According to the construct somewhat.  Both LEC and the Public MAN use their own last 
mile systems to DEU1 for service provision, while CC, ISP1, and ISP2 use their own last mile 
systems to DEU2 for service provision. 
 
If LEC and/or the Public MAN chose to provide service to DEU2, they would either have 
to establish their own systems to DEU2 or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to 
CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to DEU2.  If CC, ISP1, and/or ISP2 chose to 
provide service to DEU1, they would either have to establish their own systems to DEU1 or 
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s and/or the Public MAN’s systems for 
provision to DEU1. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEUs, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEUs, or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s and/or the Public MAN’s systems for provision to DEU1, or 
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for 
provision to DEU2. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch between LEC and the Public MAN or 
use both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers. 
 
 
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models. 
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Test 7.3. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 7.3 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream 
provider to the DEUs.  LEC’s and the Public MAN’s systems access DEU1, while CC’s and 
ISP1’s systems access DEU2. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2. 
 
DEU1 has an equal choice between LEC and the Public MAN and has chosen the Public 
MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose CC, ISP1, or 
ISP2 since there is no last mile access to either of them.  DEU2 has chosen ISP2 as its upstream 
provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose LEC or the Public MAN since 
there is no last mile access to either of them. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC router and End User 2 workstation, 
and the ISP1 router and End User 2 workstation thereby interrupting the routes represented End 
User 1 having access to the LEC and End User 2 having access to CC and ISP1 but not 
subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all 
providers.  However the construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly, whereby limiting other 
providers’ abilities to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market to DEU1 is virtually duopolized, as only LEC and the Public MAN 
have their own connections from the local market to DEU1.  The last mile market to DEU2 is 
competitive, as CC, ISP1, and ISP2 have their own connections from the local market to DEU2.  
However the construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically competitive as none of the 
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providers are sanctioned natural utilities, and other providers are therefore able to enter the 
market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC and the Public MAN provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU1, and 
ISP1, and CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU2. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1 
are typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a 
non-profit corporation.  ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary 
public sector duplication and competition. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government 
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN 
could have certain unfair advantages over them. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU1 yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit 
government enterprise and LEC is typically a for-profit corporation, the Public MAN could have 
certain unfair advantages. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU2 no, since CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit 
corporations there are likely few if any significant conflicts regarding differing business types. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market.  The two 
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly 
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential 
competitive providers.  The Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages 
against the incumbent and other potential providers in the local market too. 
 
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, 
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others 
from accessing end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a 
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barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile 
systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
50% 50% 0% 0% 0% 
> 20% > 20% < 20% < 20% < 20% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the duopoly providers’ market shares. 
 
The potential last mile market share range to DEU1 is: 
 
LEC MAN 
100% 0% 
> 50% < 50% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share. 
 
The potential last mile market share range to DEU2 is: 
 
CC ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 
> 1/3rd% < 1/3rd% < 1/3rd% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share. 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the 
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s and CC’s duopoly a little more 
difficult to maintain, and could further cut into the Public MAN’s and ISP1’s already minor 
market shares.  Likewise duopolists LEC and CC and incumbent providers Public MAN and 
ISP1 could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult. 
 
ISP2 does not enter the last mile market to DEU1, leaving the number of those providers 
at two.  That market’s competitiveness remains unaffected and still relatively underserved due to 
the low number of total providers. 
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ISP2’s entry in the last mile market to DEU2 increases the number of providers by 50% 
making that market more competitive. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC router and Downstream End User 2 
workstation, and the ISP1 router and Downstream End User 2 workstation do not recognize each 
other not only because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User workstation #2. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User Workstation #2. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User workstation #2. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC and the Public MAN access DEU1 directly via their own last mile systems, and CC, 
ISP1, and ISP2 access DEU2 directly via their own last mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct somewhat.  Both LEC and the Public MAN use their own last 
mile systems to DEU1 for service provision, while CC, ISP1, and ISP2 use their own last mile 
systems to DEU2 for service provision. 
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If LEC and/or the Public MAN chose to provide service to DEU2, they would either have 
to establish their own systems to DEU2 or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to 
CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to DEU2.  If CC, ISP1, and/or ISP2 chose to 
provide service to DEU1, they would either have to establish their own systems to DEU1 or 
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s and/or the Public MAN’s systems for 
provision to DEU1. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEUs, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEUs, or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s and/or the Public MAN’s systems for provision to DEU1, or 
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for 
provision to DEU2. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch between LEC and the Public MAN or 
use both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers. 
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Part C. 
 
Repeat Part B substituting Google Fiber for ISP2. 
 
Test 7.4. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 7.4 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream 
provider to the DEUs.  LEC’s and the Public MAN’s systems access DEU1, while CC’s and 
ISP1’s systems access DEU2. 
 
Google then enters the local market as competitive ISP2, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to both DEUs. 
 
DEU1 has an equal choice among LEC, the Public MAN, and Google, and has chosen 
LEC as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose CC or ISP1 
since there is no last mile access to either of them.  DEU2 has an equal choice among CC, ISP1, 
and Google, and has chosen CC as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but 
cannot choose LEC or the Public MAN since there is no last mile access to either of them. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, the Google and Downstream End 
User routers, the ISP1 router and End User 2 workstation, and the Google router and End User 2 
workstation thereby interrupting the routes represented End User 1 having access to the Public 
MAN and Google and End User 2 having access to ISP1 and Google but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and Google 
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and Google are all 
providers.  The construct indicates LEC and CC had a duopoly, whereby limiting other 
providers’ abilities to enter the local market.  However Google’s entry into the local market 
eliminates LEC’s and CC’s duopoly. 
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The last mile market to DEU1 was virtually duopolized, as only LEC and the Public 
MAN had their own connections from the local market to DEU1.  However Google’s entry into 
the last market eliminates LEC’s and the Public MAN’s duopoly to DEU1.  The last mile market 
to DEU2 is competitive, as CC, ISP1, and Google have their own connections from the local 
market to DEU2.  However the construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically 
competitive as none of the providers are sanctioned natural utilities, and other providers are 
therefore able to enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC and the Public MAN provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU1, and 
ISP1, and CC, ISP1, and Google provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU2. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1 
are typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a 
non-profit corporation. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government 
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN 
could have certain unfair advantages over them. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU1 yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit 
government enterprise and LEC is typically a for-profit corporation, the Public MAN could have 
certain unfair advantages. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU2 no, since CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit 
corporations there are likely few if any significant conflicts regarding differing business types. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market.  The two 
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly 
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential 
competitive providers.  The Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages 
against the incumbent and other potential providers in the local market too.  However Google’s 
entry into the local market eliminates LEC’s and CC’s duopoly and could counter any 
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governmental advantages the Public MAN may have.  Given Google’s corporate size and powers 
it could become a monopoly in the market if it so desired. 
 
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and Google provide their own last mile systems, 
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others 
from accessing end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a 
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile 
systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 Google 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range to DEU1 is: 
 
LEC MAN Google 
100% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range to DEU2 is: 
 
CC ISP1 Google 
100% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding Google make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding Google 
affect the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
Google’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the 
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers. 
 
Google’s presence in the local market eliminates LEC’s and CC’s duopoly, and could 
further cut into the Public MAN’s and/or ISP1’s already minor market shares.  Efforts by former 
duopolists LEC and CC and incumbent providers Public MAN and ISP1 to prevent Google from 
establishing a monopoly in the market if it so desired would be quite difficult for them. 
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Google’s entry in the last mile market to DEU1 increases the number of providers by 
50% making that market more competitive. 
 
Google’s entry in the last mile market to DEU2 increases the number of providers by 
50% making that market more competitive. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, the Google and Downstream End 
User routers, the ISP1 router and Downstream End User 2 workstation, and the Google router 
and Downstream End User 2 workstation do not recognize each other not only because of the 
disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User workstation #2. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User Workstation #2. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Google 
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Google 
router-Downstream End User workstation #2. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, the Public MAN, and Google access DEU1 directly via their own last mile systems, 
and CC, ISP1, and Google access DEU2 directly via their own last mile systems. 
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Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct somewhat.  LEC, the Public MAN, and Google use their own 
last mile systems to DEU1 for service provision, while CC, ISP1, and Google use their own last 
mile systems to DEU2 for service provision. 
 
If LEC and/or the Public MAN chose to provide service to DEU2, they would either have 
to establish their own systems to DEU2 or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to 
CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or Google’s systems for provision to DEU2.  If CC and/or ISP1 chose to 
provide service to DEU1, they would either have to establish their own systems to DEU1 or 
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s, the Public MAN’s, and/or Google’s 
systems for provision to DEU1. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEUs, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEUs, or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, the Public MAN’s, and/or Google’s systems for provision to DEU1, 
or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or Google’s systems 
for provision to DEU2. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, ISP1, and Google, or use 
two or all simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to multiple providers. 
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Scenario Questions 
 
Scenario #8 
 
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario? 
 
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market including a public 
MAN dominated by a monopolistic private provider between the upstream providers to the end 
users.  In Part B, competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt 
to enter the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Part A. 
 
Test 8.1. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 8.1 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to 
the DEU.  The DEU has an equal choice among the four providers and has chosen LEC as its 
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User 
routers, and the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the routes 
represented the end user having access to CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 but not subscribing to 
them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 have 
their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 are all 
providers.  However the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other 
providers’ abilities to enter the local market. 
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The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 have their 
own connections from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to enter 
the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 provide their own infrastructures and services to 
the DEU. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1 
are typically for-profit corporations. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC, 
and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair 
advantages over them in both markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market.  The provider could 
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to 
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers.  The 
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and 
other potential providers in the local market too. 
 
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 provide their own last mile systems, none of 
those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from 
accessing end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to 
market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
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LEC CC MAN ISP1 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
> 25% < 25% < 25% < 25% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares. 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User 
routers, and the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only 
because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 access the DEU directly via their own last mile 
systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
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According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to the 
DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN, 
and ISP1, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them. 
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Part B. 
 
Test 8.2. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 8.2 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream 
provider to the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice among the five providers and has chosen to retain LEC as 
its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User 
routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User 
routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to CC, the Public 
MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all 
providers.  However the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other 
providers’ abilities to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 have 
their own connections from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 500 
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services 
to the DEU. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1 
are typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a 
non-profit corporation.  ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary 
public sector duplication and competition. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC, 
ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair 
advantages over them in both markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market.  The provider could 
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to 
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers.  The 
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and 
other potential providers in the local market too. 
 
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, 
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others 
from accessing end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a 
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile 
systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
> 20% < 20% < 20% < 20% < 20% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares. 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
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LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 25% 
making those markets even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total 
providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s monopoly a little more difficult to 
maintain, and could further cut into CC’s, the Public MAN’s, and ISP1’s already minor market 
shares.  Likewise monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 
could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User 
routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User 
routers do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole 
emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last 
mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision 
to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN, 
ISP1, and ISP2, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to 
them. 
 
 
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models. 
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Test 8.3. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 8.3 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream 
provider to the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice among the five providers and has chosen CC as its 
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End 
User routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End 
User routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to LEC, the 
Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all 
providers.  However the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other 
providers’ abilities to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 have 
their own connections from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
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LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services 
to the DEU. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 are 
typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a non-
profit corporation.  ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public 
sector duplication and competition. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC, 
ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair 
advantages over them in both markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market.  The provider could 
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to 
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers.  The 
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and 
other potential providers in the local market too. 
 
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, 
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others 
from accessing end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a 
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile 
systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
> 20% < 20% < 20% < 20% < 20% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares. 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
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LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 25% 
making those markets even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total 
providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s monopoly a little more difficult to 
maintain, and could further cut into CC’s, the Public MAN’s, and ISP1’s already minor market 
shares.  Likewise monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 
could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User 
routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User 
routers do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole 
emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last 
mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision 
to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN, 
ISP1, and ISP2, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to 
them. 
 
 
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models. 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 507 
Test 8.4. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 8.4 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream 
provider to the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice among the five providers and has chosen the Public MAN 
as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers, 
the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers 
thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to LEC, CC, ISP1, and 
ISP2 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all 
providers.  However the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other 
providers’ abilities to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 have 
their own connections from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
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LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services 
to the DEU. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 are 
typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a non-
profit corporation.  ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public 
sector duplication and competition. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC, 
ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair 
advantages over them in both markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market.  The provider could 
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to 
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers.  The 
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and 
other potential providers in the local market too. 
 
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, 
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others 
from accessing end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a 
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile 
systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
> 20% < 20% < 20% < 20% < 20% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares. 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
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LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 25% 
making those markets even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total 
providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s monopoly a little more difficult to 
maintain, and could further cut into CC’s, the Public MAN’s, and ISP1’s already minor market 
shares.  Likewise monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 
could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers, 
the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers do 
not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole emulation 
malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last 
mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision 
to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN, 
ISP1, and ISP2, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to 
them. 
 
 
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models. 
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Test 8.5. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 8.5 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream 
provider to the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice among the five providers and has chosen ISP1 as its 
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers, 
the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User 
routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to LEC, CC, the 
Public MAN, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all 
providers.  However the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other 
providers’ abilities to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 have 
their own connections from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
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LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services 
to the DEU. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 are 
typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a non-
profit corporation.  ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public 
sector duplication and competition. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC, 
ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair 
advantages over them in both markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market.  The provider could 
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to 
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers.  The 
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and 
other potential providers in the local market too. 
 
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, 
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others 
from accessing end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a 
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile 
systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
> 20% < 20% < 20% < 20% < 20% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares. 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
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LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 25% 
making those markets even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total 
providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s monopoly a little more difficult to 
maintain, and could further cut into CC’s, the Public MAN’s, and ISP1’s already minor market 
shares.  Likewise monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 
could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers, 
the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User 
routers do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole 
emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last 
mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision 
to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN, 
ISP1, and ISP2, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to 
them. 
 
 
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models. 
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Test 8.6. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 8.6 is attempting to emulate a local market very well served by four incumbent 
providers and a competitive ISP2, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services 
between the upstream provider to the DEU.  The DEU has an equal choice among the five 
providers and has chosen ISP2 as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers, 
the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP1 and Downstream End User 
routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to LEC, CC, the 
Public MAN, and ISP1 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all 
providers.  However the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other 
providers’ abilities to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 have 
their own connections from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services 
to the DEU. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
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The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 are 
typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a non-
profit corporation.  ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public 
sector duplication and competition. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC, 
ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair 
advantages over them in both markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market.  The provider could 
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to 
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers.  The 
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and 
other potential providers in the local market too. 
 
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, 
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others 
from accessing end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a 
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile 
systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
> 20% < 20% < 20% < 20% < 20% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares. 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
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LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 25% 
making those markets even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total 
providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s monopoly a little more difficult to 
maintain, and could further cut into CC’s, the Public MAN’s, and ISP1’s already minor market 
shares.  Likewise monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 
could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers, 
the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP1 and Downstream End User 
routers do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole 
emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last 
mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision 
to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN, 
ISP1, and ISP2, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to 
them. 
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Scenario Questions 
 
Scenario #9 
 
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario? 
 
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by multiple 
private providers including a public MAN between the upstream providers to the end users, and 
where all providers can optionally access and use each other’s local market systems.  In Part B, 
competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt to enter the local 
and last mile markets. 
 
 
Part A. 
 
Test 9.1. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 9.1 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to 
the downstream end user.  All of the providers are interconnected to each other, enabling a 
variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market providers, and the DEU.  The 
DEU has an equal choice among the four providers and has chosen LEC as its upstream provider 
in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The interconnection of provider routers 
in the local market enabled route sharing among them.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User 
routers, and the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the routes 
represented the end user having access to CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 but not subscribing to 
them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 have 
their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
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The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 are all 
providers.  Other providers are likewise able to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 have their 
own connections from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to enter 
the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other 
providers, and their own infrastructures and services to the DEU. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1 
are typically for-profit corporations. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC, 
and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair 
advantages over them in both markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a 
duopoly in the local and last mile markets.  One of the providers could possibly try to control the 
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for 
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other 
providers or potential competitive providers respectively.  The Public MAN could use certain 
governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and other potential providers in the 
local market too. 
 
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied 
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if 
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market. 
 
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 provide their own last mile systems, none of 
those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from 
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accessing end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to 
market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the market does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User 
routers, and the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers do not directly recognize each other not 
only because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
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How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 can access the DEU both directly via their own last 
mile systems and via the other providers’ last mile systems using interconnections. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems and 
interconnect with each others’ systems for access to the DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to the 
DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN, 
and ISP1, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them. 
 
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed 
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access, 
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is 
most likely an unfair model and cost for them. 
 
 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 526 
Part B. 
 
Test 9.2. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 9.2 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream 
provider to the downstream end users.  All of the providers are interconnected to each other, 
enabling a variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market providers, and the 
DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the local market.  ISP2 also interconnects with 
the other local market providers. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice among the five providers and has chosen to retain LEC as 
its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The interconnection of provider routers 
in the local market enabled route sharing among them.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User 
routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User 
routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to CC, the Public 
MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all 
providers.  Other providers are likewise able to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 have 
their own connections from the local market to the DEU.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the market. 
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Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own interconnections to the 
other providers, and their own infrastructures and services to the DEU. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 are 
typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a non-
profit corporation.  ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public 
sector duplication and competition. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC, 
ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair 
advantages over them in both markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a 
duopoly in the local and last mile markets.  One of the providers could possibly try to control the 
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for 
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other 
providers or potential competitive providers respectively.  The Public MAN could use certain 
governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and other potential providers in the 
local market too. 
 
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied 
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if 
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market. 
 
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, 
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others 
from accessing end users.  Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a 
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile 
systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
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The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 25% 
making those markets even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total 
providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the incumbent providers to establish a 
monopoly or duopoly in them more difficult.  Likewise the incumbent providers make any effort 
by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User 
routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User 
routers do not directly recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the 
whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
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How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 can access the DEU both directly via their 
own last mile systems and via the other providers’ last mile systems using interconnections. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems and 
interconnect with each others’ systems for access to the DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision 
to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN, 
ISP1, and ISP2, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to 
them. 
 
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed 
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access, 
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is 
most likely an unfair model and cost for them. 
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Scenario Questions 
 
Scenario #10 
 
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario? 
 
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by multiple 
private providers including a public MAN but dominated by two duopolistic private providers, 
and where all providers can optionally access and use each other’s local market systems.  The 
two duopolistic private providers are the only last mile providers.  In Part B, competitor ISP2 
will then attempt to enter the local market.  In Part C, competitor Google will then attempt to 
enter the local and last mile markets as ISP2. 
 
 
Part A. 
 
Test 10.1. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 10.1 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream 
provider to the local market.  All of the providers are interconnected to each other, enabling a 
variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market providers, and the DEUs.  
LEC’s system accesses DEU1, while CC’s system accesses DEU2. 
 
DEU1 has chosen LEC as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but 
cannot choose CC, the Public MAN, or ISP1 without first accessing LEC since there is no direct 
access to the others available.  DEU2 has chosen CC as its upstream provider in the local and last 
mile markets, but cannot choose LEC, the Public MAN, or ISP1 without first accessing CC since 
there is no direct access to the others available. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The interconnection of provider routers 
in the local market enabled route sharing among them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 have 
their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
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participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and the Public MAN, ISP1 are all 
providers.  However the construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly, whereby limiting other 
providers’ abilities to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market to DEU1 is virtually monopolized, as only LEC has its own 
connection from the local market to DEU1.  The last mile market to DEU2 is also virtually 
monopolized, as only CC has its own connection from the local market to DEU2.  CC, the Public 
MAN, and ISP1 either once had their own connections to DEU1 or currently refuse to provide 
their own, and LEC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 either once had their own connections to DEU2 
or currently refuse to provide their own.  However the construct indicates the last mile market is 
theoretically uncompetitive as LEC and CC appear to be sanctioned natural utilities, and other 
providers are therefore unlikely or unable to enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and infrastructure and 
service to DEU1.  CC provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and infrastructure 
and service to DEU2. 
 
The Public MAN and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and 
can provide their own services to the two DEUs via LEC and CC. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1 
are typically for-profit corporations. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government 
enterprise and LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could 
have certain unfair advantages over them. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU1 the question is not applicable, as LEC is the only last 
mile market provider. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU2 the question is not applicable, as CC is the only last mile 
market provider. 
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Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market.  The two 
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly 
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential 
competitive providers.  The Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages 
against the incumbent and other potential providers in the local market too. 
 
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied 
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if 
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market. 
 
However if LEC denied other providers access to its own network, it could also restrict 
last mile access to DEU1, enforcing that technique as an effective way to control the market.  
Likewise if CC denied other providers access to its own network, it could also restrict last mile 
access to DEU2, enforcing that technique as an effective way to control the market.  If both LEC 
and CC denied the other providers access to their own networks, the other providers could use 
interconnections to each other but would not be able to access either of the DEUs, enforcing that 
technique as an effective way to control the market. 
 
If the Public MAN and/or ISP1 denied the other providers access to their own networks, 
the others could still provide access via interconnections to LEC and/or CC.  The Public MAN 
and ISP1 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control 
the market inconsequential. 
 
The four providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential 
competitors entering, with LEC and CC as duopolists and the only last mile system providers 
wielding the most power and the Public MAN potentially using certain governmental enterprise 
advantages for such control. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 
50% 50% 0% 0% 
> 25% > 25% < 25% < 25% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the duopoly providers’ market shares. 
 
LEC has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU1.  CC has a 100% share of the last mile 
market to DEU2. 
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Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
No. 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
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How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC accesses DEU1 directly via its own last mile system, and CC accesses DEU2 
directly via its own last mile system. 
 
CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 can indirectly access DEU1 via interconnections with 
LEC as the last hop in those routes.  LEC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 can indirectly access 
DEU2 via interconnections with CC as the last hop in those routes. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct no.  LEC uses its own last mile system to DEU1 for service 
provision, while CC uses its own last mile system to DEU2 for service provision. 
 
If LEC, the Public MAN, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to DEU2, they would 
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s system for provision to DEU2.  
If CC, the Public MAN, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to DEU1, they would have to 
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s system for provision to DEU1. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEUs, they would 
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s system for provision to 
DEU1, or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s system for provision to 
DEU2. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed 
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access, 
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is 
most likely an unfair model and cost for them. 
 
The Public MAN is technically not a true public MAN in this model as it does not own 
and operate its own last mile system, and instead it must acquire last mile access from other 
providers. 
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Part B. 
 
Test 10.2. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 10.2 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream 
provider to the local market.  All of the providers are interconnected to each other, enabling a 
variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market providers, and the DEUs.  
LEC’s system accesses DEU1, while CC’s system accesses DEU2. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the local market.  ISP2 also interconnects with 
the other local market providers. 
 
DEU1 has chosen LEC as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but 
cannot choose CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, or ISP2 without first accessing LEC since there is no 
direct access to the others available.  DEU2 has chosen CC as its upstream provider in the local 
and last mile markets, but cannot choose LEC, the Public MAN, ISP1, or ISP2 without first 
accessing CC since there is no direct access to the others available. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The interconnection of provider routers 
in the local market enabled route sharing among them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all 
providers.  However the construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly, whereby limiting other 
providers’ abilities to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market to DEU1 is virtually monopolized, as only LEC has its own 
connection from the local market to DEU1.  The last mile market to DEU2 is also virtually 
monopolized, as only CC has its own connection from the local market to DEU2.  CC, the Public 
MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 either once had their own connections to DEU1 or currently refuse to 
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provide their own, and LEC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 either once had their own 
connections to DEU2 or currently refuse to provide their own.  However the construct indicates 
the last mile market is theoretically uncompetitive as LEC and CC appear to be sanctioned 
natural utilities, and other providers are therefore unlikely or unable to enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and infrastructure and 
service to DEU1.  CC provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and infrastructure 
and service to DEU2. 
 
The Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own interconnections to the other 
providers, and can provide their own services to the two DEUs via LEC and CC. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 are 
typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a non-
profit corporation.  ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public 
sector duplication and competition. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government 
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN 
could have certain unfair advantages over them. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU1 the question is not applicable, as LEC is the only last 
mile market provider. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU2 the question is not applicable, as CC is the only last mile 
market provider. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market.  The two 
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly 
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential 
competitive providers.  The Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages 
against the incumbent and other potential providers in the local market too. 
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All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied 
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if 
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market. 
 
However if LEC denied other providers access to its own network, it could also restrict 
last mile access to DEU1, enforcing that technique as an effective way to control the market.  
Likewise if CC denied other providers access to its own network, it could also restrict last mile 
access to DEU2, enforcing that technique as an effective way to control the market.  If both LEC 
and CC denied the other providers access to their own networks, the other providers could use 
interconnections to each other but would not be able to access either of the DEUs, enforcing that 
technique as an effective way to control the market. 
 
If the Public MAN, ISP1, and/or ISP2 denied the other providers access to their own 
networks, the others could still provide access via interconnections to LEC and/or CC.  The 
Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as 
an attempt to control the market inconsequential. 
 
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential 
competitors entering, with LEC and CC as duopolists and the only last mile system providers 
wielding the most power and the Public MAN potentially using certain governmental enterprise 
advantages for such control. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
50% 50% 0% 0% 0% 
> 20% > 20% < 20% < 20% < 20% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the duopoly providers’ market shares. 
 
LEC has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU1.  CC has a 100% share of the last mile 
market to DEU2. 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the 
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s and CC’s duopoly a little more 
difficult to maintain, and could further cut into the Public MAN’s and ISP1’s already minor 
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market shares.  Likewise duopolists LEC and CC and incumbent providers Public MAN and 
ISP1 could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult. 
 
ISP2 does not enter the last mile market to DEU1, leaving the number of those providers 
at one.  That market’s competitiveness remains unaffected and still underserved due to its sole 
provider. 
 
ISP2 does not enter the last mile market to DEU2, leaving the number of those providers 
at one.  That market’s competitiveness remains unaffected and still underserved due to its sole 
provider. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
No. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
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How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC accesses DEU1 directly via its own last mile system, and CC accesses DEU2 
directly via its own last mile system. 
 
CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 can indirectly access DEU1 via interconnections 
with LEC as the last hop in those routes.  LEC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 can indirectly 
access DEU2 via interconnections with CC as the last hop in those routes. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct no.  LEC uses its own last mile system to DEU1 for service 
provision, while CC uses its own last mile system to DEU2 for service provision. 
 
If LEC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and/or ISP2 chose to provide service to DEU2, they 
would have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s system for provision to 
DEU2.  If CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and/or ISP2 chose to provide service to DEU1, they 
would have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s system for provision 
to DEU1. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEUs, they would 
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s system for provision to 
DEU1, or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s system for provision to 
DEU2. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed 
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access, 
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is 
most likely an unfair model and cost for them. 
 
The Public MAN is technically not a true public MAN in this model as it does not own 
and operate its own last mile system, and instead it must acquire last mile access from other 
providers. 
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Part C. 
 
Repeat Part B substituting Google Fiber for ISP2. 
 
Test 10.3. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 10.3 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream 
provider to the local market.  All of the providers are interconnected to each other, enabling a 
variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market providers, and the DEUs.  
LEC’s system accesses DEU1, while CC’s system accesses DEU2. 
 
Google then enters the local market as competitive ISP2, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to both DEUs.  Google interconnects with the 
other local market providers, and also accesses both DEU1 and DEU2. 
 
DEU1 has an equal choice between LEC and Google, and has chosen LEC as its 
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose CC, the Public MAN, or 
ISP1 without first accessing LEC or Google since there is no direct access to the others available.  
DEU2 has an equal choice between CC and Google, and has chosen CC as its upstream provider 
in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose LEC, the Public MAN, or ISP1 without first 
accessing CC or Google since there is no direct access to the others available. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The interconnection of provider routers 
in the local market enabled route sharing among them.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the Google and Downstream End User routers and the Google router and End User 2 
workstation thereby interrupting the routes represented End User 1 and End User 2 having access 
to Google but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1, and Google have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the 
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and Google are all providers.  The 
construct indicates LEC and CC had a duopoly, whereby limiting other providers’ abilities to 
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enter the local market.  However Google’s entry into the local market eliminates LEC’s and 
CC’s duopoly. 
 
The last mile market to DEU1 was virtually monopolized, as only LEC had its own 
connection from the local market to DEU1.  However Google’s entry into the last market 
eliminates LEC’s monopoly to DEU1.  The last mile market to DEU2 is also virtually 
duopolized, as only CC and Google have their own connections from the local market to DEU2.  
CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 either once had their own connections to DEU1 or currently 
refuse to provide their own, and LEC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 either once had their own 
connections to DEU2 or currently refuse to provide their own.  The construct indicates the last 
mile market was theoretically uncompetitive as LEC and CC appeared to be sanctioned natural 
utilities, and other providers were therefore unlikely or unable to enter the market.  However 
Google’s entry into the last market eliminates the natural utilities. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and infrastructure and 
service to DEU1.  CC provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and infrastructure 
and service to DEU2.  Google provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and 
infrastructures and services to DEU1 and DEU2. 
 
The Public MAN and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and 
can provide their own services to the two DEUs via LEC, CC, and Google. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 are 
typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a non-
profit corporation. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government 
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN 
could have certain unfair advantages over them. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU1 the question is not applicable, as LEC is the only last 
mile market provider. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU2 the question is not applicable, as CC is the only last mile 
market provider. 
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Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market.  The two 
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly 
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential 
competitive providers.  The Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages 
against the incumbent and other potential providers in the local market too.  However Google’s 
entry into the local market eliminates LEC’s and CC’s duopoly and could counter any 
governmental advantages the Public MAN may have.  Given Google’s corporate size and powers 
it could become a monopoly in the market if it so desired. 
 
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied 
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if 
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market. 
 
However if LEC and Google denied other providers access to their own networks, they 
could also restrict last mile access to DEU1, enforcing that technique as an effective way to 
control the market.  Likewise if CC and Google denied other providers access to their own 
networks, they could also restrict last mile access to DEU2, enforcing that technique as an 
effective way to control the market.  If LEC, CC, and Google denied the other providers access 
to their own networks, the other providers could use interconnections to each other but would not 
be able to access either of the DEUs, enforcing that technique as an effective way to control the 
market. 
 
If the Public MAN and/or ISP1 denied the other providers access to their own networks, 
the others could still provide access via interconnections to LEC, CC, and/or Google.  The Public 
MAN and ISP1 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to 
control the market inconsequential. 
 
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential 
competitors entering, with LEC, CC, and Google as the only last mile system providers wielding 
the most power and the Public MAN potentially using certain governmental enterprise 
advantages for such control. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 Google 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
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The potential last mile market share range to DEU1 is: 
 
LEC Google 
100% 0% 
0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range to DEU2 is: 
 
CC Google 
100% 0% 
0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding Google make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding Google 
affect the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
Google’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the 
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers. 
 
Google’s presence in the local market eliminates LEC’s and CC’s duopoly, and could 
further cut into the Public MAN’s and/or ISP1’s already minor market shares.  Efforts by former 
duopolists LEC and CC and incumbent providers Public MAN and ISP1 to prevent Google from 
establishing a monopoly in the market if it so desired would be quite difficult for them. 
 
Google’s entry in the last mile market to DEU1 increases the number of providers by 
100% making that market more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low 
number of total providers. 
 
Google’s entry in the last mile market to DEU2 increases the number of providers by 
100% making that market more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low 
number of total providers. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The Google and Downstream End User routers and the Google router and Downstream 
End User 2 workstation do not directly recognize each other not only because of the 
disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
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How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC and Google access DEU1 directly via their own last mile systems, and CC and 
Google access DEU2 directly via their own last mile systems. 
 
CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 can indirectly access DEU1 via interconnections with 
LEC and Google as the last hops in those routes.  LEC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 can indirectly 
access DEU2 via interconnections with CC and Google as the last hops in those routes. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct somewhat.  LEC and Google use their own last mile systems 
to DEU1 for service provision, while CC and Google use their own last mile systems to DEU2 
for service provision. 
 
If LEC, the Public MAN, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to DEU2, they would 
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s and/or Google’s systems for 
provision to DEU2.  If CC, the Public MAN, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to DEU1, they 
would have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s and/or Google’s 
systems for provision to DEU1. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEUs, they would 
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s and/or Google’s systems for 
provision to DEU1, or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s and/or Google’s 
systems for provision to DEU2. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed 
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access, 
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is 
most likely an unfair model and cost for them. 
 
The Public MAN is technically not a true public MAN in this model as it does not own 
and operate its own last mile system, and instead it must acquire last mile access from other 
providers. 
 
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch between LEC and Google, or use both 
simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers. 
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Scenario Questions 
 
Scenario #11 
 
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario? 
 
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by multiple 
private providers including a public MAN but dominated by a monopolistic private provider, and 
where all providers can optionally access and use each other’s local market systems.  The 
monopolistic private provider is the only last mile provider.  In Part B, competitor ISP2 will then 
attempt to enter the local market.  In Part C, competitor Google will then attempt to enter the 
local and last mile markets as ISP2. 
 
 
Part A. 
 
Test 11.1. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 11.1 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream 
provider to the local market.  All of the providers are interconnected to each other, enabling a 
variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market providers, and the DEU.  
LEC’s system accesses the DEU. 
 
The DEU has chosen LEC as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but 
cannot choose CC, the Public MAN, or ISP1 without first accessing LEC since there is no direct 
access to the others available. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The interconnection of provider routers 
in the local market enabled route sharing among them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 have 
their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
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The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 are all 
providers.  However the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other 
providers’ abilities to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market to the DEU is virtually monopolized, as only LEC has its own 
connection from the local market to the DEU.  CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 either once had 
their own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own.  However the 
construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically uncompetitive as LEC appears to be 
sanctioned natural utility, and other providers are therefore unlikely or unable to enter the 
market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and infrastructure and 
service to the DEU. 
 
CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, 
and can provide their own services to the DEU via LEC. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1 
are typically for-profit corporations. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government 
enterprise and LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could 
have certain unfair advantages over them. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as LEC is the only last mile 
market provider. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market.  The provider could 
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to 
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers.  The 
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbents and 
other potential providers in the local market too. 
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All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied 
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if 
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market. 
 
However if LEC denied other providers access to its own network, it could also restrict 
last mile access to the DEU.  The other providers could use interconnections to each other but 
would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique as an effective way to control the 
market. 
 
If CC, the Public MAN, and/or ISP1 denied the other providers access to their own 
networks, the others could still provide access via interconnections to LEC.  CC, the Public 
MAN, and ISP1 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to 
control the market inconsequential. 
 
The four providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential 
competitors entering, with LEC as a monopolist and the only last mile system provider wielding 
the most power and the Public MAN potentially using certain governmental enterprise 
advantages for such control. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
> 25% < 25% < 25% < 25% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares. 
 
LEC has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
No. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
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How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system.  CC, the Public MAN, and 
ISP1 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with LEC as the last hop in those 
routes. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct no.  LEC uses its own last mile system to the DEU for service 
provision. 
 
If CC, the Public MAN, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would 
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s system for provision to the 
DEU. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s system for provision to the 
DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed 
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access, 
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is 
most likely an unfair model and cost for them. 
 
The Public MAN is technically not a true public MAN in this model as it does not own 
and operate its own last mile system, and instead it must acquire last mile access from other 
providers. 
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Part B. 
 
Test 11.2. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 11.2 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream 
provider to the local market.  All of the providers are interconnected to each other, enabling a 
variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market providers, and the DEU.  
LEC’s system accesses the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the local market.  ISP2 also interconnects with 
the other local market providers. 
 
The DEU has chosen LEC as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but 
cannot choose CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, or ISP2 without first accessing LEC since there is no 
direct access to the others available. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The interconnection of provider routers 
in the local market enabled route sharing among them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 are all 
providers.  However the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other 
providers’ abilities to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market to the DEU is virtually monopolized, as only LEC has its own 
connection from the local market to the DEU.  CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 either once 
had their own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own.  However the 
construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically uncompetitive as LEC appears to be 
sanctioned natural utility, and other providers are therefore unlikely or unable to enter the 
market. 
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Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and infrastructure and 
service to the DEU. 
 
CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own interconnections to the other 
providers, and can provide their own services to the DEU via LEC. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 are 
typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a non-
profit corporation.  ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public 
sector duplication and competition. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government 
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN 
could have certain unfair advantages over them. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as LEC is the only last mile 
market provider. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market.  The provider could 
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to 
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers.  The 
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbents and 
other potential providers in the local market too. 
 
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied 
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if 
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market. 
 
However if LEC denied other providers access to its own network, it could also restrict 
last mile access to the DEU.  The other providers could use interconnections to each other but 
would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique as an effective way to control the 
market. 
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If CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and/or ISP2 denied the other providers access to their own 
networks, the others could still provide access via interconnections to LEC.  CC, the Public 
MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an 
attempt to control the market inconsequential. 
 
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential 
competitors entering, with LEC as a monopolist and the only last mile system provider wielding 
the most power and the Public MAN potentially using certain governmental enterprise 
advantages for such control. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
> 20% < 20% < 20% < 20% < 20% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares. 
 
LEC has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU. 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the 
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s monopoly a little more difficult to 
maintain, and could further cut into CC’s, the Public MAN’s, and ISP1’s already minor market 
shares.  Likewise monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 
could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult. 
 
ISP2 does not enter the last mile market to the DEU, leaving the number of those 
providers at one.  That market’s competitiveness remains unaffected and still underserved due to 
its sole provider. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
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No. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
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How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system.  CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, 
and ISP2 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with LEC as the last hop in those 
routes. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct no.  LEC uses its own last mile system to the DEU for service 
provision. 
 
If CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and/or ISP2 chose to provide service to the DEU, they 
would have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s system for provision 
to the DEU. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s system for provision to the 
DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed 
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access, 
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is 
most likely an unfair model and cost for them. 
 
The Public MAN is technically not a true public MAN in this model as it does not own 
and operate its own last mile system, and instead it must acquire last mile access from other 
providers. 
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Part C. 
 
Repeat Part B substituting Google Fiber for ISP2. 
 
Test 11.3. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 11.3 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream 
provider to the local market.  All of the providers are interconnected to each other, enabling a 
variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market providers, and the DEU.  
LEC’s system accesses the DEU. 
 
Google then enters the local market as competitive ISP2, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU.  Google interconnects with the other 
local market providers, and also accesses the DEU. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice between LEC and Google, and has chosen LEC as its 
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose CC, the Public MAN, or 
ISP1 without first accessing LEC or Google since there is no direct access to the others available. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The interconnection of provider routers 
in the local market enabled route sharing among them.  The network cable being disconnected 
between the Google and Downstream End User router thereby interrupting the route represented 
the End User having access to Google but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and Google have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the 
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and Google are all 
providers.  The construct indicates LEC had a monopoly, whereby limiting other providers’ 
abilities to enter the local market.  However Google’s entry into the local market eliminates 
LEC’s monopoly. 
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The last mile market to the DEU was virtually monopolized, as only LEC had its own 
connection from the local market to the DEU.  However Google’s entry into the last market 
eliminates LEC’s monopoly to the DEU.  CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 either once had their 
own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own.  The construct indicates 
the last mile market was theoretically uncompetitive as LEC appeared to be the sanctioned 
natural utility, and other providers were therefore unlikely or unable to enter the market.  
However Google’s entry into the last market eliminates the natural utility. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
LEC and Google provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and 
infrastructures and services to the DEU. 
 
CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, 
and can provide their own services to the DEU via LEC and Google. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 are 
typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a non-
profit corporation. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government 
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN 
could have certain unfair advantages over them. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as LEC is the only last mile 
market provider. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market.  The provider could 
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to 
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers.  The 
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbents and 
other potential providers in the local market too.  However Google’s entry into the local market 
eliminates LEC’s monopoly and could counter any governmental advantages the Public MAN 
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may have.  Given Google’s corporate size and powers it could become a monopoly in the market 
if it so desired. 
 
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied 
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if 
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market. 
 
However if LEC and Google denied other providers access to their own networks, they 
could also restrict last mile access to the DEU.  The other providers could use interconnections to 
each other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique as an effective way 
to control the market. 
 
If CC, the Public MAN, and/or ISP1 denied the other providers access to their own 
networks, the others could still provide access via interconnections to LEC and Google.  CC, the 
Public MAN, and ISP1 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an 
attempt to control the market inconsequential. 
 
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential 
competitors entering, with LEC and Google as the only last mile system providers wielding the 
most power and the Public MAN potentially using certain governmental enterprise advantages 
for such control. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 Google 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range to the DEU is: 
 
LEC Google 
100% 0% 
0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding Google make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding Google 
affect the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
Google’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the 
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers. 
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Google’s presence in the local market eliminates LEC’s monopoly, and could further cut 
into CC’s, the Public MAN’s, and/or ISP1’s already minor market shares.  Efforts by former 
monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC, Public MAN, and ISP1 to prevent Google from 
establishing a monopoly in the market if it so desired would be quite difficult for them. 
 
Google’s entry in the last mile market to the DEU increases the number of providers by 
100% making that market more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low 
number of total providers. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The Google and Downstream End User routers do not directly recognize each other not 
only because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
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How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
LEC and Google accesses the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.  CC, the 
Public MAN, and ISP1 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with LEC and Google 
as the last hops in those routes. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct somewhat.  LEC and Google use their own last mile systems 
to the DEU for service provision. 
 
If CC, the Public MAN, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would 
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s and/or Google’s systems for 
provision to the DEU. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s and/or Google’s systems for 
provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed 
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access, 
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is 
most likely an unfair model and cost for them. 
 
The Public MAN is technically not a true public MAN in this model as it does not own 
and operate its own last mile system, and instead it must acquire last mile access from other 
providers. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch between LEC and Google, or use 
both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers. 
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Scenario Questions 
 
Scenario #12 
 
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario? 
 
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by multiple 
private providers including a public MAN but dominated by the monopolistic public MAN, and 
where all providers can optionally access and use each other’s local market systems.  The 
monopolistic public MAN is the only last mile provider.  In Part B, competitor ISP2 will then 
attempt to enter the local market.  In Part C, competitor Google will then attempt to enter the 
local and last mile markets as ISP2. 
 
 
Part A. 
 
Test 12.1. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 12.1 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream 
provider to the local market.  All of the providers are interconnected to each other, enabling a 
variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market providers, and the DEU.  The 
Public MAN’s system accesses the DEU. 
 
The DEU has chosen the Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile 
markets, but cannot choose LEC, CC, or ISP1 without first accessing the Public MAN since 
there is no direct access to the others available. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The interconnection of provider routers 
in the local market enabled route sharing among them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 have 
their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
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The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 are all 
providers.  However the construct indicates the Public MAN has a monopoly, whereby limiting 
other providers’ abilities to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market to the DEU is virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN has 
its own connection from the local market to the DEU.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 either once had their 
own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own.  However the construct 
indicates the last mile market is theoretically uncompetitive as LEC appears to be sanctioned 
natural utility, and other providers are therefore unlikely or unable to enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
The Public MAN provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and 
infrastructure and service to the DEU. 
 
LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and can 
provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1 
are typically for-profit corporations. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government 
enterprise and LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could 
have certain unfair advantages over them. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the 
only last mile market provider. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates the Public MAN has a monopoly in the local market.  The 
provider could possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service 
under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive 
providers.  It could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbents and 
other potential providers in the local market too. 
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All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied 
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if 
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market. 
 
However if the Public MAN denied other providers access to its own network, it could 
also restrict last mile access to the DEU.  The other providers could use interconnections to each 
other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique as an effective way to 
control the market. 
 
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 denied the other providers access to their own networks, the 
others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 
lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control the 
market inconsequential. 
 
The four providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential 
competitors entering, with the Public MAN as a monopolist and the only last mile system 
provider wielding the most power and potentially using certain governmental enterprise 
advantages for such control. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 
0% 0% 100% 0% 
< 25% < 25% > 25% < 25% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares. 
 
The Public MAN has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
No. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
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How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
The Public MAN accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system.  LEC, CC, and 
ISP1 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN as the last hop in 
those routes. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct no.  The Public MAN uses its own last mile system to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to 
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for provision to 
the DEU. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for 
provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed 
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access, 
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is 
most likely an unfair model and cost for them. 
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Part B. 
 
Test 12.2. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 12.2 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream 
provider to the local market.  All of the providers are interconnected to each other, enabling a 
variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market providers, and the DEU.  The 
Public MAN’s system accesses the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the local market.  ISP2 also interconnects with 
the other local market providers. 
 
The DEU has chosen the Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile 
markets, but cannot choose LEC, CC, ISP1, or ISP2 without first accessing the Public MAN 
since there is no direct access to the others available. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The interconnection of provider routers 
in the local market enabled route sharing among them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all 
providers.  However the construct indicates the Public MAN has a monopoly, whereby limiting 
other providers’ abilities to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market to the DEU is virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN has 
its own connection from the local market to the DEU.  LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 either once had 
their own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own.  However the 
construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically uncompetitive as the Public MAN 
appears to be sanctioned natural utility, and other providers are therefore unlikely or unable to 
enter the market. 
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Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
The Public MAN provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and 
infrastructure and service to the DEU. 
 
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and 
can provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 are 
typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a non-
profit corporation.  ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public 
sector duplication and competition. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government 
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN 
could have certain unfair advantages over them. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the 
only last mile market provider. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates the Public MAN has a monopoly in the local market.  The 
provider could possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service 
under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive 
providers.  It could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbents and 
other potential providers in the local market too. 
 
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied 
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if 
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market. 
 
However if the Public MAN denied other providers access to its own network, it could 
also restrict last mile access to the DEU.  The other providers could use interconnections to each 
other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique as an effective way to 
control the market. 
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If LEC, CC, ISP1, and/or ISP2 denied the other providers access to their own networks, 
the others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN.  LEC, CC, ISP1, 
and ISP2 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control 
the market inconsequential. 
 
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential 
competitors entering, with the Public MAN as a monopolist and the only last mile system 
provider wielding the most power and potentially using certain governmental enterprise 
advantages for such control. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
< 20% < 20% > 20% < 20% < 20% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares. 
 
The Public MAN has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU. 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the 
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make the Public MAN’s monopoly a little more 
difficult to maintain, and could further cut into LEC’s CC’s, and ISP1’s already minor market 
shares.  Likewise the monopolist Public MAN and incumbent providers LEC, CC, and ISP1 
could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult. 
 
ISP2 does not enter the last mile market to the DEU, leaving the number of those 
providers at one.  That market’s competitiveness remains unaffected and still underserved due to 
its sole provider. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
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No. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
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How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
The Public MAN accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system.  LEC, CC, 
ISP1, and ISP2 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN as the 
last hop in those routes. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct no.  The Public MAN uses its own last mile system to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If LEC, CC, ISP1, and/or ISP2 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to 
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for provision to 
the DEU. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for 
provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed 
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access, 
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is 
most likely an unfair model and cost for them. 
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Part C. 
 
Repeat Part B substituting Google Fiber for ISP2. 
 
Test 12.3. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 12.3 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream 
provider to the local market.  All of the providers are interconnected to each other, enabling a 
variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market providers, and the DEU.  The 
Public MAN’s system accesses the DEU. 
 
Google then enters the local market as competitive ISP2, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU.  Google interconnects with the other 
local market providers, and also accesses the DEU. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice between the Public MAN and Google, and has chosen the 
Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose LEC, 
CC, or ISP1 without first accessing the Public MAN or Google since there is no direct access to 
the others available. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The interconnection of provider routers 
in the local market enabled route sharing among them.  The network cable being disconnected 
between the Google and Downstream End User router thereby interrupting the route represented 
the End User having access to Google but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and Google have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the 
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers are likewise able to 
enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and Google are all 
providers.  The construct indicates the Public MAN had a monopoly, whereby limiting other 
providers’ abilities to enter the local market.  However Google’s entry into the local market 
eliminates the Public MAN’s monopoly. 
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The last mile market to the DEU was virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN had 
its own connection from the local market to the DEU.  However Google’s entry into the last 
market eliminates the Public MAN’s monopoly to the DEU.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 either once had 
their own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own.  The construct 
indicates the last mile market was theoretically uncompetitive as the Public MAN appeared to be 
the sanctioned natural utility, and other providers were therefore unlikely or unable to enter the 
market.  However Google’s entry into the last market eliminates the natural utility. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
The Public MAN and Google provide their own interconnections to the other providers, 
and infrastructures and services to the DEU. 
 
LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and can 
provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN and Google. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 are 
typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a non-
profit corporation. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government 
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN 
could have certain unfair advantages over them. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the 
only last mile market provider. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates the Public MAN has a monopoly in the local market.  The 
provider could possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service 
under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive 
providers.  It could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbents and 
other potential providers in the local market too.  However Google’s entry into the local market 
eliminates the Public MAN’s monopoly and could counter any governmental advantages the 
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Public MAN may have.  Given Google’s corporate size and powers it could become a monopoly 
in the market if it so desired. 
 
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied 
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if 
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market. 
 
However if the Public MAN and Google denied other providers access to their own 
networks, they could also restrict last mile access to the DEU.  The other providers could use 
interconnections to each other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique 
as an effective way to control the market. 
 
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 denied the other providers access to their own networks, the 
others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN and Google.  LEC, CC, 
and ISP1 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control 
the market inconsequential. 
 
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential 
competitors entering, with the Public MAN and Google as the only last mile system providers 
wielding the most power and potentially using certain governmental enterprise advantages for 
such control. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 Google 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range to the DEU is: 
 
MAN Google 
100% 0% 
0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding Google make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding Google 
affect the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
Google’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the 
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers. 
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Google’s presence in the local market eliminates the Public MAN’s monopoly, and could 
further cut into LEC’s CC’s, and/or ISP1’s already minor market shares.  Efforts by former 
monopolist Public MAN and incumbent providers LEC, CC, and ISP1 to prevent Google from 
establishing a monopoly in the market if it so desired would be quite difficult for them. 
 
Google’s entry in the last mile market to the DEU increases the number of providers by 
100% making that market more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low 
number of total providers. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The Google and Downstream End User routers do not directly recognize each other not 
only because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
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How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
The Public MAN and Google access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.  
LEC, CC, and ISP1 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN 
and Google as the last hops in those routes. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct somewhat.  The Public MAN and Google use their own last 
mile systems to the DEU for service provision. 
 
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to 
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or Google’s systems 
for provision to the DEU. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or Google’s 
systems for provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed 
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access, 
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is 
most likely an unfair model and cost for them. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch between the Public MAN and 
Google, or use both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers. 
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Scenario Questions 
 
Scenario #13 
 
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario? 
 
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by only a public 
MAN.  The public MAN is the sole last mile system provider but does not provide upstream 
carriage service.  In Part B, competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as Google) will 
then attempt to enter the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Part A. 
 
Test 13.1. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 13.1 is attempting to emulate a local market “under-served” by the only incumbent 
Public MAN that provides its own system and carriage service to the DEU, but not to the 
upstream provider.  The DEU has selected the Public MAN as its upstream provider, although it 
is the only provider available to choose from participating in the local and last mile markets, and 
it cannot access any other networks further upstream directly from the Public MAN. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is unserved and not competitive, as the construct indicates no 
providers have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Public MAN 
either once had a connection to the Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one.  The Tier I ISP 
either once participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  The 
Tier I ISP, the Public MAN, and/or other third parties may have a virtual monopoly upon the 
middle mile ROW and/or infrastructure artificially restricting the market from being served.  
However the construct indicates the Public MAN does not have an actual monopoly, and other 
providers may therefore be able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is virtually monopolized, as the Public MAN is the only provider.  
However the construct indicates the Public MAN does not have an actual monopoly, and other 
providers are therefore able to enter the local market. 
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The last mile market is virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN has its own 
connection from the local market to the DEU.  However the construct indicates the last mile 
market is theoretically competitive as the Public MAN is not a sanctioned natural utility, and 
other providers are therefore able to enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
The Public MAN provides both infrastructure and service to the DEU. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Not applicable, as the Public MAN is the only local and last mile market provider. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates the Public MAN does not have an actual monopoly, but the 
Public MAN could potentially control the local and last mile markets since it is the only current 
provider in both markets thereby giving it de facto control over them.  The Public MAN cannot 
discriminate against other providers until there actually are other providers in the two markets.  
However the Public MAN could announce discriminatory policies as a barrier towards potential 
competitors including network access restrictions, monopoly service under-pricing in the 
particular local market, certain governmental enterprise advantages, etc. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The Public MAN has a 100% share of both the local and last mile market. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The Tier I and Public MAN routers do not recognize each other not only because of the 
disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
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Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
The Public MAN accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as the Public MAN uses its own last mile system to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
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Part B. 
 
Test 13.2. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 13.2 is attempting to emulate a local market “under-served” by the only incumbent 
Public MAN.  The Public MAN provides its own system and carriage service to the DEU, but 
not to the upstream provider. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU.  ISP2 also interconnects with the 
Public MAN. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice between the two providers and has chosen to retain the 
Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot access any 
other networks further upstream directly from the Public MAN, and must access ISP2 for further 
upstream connectivity. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The interconnection of provider routers 
in the local market enabled route sharing among them.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the route represented 
the End User having access to ISP2 but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is virtually monopolized, as only ISP2 has its own connection 
from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Public MAN either once had a connection to the 
Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the 
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  However the construct indicates 
neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 have an actual duopoly, and other providers are therefore able 
to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is virtually duopolized, as the Public MAN and ISP2 are the only 
providers.  However the construct indicates neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 have an actual 
duopoly, and other providers are therefore able to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is virtually duopolized, as only the Public MAN and ISP2 have their 
own connections from the local market to the DEU.  However the construct indicates the last 
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mile market is theoretically competitive as neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 are sanctioned 
natural utilities, and other providers are therefore able to enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
The Public MAN and ISP2 provide their own interconnections to each other, and 
infrastructures and services to the DEU. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  ISP2 is typically a for-
profit corporation, but could be a non-profit corporation.  ISP2 is likely not another government 
enterprise to avoid unnecessary public sector duplication and competition. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and ISP2 is 
typically a for-profit corporation, the Public MAN could have certain unfair advantages in both 
markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 currently have actual 
monopolies nor a duopoly in the local and last mile markets.  One of the providers could possibly 
try to control the local market, or both providers could possibly try to jointly control the local 
market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users 
than the other provider or potential competitive providers respectively.  The Public MAN could 
use certain governmental enterprise advantages against ISP2 and other potential providers in the 
local market too. 
 
Both of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider 
denied others access to its own network, the other could still provide access via its 
interconnection if necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the 
market. 
 
Since both the Public MAN and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, neither 
provider could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the other from accessing 
end users.  Both could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market 
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
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What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
MAN ISP2 
100% 0% 
0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
 
MAN ISP2 
100% 0% 
0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 
100% making those markets more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low 
number of total providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the Public MAN to establish a 
monopoly in them more difficult.  Likewise the Public MAN makes any effort by ISP2 to 
establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The ISP2 and Downstream End User routers do not directly recognize each other not only 
because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Public MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
 
How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
Both the Public MAN and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as both the Public MAN and ISP2 use their own last mile 
systems and interconnect with each others’ systems for access to the DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch between the Public MAN and ISP2 
or use both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers. 
 
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed 
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access, 
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is 
most likely an unfair model and cost for them. 
 
The Public MAN is an intermediary hop since the DEU choose it as its upstream 
provider, though the Public MAN must use the shared interconnection with ISP2 for its direct 
connection further upstream to Tier I ISP. 
 
 
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models. 
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Test 13.3. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 13.3 is attempting to emulate a local market “under-served” by the only incumbent 
Public MAN.  The Public MAN provides its own system and carriage service to the DEU, but 
not to the upstream provider. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU.  ISP2 also interconnects with the 
Public MAN. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice between the two providers and has chosen ISP2 as its 
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The interconnection of provider routers 
in the local market enabled route sharing among them.  The network cables being disconnected 
between the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the route 
represented the End User having access to the Public MAN but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is virtually monopolized, as only ISP2 has its own connection 
from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Public MAN either once had a connection to the 
Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one.  The Tier I ISP either once participated in the 
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  However the construct indicates 
neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 have an actual duopoly, and other providers are therefore able 
to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is virtually duopolized, as the Public MAN and ISP2 are the only 
providers.  However the construct indicates neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 have an actual 
duopoly, and other providers are therefore able to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market is virtually duopolized, as only the Public MAN and ISP2 have their 
own connections from the local market to the DEU.  However the construct indicates the last 
mile market is theoretically competitive as neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 are sanctioned 
natural utilities, and other providers are therefore able to enter the market. 
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Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
The Public MAN and ISP2 provide their own interconnections to each other, and 
infrastructures and services to the DEU. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  ISP2 is typically a for-
profit corporation, but could be a non-profit corporation.  ISP2 is likely not another government 
enterprise to avoid unnecessary public sector duplication and competition. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and ISP2 is 
typically a for-profit corporation, the Public MAN could have certain unfair advantages in both 
markets. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 currently have actual 
monopolies nor a duopoly in the local and last mile markets.  One of the providers could possibly 
try to control the local market, or both providers could possibly try to jointly control the local 
market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users 
than the other provider or potential competitive providers respectively.  The Public MAN could 
use certain governmental enterprise advantages against ISP2 and other potential providers in the 
local market too. 
 
Both of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider 
denied others access to its own network, the other could still provide access via its 
interconnection if necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the 
market. 
 
Since both the Public MAN and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, neither 
provider could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the other from accessing 
end users.  Both could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market 
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
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MAN ISP2 
100% 0% 
0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range is: 
 
MAN ISP2 
100% 0% 
0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 
100% making those markets more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low 
number of total providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the Public MAN to establish a 
monopoly in them more difficult.  Likewise the Public MAN makes any effort by ISP2 to 
establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The Public MAN and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only 
because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public 
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Public MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
 
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router-
Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation. 
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How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
Both the Public MAN and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct yes, as both the Public MAN and ISP2 use their own last mile 
systems and interconnect with each others’ systems for access to the DEU for service provision. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted 
adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch between the Public MAN and ISP2 
or use both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers. 
 
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed 
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access, 
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is 
most likely an unfair model and cost for them. 
 
The Public MAN is eliminated as an intermediary hop with the DEU choosing ISP2 as its 
upstream provider with its direct connection to Tier I ISP. 
 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 631 
Scenario Questions 
 
Scenario #14 
 
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario? 
 
 
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by multiple 
private providers including a public MAN, where the Public MAN is the sole last mile system 
provider but does not provide upstream carriage service.  All providers can optionally access and 
use each other’s local market systems.  In Part B, competitor ISP2 will then attempt to enter the 
local market.  In Part C, competitor Google will then attempt to enter the local and last mile 
markets as ISP2. 
 
 
Part A. 
 
Test 14.1. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 14.1 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own systems and carriage services between the 
upstream provider to the local market.  The Public MAN provides its own system and carriage 
service to the DEU, but not to the upstream provider.  All of the providers are interconnected to 
each other, enabling a variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market 
providers, and the DEU. 
 
The DEU has chosen the Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile 
markets, but cannot choose LEC, CC, or ISP1 without first accessing the Public MAN since 
there is no direct access to the others available. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The interconnection of provider routers 
in the local market enabled route sharing among them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and ISP1 have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Public MAN either once had a 
connection to the Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one.  The Tier I ISP either once 
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participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 are all 
providers.  Other providers are likewise able to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market to the DEU is virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN has 
its own connection from the local market to the DEU.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 either once had their 
own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own.  However the construct 
indicates the last mile market is theoretically uncompetitive as the Public MAN appears to be 
sanctioned natural utility, and other providers are therefore unlikely or unable to enter the 
market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
The Public MAN provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and 
infrastructure and service to the DEU. 
 
LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and can 
provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1 
are typically for-profit corporations. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government 
enterprise and LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could 
have certain unfair advantages over them. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the 
only last mile market provider. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a 
duopoly in the local and last mile markets.  One of the providers could possibly try to control the 
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for 
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instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other 
providers or potential competitive providers respectively.  The Public MAN could use certain 
governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and other potential providers in the 
local market too. 
 
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied 
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if 
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market. 
 
However if the Public MAN denied other providers access to its own network, it could 
also restrict last mile access to the DEU.  The other providers could use interconnections to each 
other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique as an effective way to 
control the market. 
 
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 denied the other providers access to their own networks, the 
others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 
lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control the 
market inconsequential. 
 
The four providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential 
competitors entering, with the Public MAN as the only last mile system provider wielding the 
most power and potentially using certain governmental enterprise advantages for such control. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the market does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
The Public MAN has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
No. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
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How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
The Public MAN accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system.  LEC, CC, and 
ISP1 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN as the last hop in 
those routes. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct no.  The Public MAN uses its own last mile system to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to 
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for provision to 
the DEU. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for 
provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed 
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access, 
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is 
most likely an unfair model and cost for them. 
 
The Public MAN could opt out of competitive service provision in the local market, and 
act solely as a common provider in the last mile.  Thus no other local market provider would 
have to provide their own last mile system. 
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Part B. 
 
Test 14.2. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 14.2 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own systems and carriage services between the 
upstream provider to the local market.  The Public MAN provides its own system and carriage 
service to the DEU, but not to the upstream provider.  All of the providers are interconnected to 
each other, enabling a variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market 
providers, and the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the local market.  ISP2 also interconnects with 
the other local market providers. 
 
The DEU has chosen the Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile 
markets, but cannot choose LEC, CC, ISP1, or ISP2 without first accessing the Public MAN 
since there is no direct access to the others available. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The interconnection of provider routers 
in the local market enabled route sharing among them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Public MAN either once had a 
connection to the Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all 
providers.  Other providers are likewise able to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market to the DEU is virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN has 
its own connection from the local market to the DEU.  LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 either once had 
their own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own.  However the 
construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically uncompetitive as the Public MAN 
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appears to be sanctioned natural utility, and other providers are therefore unlikely or unable to 
enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
The Public MAN provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and 
infrastructure and service to the DEU. 
 
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and 
can provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 are 
typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a non-
profit corporation.  ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public 
sector duplication and competition. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government 
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN 
could have certain unfair advantages over them. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the 
only last mile market provider. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a 
duopoly in the local and last mile markets.  One of the providers could possibly try to control the 
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for 
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other 
providers or potential competitive providers respectively.  The Public MAN could use certain 
governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and other potential providers in the 
local market too. 
 
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied 
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if 
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market. 
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However if the Public MAN denied other providers access to its own network, it could 
also restrict last mile access to the DEU.  The other providers could use interconnections to each 
other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique as an effective way to 
control the market. 
 
If LEC, CC, ISP1, and/or ISP2 denied the other providers access to their own networks, 
the others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN.  LEC, CC, ISP1, 
and ISP2 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control 
the market inconsequential. 
 
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential 
competitors entering, with the Public MAN as the only last mile system provider wielding the 
most power and potentially using certain governmental enterprise advantages for such control. 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
The Public MAN has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU. 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the 
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers. 
 
ISP2 does not enter the last mile market to the DEU, leaving the number of those 
providers at one.  That market’s competitiveness remains unaffected and still underserved due to 
its sole provider. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
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No. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
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How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
The Public MAN accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system.  LEC, CC, 
ISP1, and ISP2 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN as the 
last hop in those routes. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct no.  The Public MAN uses its own last mile system to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If LEC, CC, ISP1, and/or ISP2 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to 
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for provision to 
the DEU. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for 
provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed 
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access, 
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is 
most likely an unfair model and cost for them. 
 
The Public MAN could opt out of competitive service provision in the local market, and 
act solely as a common provider in the last mile.  Thus no other local market provider would 
have to provide their own last mile system. 
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Part C. 
 
Repeat Part B substituting Google Fiber for ISP2. 
 
Test 14.3. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 14.3 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own systems and carriage services between the 
upstream provider to the local market.  The Public MAN provides its own system and carriage 
service to the DEU, but not to the upstream provider.  All of the providers are interconnected to 
each other, enabling a variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market 
providers, and the DEU. 
 
Google then enters the local market as competitive ISP2, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU.  Google interconnects with the other 
local market providers, and also accesses the DEU. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice between the Public MAN and Google, and has chosen the 
Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose LEC, 
CC, or ISP1 without first accessing the Public MAN or Google since there is no direct access to 
the others available. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The interconnection of provider routers 
in the local market enabled route sharing among them.  The network cable being disconnected 
between the Google and Downstream End User router thereby interrupting the route represented 
the End User having access to Google but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1, and Google have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Public MAN either once had a 
connection to the Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and Google are all 
providers.  Other providers are likewise able to enter the local market. 
 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 645 
The last mile market to the DEU was virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN had 
its own connection from the local market to the DEU.  However Google’s entry into the last 
market eliminates the Public MAN’s monopoly to the DEU.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 either once had 
their own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own.  The construct 
indicates the last mile market was theoretically uncompetitive as the Public MAN appeared to be 
the sanctioned natural utility, and other providers were therefore unlikely or unable to enter the 
market.  However Google’s entry into the last market eliminates the natural utility. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
The Public MAN and Google provide their own interconnections to the other providers, 
and infrastructures and services to the DEU. 
 
LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and can 
provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN and Google. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 are 
typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a non-
profit corporation. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government 
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN 
could have certain unfair advantages over them. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the 
only last mile market provider. 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a 
duopoly in the local and last mile markets.  One of the providers could possibly try to control the 
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for 
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other 
providers or potential competitive providers respectively.  The Public MAN could use certain 
governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and other potential providers in the 
local market too.  However Google’s entry into the local market could counter any governmental 
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advantages the Public MAN may have.  Given Google’s corporate size and powers it could 
become a monopoly in the market if it so desired. 
 
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied 
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if 
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market. 
 
However if the Public MAN and Google denied other providers access to their own 
networks, they could also restrict last mile access to the DEU.  The other providers could use 
interconnections to each other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique 
as an effective way to control the market. 
 
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 denied the other providers access to their own networks, the 
others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN and Google.  LEC, CC, 
and ISP1 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control 
the market inconsequential. 
 
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential 
competitors entering, with the Public MAN and Google as the only last mile system providers 
wielding the most power and potentially using certain governmental enterprise advantages for 
such control. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 Google 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range to the DEU is: 
 
MAN Google 
100% 0% 
0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding Google make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding Google 
affect the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
Google’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the 
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers. 
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Efforts by incumbent providers LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 to prevent Google 
from establishing a monopoly in the market if it so desired would be quite difficult for them. 
 
Google’s entry in the last mile market to the DEU increases the number of providers by 
100% making that market more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low 
number of total providers. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The Google and Downstream End User routers do not directly recognize each other not 
only because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
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How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
The Public MAN and Google access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.  
LEC, CC, and ISP1 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN 
and Google as the last hops in those routes. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct somewhat.  The Public MAN and Google use their own last 
mile systems to the DEU for service provision. 
 
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to 
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or Google’s systems 
for provision to the DEU. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or Google’s 
systems for provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed 
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access, 
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is 
most likely an unfair model and cost for them. 
 
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch between the Public MAN and Google, 
or use both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers. 
 
The Public MAN could opt out of competitive service provision in the local market, and 
act solely as a common provider in the last mile.  Thus no other local market provider would 
have to provide their own last mile system. 
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Scenario Questions 
 
Scenario #15 
 
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario? 
 
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by multiple 
private providers including a public MAN that is dominated by two private duopolistic providers.  
The Public MAN is the sole last mile system provider but does not provide upstream carriage 
service.  All providers can optionally access and use each other’s local market systems.  In Part 
B, competitor ISP2 will then attempt to enter the local market.  In Part C, competitor Google will 
then attempt to enter the local and last mile markets as ISP2. 
 
 
Part A. 
 
Test 15.1. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 15.1 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own systems and carriage services between the 
upstream provider to the local market.  The Public MAN provides its own system and carriage 
service to the DEU, but not to the upstream provider.  All of the providers are interconnected to 
each other, enabling a variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market 
providers, and the DEU. 
 
The DEU has chosen the Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile 
markets, but cannot choose LEC, CC, or ISP1 without first accessing the Public MAN since 
there is no direct access to the others available. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The interconnection of provider routers 
in the local market enabled route sharing among them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and ISP1 have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Public MAN either once had a 
connection to the Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one.  The Tier I ISP either once 
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participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 are all 
providers.  However the construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly, whereby limiting other 
providers’ abilities to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market to the DEU is virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN has 
its own connection from the local market to the DEU.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 either once had their 
own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own.  However the construct 
indicates the last mile market is theoretically uncompetitive as the Public MAN appears to be 
sanctioned natural utility, and other providers are therefore unlikely or unable to enter the 
market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
The Public MAN provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and 
infrastructure and service to the DEU. 
 
LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and can 
provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1 
are typically for-profit corporations. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government 
enterprise and LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could 
have certain unfair advantages over them. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the 
only last mile market provider. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market.  The two 
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly 
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service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential 
competitive providers.  The Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages 
against the incumbent and other potential providers in the local market too. 
 
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied 
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if 
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market. 
 
However if the Public MAN denied other providers access to its own network, it could 
also restrict last mile access to the DEU.  The other providers could use interconnections to each 
other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique as an effective way to 
control the market. 
 
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 denied the other providers access to their own networks, the 
others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 
lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control the 
market inconsequential. 
 
The four providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential 
competitors entering, with LEC and CC as duopolists and the Public MAN as the only last mile 
system provider wielding the most power, and the Public MAN potentially using certain 
governmental enterprise advantages for such control. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 
50% 50% 0% 0% 
> 25% > 25% < 25% < 25% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the duopoly providers’ market shares. 
 
The Public MAN has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
No. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
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How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
The Public MAN accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system.  LEC, CC, and 
ISP1 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN as the last hop in 
those routes. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct no.  The Public MAN uses its own last mile system to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to 
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for provision to 
the DEU. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for 
provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed 
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access, 
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is 
most likely an unfair model and cost for them. 
 
The Public MAN could opt out of competitive service provision in the local market, and 
act solely as a common provider in the last mile.  Thus no other local market provider would 
have to provide their own last mile system. 
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Part B. 
 
Test 15.2. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 15.2 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own systems and carriage services between the 
upstream provider to the local market.  The Public MAN provides its own system and carriage 
service to the DEU, but not to the upstream provider.  All of the providers are interconnected to 
each other, enabling a variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market 
providers, and the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the local market.  ISP2 also interconnects with 
the other local market providers. 
 
The DEU has chosen the Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile 
markets, but cannot choose LEC, CC, ISP1, or ISP2 without first accessing the Public MAN 
since there is no direct access to the others available. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The interconnection of provider routers 
in the local market enabled route sharing among them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Public MAN either once had a 
connection to the Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all 
providers.  However the construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly, whereby limiting other 
providers’ abilities to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market to the DEU is virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN has 
its own connection from the local market to the DEU.  LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 either once had 
their own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own.  However the 
construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically uncompetitive as the Public MAN 
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appears to be sanctioned natural utility, and other providers are therefore unlikely or unable to 
enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
The Public MAN provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and 
infrastructure and service to the DEU. 
 
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and 
can provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 are 
typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a non-
profit corporation.  ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public 
sector duplication and competition. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government 
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN 
could have certain unfair advantages over them. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the 
only last mile market provider. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market.  The two 
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly 
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential 
competitive providers.  The Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages 
against the incumbent and other potential providers in the local market too. 
 
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied 
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if 
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market. 
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However if the Public MAN denied other providers access to its own network, it could 
also restrict last mile access to the DEU.  The other providers could use interconnections to each 
other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique as an effective way to 
control the market. 
 
If LEC, CC, ISP1, and/or ISP2 denied the other providers access to their own networks, 
the others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN.  LEC, CC, ISP1, 
and ISP2 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control 
the market inconsequential. 
 
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential 
competitors entering, with LEC and CC as duopolists and the Public MAN as the only last mile 
system provider wielding the most power, and the Public MAN potentially using certain 
governmental enterprise advantages for such control. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
50% 50% 0% 0% 0% 
> 20% > 20% < 20% < 20% < 20% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the duopoly providers’ market shares. 
 
The Public MAN has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU. 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the 
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s and CC’s duopoly a little more 
difficult to maintain, and could further cut into the Public MAN’s and ISP1’s already minor 
market shares.  Likewise duopolists LEC and CC and incumbent providers Public MAN and 
ISP1 could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult. 
 
ISP2 does not enter the last mile market to DEU1, leaving the number of those providers 
at one.  That market’s competitiveness remains unaffected and still underserved due to its sole 
provider. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
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No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
No. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
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How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
The Public MAN accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system.  LEC, CC, 
ISP1, and ISP2 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN as the 
last hop in those routes. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct no.  The Public MAN uses its own last mile system to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If LEC, CC, ISP1, and/or ISP2 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to 
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for provision to 
the DEU. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for 
provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed 
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access, 
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is 
most likely an unfair model and cost for them. 
 
The Public MAN could opt out of competitive service provision in the local market, and 
act solely as a common provider in the last mile.  Thus no other local market provider would 
have to provide their own last mile system. 
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Part C. 
 
Repeat Part B substituting Google Fiber for ISP2. 
 
Test 15.3. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 15.3 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own systems and carriage services between the 
upstream provider to the local market.  The Public MAN provides its own system and carriage 
service to the DEU, but not to the upstream provider.  All of the providers are interconnected to 
each other, enabling a variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market 
providers, and the DEU. 
 
Google then enters the local market as competitive ISP2, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU.  Google interconnects with the other 
local market providers, and also accesses the DEU. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice between the Public MAN and Google, and has chosen the 
Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose LEC, 
CC, or ISP1 without first accessing the Public MAN or Google since there is no direct access to 
the others available. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The interconnection of provider routers 
in the local market enabled route sharing among them.  The network cable being disconnected 
between the Google and Downstream End User router thereby interrupting the route represented 
the End User having access to Google but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1, and Google have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Public MAN either once had a 
connection to the Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and Google are all 
providers.  The construct indicates LEC and CC had a duopoly, whereby limiting other 
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providers’ abilities to enter the local market.  However Google’s entry into the local market 
eliminates LEC’s and CC’s duopoly. 
 
The last mile market to the DEU was virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN had 
its own connection from the local market to the DEU.  However Google’s entry into the last 
market eliminates the Public MAN’s monopoly to the DEU.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 either once had 
their own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own.  The construct 
indicates the last mile market was theoretically uncompetitive as the Public MAN appeared to be 
the sanctioned natural utility, and other providers were therefore unlikely or unable to enter the 
market.  However Google’s entry into the last market eliminates the natural utility. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
The Public MAN and Google provide their own interconnections to the other providers, 
and infrastructures and services to the DEU. 
 
LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and can 
provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN and Google. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 are 
typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a non-
profit corporation. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government 
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN 
could have certain unfair advantages over them. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the 
only last mile market provider. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market.  The two 
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly 
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential 
competitive providers.  The Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 669 
against the incumbent and other potential providers in the local market too.  However Google’s 
entry into the local market eliminates LEC’s and CC’s duopoly and could counter any 
governmental advantages the Public MAN may have.  Given Google’s corporate size and powers 
it could become a monopoly in the market if it so desired. 
 
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied 
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if 
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market. 
 
However if the Public MAN and Google denied other providers access to their own 
networks, they could also restrict last mile access to the DEU.  The other providers could use 
interconnections to each other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique 
as an effective way to control the market. 
 
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 denied the other providers access to their own networks, the 
others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN and Google.  LEC, CC, 
and ISP1 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control 
the market inconsequential. 
 
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential 
competitors entering, with LEC and CC as duopolists and the Public MAN and Google as the 
only last mile system providers wielding the most power, and the Public MAN potentially using 
certain governmental enterprise advantages for such control. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 Google 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range to the DEU is: 
 
MAN Google 
100% 0% 
0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding Google make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding Google 
affect the conditions governing each scenario? 
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Google’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the 
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers. 
 
Google’s presence in the local market eliminates LEC’s and CC’s duopoly, and could 
further cut into the Public MAN’s and/or ISP1’s already minor market shares.  Efforts by former 
duopolists LEC and CC and incumbent providers Public MAN and ISP1 to prevent Google from 
establishing a monopoly in the market if it so desired would be quite difficult for them. 
 
Google’s entry in the last mile market to the DEU increases the number of providers by 
100% making that market more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low 
number of total providers. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The Google and Downstream End User routers do not directly recognize each other not 
only because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
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How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
The Public MAN and Google access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.  
LEC, CC, and ISP1 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN 
and Google as the last hops in those routes. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct somewhat.  The Public MAN and Google use their own last 
mile systems to the DEU for service provision. 
 
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP2 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to 
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or Google’s systems 
for provision to the DEU. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or Google’s 
systems for provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed 
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access, 
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is 
most likely an unfair model and cost for them. 
 
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch between the Public MAN and Google, 
or use both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers. 
 
The Public MAN could opt out of competitive service provision in the local market, and 
act solely as a common provider in the last mile.  Thus no other local market provider would 
have to provide their own last mile system. 
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Scenario Questions 
 
Scenario #16 
 
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario? 
 
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by multiple 
private providers including a public MAN that is dominated by a private monopolistic provider.  
The Public MAN is the sole last mile system provider but does not provide upstream carriage 
service.  All providers can optionally access and use each other’s local market systems.  In Part 
B, competitor ISP2 will then attempt to enter the local market.  In Part C, competitor Google will 
then attempt to enter the local and last mile markets as ISP2. 
 
 
Part A. 
 
Test 16.1. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 16.1 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own systems and carriage services between the 
upstream provider to the local market.  The Public MAN provides its own system and carriage 
service to the DEU, but not to the upstream provider.  All of the providers are interconnected to 
each other, enabling a variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market 
providers, and the DEU. 
 
The DEU has chosen the Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile 
markets, but cannot choose LEC, CC, or ISP1 without first accessing the Public MAN since 
there is no direct access to the others available. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The interconnection of provider routers 
in the local market enabled route sharing among them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and ISP1 have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Public MAN either once had a 
connection to the Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one.  The Tier I ISP either once 
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participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 are all 
providers.  However the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other 
providers’ abilities to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market to the DEU is virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN has 
its own connection from the local market to the DEU.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 either once had their 
own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own.  However the construct 
indicates the last mile market is theoretically uncompetitive as the Public MAN appears to be 
sanctioned natural utility, and other providers are therefore unlikely or unable to enter the 
market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
The Public MAN provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and 
infrastructure and service to the DEU. 
 
LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and can 
provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1 
are typically for-profit corporations. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government 
enterprise and LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could 
have certain unfair advantages over them. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the 
only last mile market provider. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market.  The provider could 
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to 
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gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers.  The 
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and 
other potential providers in the local market too. 
 
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied 
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if 
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market. 
 
However if the Public MAN denied other providers access to its own network, it could 
also restrict last mile access to the DEU.  The other providers could use interconnections to each 
other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique as an effective way to 
control the market. 
 
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 denied the other providers access to their own networks, the 
others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 
lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control the 
market inconsequential. 
 
The four providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential 
competitors entering, with LEC as a monopolist and the Public MAN as the only last mile 
system provider wielding the most power, and the Public MAN potentially using certain 
governmental enterprise advantages for such control. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 
100% 0% 0% 0% 
> 25% < 25% < 25% < 25% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares. 
 
The Public MAN has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
No. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
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How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
The Public MAN accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system.  LEC, CC, and 
ISP1 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN as the last hop in 
those routes. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct no.  The Public MAN uses its own last mile system to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to 
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for provision to 
the DEU. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for 
provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed 
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access, 
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is 
most likely an unfair model and cost for them. 
 
The Public MAN could opt out of competitive service provision in the local market, and 
act solely as a common provider in the last mile.  Thus no other local market provider would 
have to provide their own last mile system. 
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Part B. 
 
Test 16.2. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 16.2 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own systems and carriage services between the 
upstream provider to the local market.  The Public MAN provides its own system and carriage 
service to the DEU, but not to the upstream provider.  All of the providers are interconnected to 
each other, enabling a variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market 
providers, and the DEU. 
 
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the local market.  ISP2 also interconnects with 
the other local market providers. 
 
The DEU has chosen the Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile 
markets, but cannot choose LEC, CC, ISP1, or ISP2 without first accessing the Public MAN 
since there is no direct access to the others available. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The interconnection of provider routers 
in the local market enabled route sharing among them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Public MAN either once had a 
connection to the Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all 
providers.  However the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other 
providers’ abilities to enter the local market. 
 
The last mile market to the DEU is virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN has 
its own connection from the local market to the DEU.  LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 either once had 
their own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own.  However the 
construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically uncompetitive as the Public MAN 
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appears to be sanctioned natural utility, and other providers are therefore unlikely or unable to 
enter the market. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
The Public MAN provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and 
infrastructure and service to the DEU. 
 
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and 
can provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 are 
typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a non-
profit corporation.  ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public 
sector duplication and competition. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government 
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN 
could have certain unfair advantages over them. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the 
only last mile market provider. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market.  The provider could 
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to 
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers.  The 
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and 
other potential providers in the local market too. 
 
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied 
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if 
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market. 
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However if the Public MAN denied other providers access to its own network, it could 
also restrict last mile access to the DEU.  The other providers could use interconnections to each 
other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique as an effective way to 
control the market. 
 
If LEC, CC, ISP1, and/or ISP2 denied the other providers access to their own networks, 
the others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN.  LEC, CC, ISP1, 
and ISP2 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control 
the market inconsequential. 
 
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential 
competitors entering, with LEC as a monopolist and the Public MAN as the only last mile 
system provider wielding the most power, and the Public MAN potentially using certain 
governmental enterprise advantages for such control. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 ISP2 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
> 20% < 20% < 20% < 20% < 20% 
 
Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares. 
 
The Public MAN has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU. 
 
 
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding ISP2 affect 
the conditions governing each scenario? 
 
ISP2’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the 
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers. 
 
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make the Public MAN’s monopoly a little more 
difficult to maintain, and could further cut into LEC’s, CC’s, and ISP1’s already minor market 
shares.  Likewise the monopolist Public MAN and incumbent providers LEC, CC, and ISP1 
could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult. 
 
ISP2 does not enter the last mile market to the DEU, leaving the number of those 
providers at one.  That market’s competitiveness remains unaffected and still underserved due to 
its sole provider. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router? 
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No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
No. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
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How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
The Public MAN accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system.  LEC, CC, 
ISP1, and ISP2 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN as the 
last hop in those routes. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct no.  The Public MAN uses its own last mile system to the 
DEU for service provision. 
 
If LEC, CC, ISP1, and/or ISP2 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to 
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for provision to 
the DEU. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for 
provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed 
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access, 
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is 
most likely an unfair model and cost for them. 
 
The Public MAN could opt out of competitive service provision in the local market, and 
act solely as a common provider in the last mile.  Thus no other local market provider would 
have to provide their own last mile system. 
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Part C. 
 
Repeat Part B substituting Google Fiber for ISP2. 
 
Test 16.3. 
 
Describe what the model is trying to emulate. 
 
Model 16.3 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent 
providers.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own systems and carriage services between the 
upstream provider to the local market.  The Public MAN provides its own system and carriage 
service to the DEU, but not to the upstream provider.  All of the providers are interconnected to 
each other, enabling a variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market 
providers, and the DEU. 
 
Google then enters the local market as competitive ISP2, providing its own system and 
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU.  Google interconnects with the other 
local market providers, and also accesses the DEU. 
 
The DEU has an equal choice between the Public MAN and Google, and has chosen the 
Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose LEC, 
CC, or ISP1 without first accessing the Public MAN or Google since there is no direct access to 
the others available. 
 
 
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions. 
 
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully 
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned 
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.  The interconnection of provider routers 
in the local market enabled route sharing among them.  The network cable being disconnected 
between the Google and Downstream End User router thereby interrupting the route represented 
the End User having access to Google but not subscribing to them. 
 
 
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users. 
 
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1, and Google have their own 
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market.  The Public MAN either once had a 
connection to the Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one.  The Tier I ISP either once 
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there.  Other providers 
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market. 
 
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and Google are all 
providers.  The construct indicates LEC had a monopoly, whereby limiting other providers’ 
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abilities to enter the local market.  However Google’s entry into the local market eliminates 
LEC’s monopoly. 
 
The last mile market to the DEU was virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN had 
its own connection from the local market to the DEU.  However Google’s entry into the last 
market eliminates the Public MAN’s monopoly to the DEU.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 either once had 
their own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own.  The construct 
indicates the last mile market was theoretically uncompetitive as the Public MAN appeared to be 
the sanctioned natural utility, and other providers were therefore unlikely or unable to enter the 
market.  However Google’s entry into the last market eliminates the natural utility. 
 
 
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and 
service. 
 
The Public MAN and Google provide their own interconnections to the other providers, 
and infrastructures and services to the DEU. 
 
LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and can 
provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN and Google. 
 
 
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider. 
 
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.  LEC, CC, and ISP1 are 
typically for-profit corporations.  ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a non-
profit corporation. 
 
 
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets? 
 
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government 
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN 
could have certain unfair advantages over them. 
 
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the 
only last mile market provider. 
 
 
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or 
discriminate vs. other providers?  How? 
 
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market.  The provider could 
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to 
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers.  The 
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and 
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other potential providers in the local market too.  However Google’s entry into the local market 
eliminates LEC’s monopoly and could counter any governmental advantages the Public MAN 
may have.  Given Google’s corporate size and powers it could become a monopoly in the market 
if it so desired. 
 
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied 
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if 
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market. 
 
However if the Public MAN and Google denied other providers access to their own 
networks, they could also restrict last mile access to the DEU.  The other providers could use 
interconnections to each other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique 
as an effective way to control the market. 
 
If LEC, CC, ISP1, and/or ISP2 denied the other providers access to their own networks, 
the others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN.  LEC, CC, ISP1, 
and ISP2 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control 
the market inconsequential. 
 
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential 
competitors entering, with LEC as a monopolist and the Public MAN and Google as the only last 
mile system providers wielding the most power, and the Public MAN potentially using certain 
governmental enterprise advantages for such control. 
 
 
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have? 
 
The potential local market share range is: 
 
LEC CC MAN ISP1 Google 
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
The potential last mile market share range to the DEU is: 
 
MAN Google 
100% 0% 
0% 100% 
 
 
Does adding Google make the market in the models more competitive?  Does adding Google 
affect the conditions governing each scenario? 
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Google’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the 
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers. 
 
Google’s presence in the local market eliminates LEC’s monopoly, and could further cut 
into CC’s, the Public MAN’s, and/or ISP1’s already minor market shares.  Efforts by former 
monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC, Public MAN, and ISP1 to prevent Google from 
establishing a monopoly in the market if it so desired would be quite difficult for them. 
 
Google’s entry in the last mile market to the DEU increases the number of providers by 
100% making that market more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low 
number of total providers. 
 
 
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router? 
 
No. 
 
 
Do the connected units recognize each other? 
 
The Google and Downstream End User routers do not directly recognize each other not 
only because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned. 
 
 
What is the potential routing table? 
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How do the providers access downstream end users? 
 
The Public MAN and Google access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.  
LEC, CC, and ISP1 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN 
and Google as the last hops in those routes. 
 
 
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market?  Explain for each if 
necessary. 
 
According to the construct somewhat.  The Public MAN and Google use their own last 
mile systems to the DEU for service provision. 
 
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to 
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or Google’s systems 
for provision to the DEU. 
 
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would 
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or Google’s 
systems for provision to the DEU. 
 
 
Additional observations. 
 
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed 
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access, 
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is 
most likely an unfair model and cost for them. 
 
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch between the Public MAN and Google, 
or use both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers. 
 
The Public MAN could opt out of competitive service provision in the local market, and 
act solely as a common provider in the last mile.  Thus no other local market provider would 
have to provide their own last mile system. 
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Appendix D 
 
Model 1.1 Consultant Recommendations 
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Appendix E 
 
Models Only 
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Model 1.1 Base Topology. 
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Model 1.2 Test Topology. 
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Model 1.3 Test Topology. 
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Model 2.1 Base Topology. 
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Model 2.2 Test Topology. 
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Model 2.3 Test Topology. 
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Model 2.4 Test Topology. 
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Model 2.5 Test Topology. 
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Model 3.1 Base Topology. 
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Model 3.2 Test Topology. 
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Model 3.3 Test Topology. 
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Model 3.4 Test Topology. 
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Model 4.1 Base Topology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Upstream 
End User 
WS 
 
Upstream 
End User 
Router 
 
Dnstream 
End User 
Router 
 
Dnstream 
End User 
WS 
 
Tier I 
ISP 
 
 
CC 
 
 
ISP1 
 
 
LEC 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 716 
Model 4.2 Test Topology. 
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Model 4.3 Test Topology. 
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Model 4.4 Test Topology. 
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Model 4.5 Test Topology. 
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Model 5.1 Base Topology. 
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Model 5.2 Test Topology. 
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Model 5.3 Test Topology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Upstream 
End User 
WS 
 
Public 
MAN 
 
Upstream 
End User 
Router 
 
Dnstream 
End User 
Router 
 
Dnstream 
End User 
WS 
 
Tier I 
ISP 
 
 
ISP2 
EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION 723 
Model 6.1 Base Topology. 
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Model 6.2 Test Topology. 
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Model 6.3 Test Topology. 
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Model 6.4 Test Topology. 
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Model 6.5 Test Topology. 
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Model 6.6 Test Topology. 
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Model 7.1 Base Topology. 
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Model 7.2 Test Topology. 
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Model 7.3 Test Topology. 
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Model 7.4 Test Topology. 
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Model 8.1 Base Topology. 
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Model 8.2 Test Topology. 
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Model 8.3 Test Topology. 
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Model 8.4 Test Topology. 
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Model 8.5 Test Topology. 
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Model 8.6 Test Topology. 
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Model 9.1 Base Topology. 
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Model 9.2 Test Topology. 
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Model 10.1 Base Topology. 
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Model 10.2 Test Topology. 
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Model 10.3 Test Topology. 
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Model 11.1 Base Topology. 
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Model 11.2 Test Topology. 
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Model 11.3 Test Topology. 
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Model 12.1 Base Topology. 
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